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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to generate an understanding of antitrust and its evolution in the 
context of the globalising economy of the 20th and early 21st centuries. I do this by 
focusing on the role of economic ideas and more specifically, conceptual approaches to 
competition policy, in the international context. Existing legal and economic studies have 
mainly framed antitrust as the disciplinary tool regulating market competition according 
to criteria of efficiency and/or economic welfare. So far, few researchers have addressed 
the enforcement of policies - and specifically, of market competition regulations, without 
resorting to pure rational-choice or reflectivist arguments. This thesis aims to fill this gap 
by examining the ways in which abstract economic concepts and theories on the one 
hand and material interests on the other, by influencing political actors’ understanding of 
reality, have shaped the decision-making process behind specific antitrust policies and 
laws. My analysis develops on the basis of what I call a pan-institutional methodology, a 
synthesis of an institutional understanding of antitrust and sociological theories of 
isomorphism. Pan-institutionalism is employed here to examine the development of 
antitrust policies in the US, Europe and Japan during the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
the oil crises of the 1970s and the current recession. My study reveals that the corpus of 
ideas and institutions of antitrust of the 20th and early 21st century can be identified as 
Harvard, Chicago and Post-Chicago paradigms of competition policy. To a degree, these 
US-originated approaches have been internalised by Europe and Japan through formal 
and informal institutions, and adapted in light of major economic crises. At the same 
time however, the reliance of Europe and Japan on their traditional understanding of 
market practices has prevented a total harmonisation of their antitrust policies with the 
dominant American ones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the philosopher Immanuel Kant, ideas – or the ‘rose-coloured glasses of  
morality’ we are all wearing – are the tools we use to perceive and determine our 
understanding of  reality.1 However beholden to this view, this thesis does not seek to 
analyse Kant’s philosophical thought, nor does it attempt to understand why reality 
should be necessarily perceived as ‘rose’. Rather, it is aimed at investigating a much 
narrower topic: namely, the role ideas play in inspiring and sustaining the development of  
antitrust policies. 
The raison d’être of  this thesis has a twofold explanation. On the one hand, 
antitrust has been normally framed by legal or economic studies as a discipline designed 
to regulate market competition according to criteria of  efficiency and/or economic 
welfare. On the other hand, there are very few researchers who undertake to understand 
the enforcement of  market regulations without resorting to pure rational-choice 
arguments; in other words, the role of  the ideological framework in influencing policy- 
and rule-making is typically dismissed by many rational-choice theories as irrelevant and 
inconsistent. To be sure, many scholars of  different theoretical persuasion, such as 
Berger, Luckmann or Mead, have tried to better comprehend quite how ideas, in addition 
to economic interests or needs, might drive the institutionalisation of  specific 
regulations.2 However, these efforts have been challenged on two main fronts. First, it is 
not clear how ideas, and their effects over the social realm, are to be conceptualised. In 
John Campbell’s words, ‘many scholars agree that an analytic distinction should be drawn 
between ideas and interests as determinant of  policy, but what they mean by ideas has 
                                                        
1
 See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 2008, (1788) 
Forgotten Books. 
2
 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, 1984, 
University of California Press. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 1934, University of 
Chicago Press, 162. Peter  L., Berger  and Thomas Luckmann, The  Social  Construction  of  Reality, 
1967, New  York, Doubleday. 
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varied widely from broad notions of  culture, shared belief  systems and world views to 
specific strategies of  action and policy programs.’3 Secondly, it has not been empirically 
proven whether ideas can ever affect policy outcomes independently of  material 
interests.4 
In order to address those challenges, this thesis is going to contextualise the 
analysis of  ideas into a narrower framework. It will attempt to explain the extent to 
which abstract economic concepts and theories contribute to the political decision-
making behind particular antitrust policies and regulations. In other words, it will seek to 
trace the impact of economic theories on the institutionalisation of antitrust policies and 
laws. In particular, this research sets out to explore the paths through which such 
economic ideas as the ones constructed by the Harvard, Chicago and Post-Chicago 
Schools have determined not only the evolution and understanding of  US antitrust 
policy, but also the development of  European and Japanese competition regulations by 
altering collective perceptions of  reality and, therefore, of  interests. 
To illustrate the power of antitrust ideas in shaping the market and the political 
implications thereof, it is necessary to examine both the government institutions and the 
historical context behind every policy under analysis.5 On the one hand, the social actors 
governing the organisation of the state are indispensable to interpret ideas in a specific 
way and to convert them into defined institutions, thereby allowing for the perception of 
interests. On the other hand, the historical context plays a vital role in creating a sense of 
general uncertainty, which pushes individuals to intervene in reinterpreting the social 
                                                        
3
 John L. Campbell, ‘Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy’, 1998, 27 
Theory and Society 3, 377–409. 
4
 Margaret R. Somers, ‘What’s Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? 
Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept Formation’, 1995, 13 Sociological Theory 2, 113–144. 
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ’Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, in Svein 
Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism 
in Comparative Analysis, 1992, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1–32.  
5 Lawrence A. Sullivan and Wolfgang Fikentscher, ‘On the Growth of Antitrust Ideas’, 1998, 16 
Berkley Journal of International Law, 197–233. 
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realm, defining its problems and converting possible solutions into a restructured 
institutional framework. With that in mind, this thesis specifically analyses the 
instruments employed by Washington in constructing the institutional framework of 
antitrust in the context of three crises: the Great Depression, the 1970’s oil crises and the 
2008 credit crisis. 
Since the role of ideas cannot be restricted to a single national arena, this project 
will also investigate the possible influence of American antitrust principles on the 
evolution and development of European and Japanese competition policy after the 
above-mentioned downturns – and vice-versa. In doing so, this thesis will not only 
analyse the institutionalisation process of antitrust ideas, but will also focus on the 
process of internationalisation of said ideological framework. Here, Europe and Japan 
can be safely considered countries of reference as they represented, at the time in 
question, the most important American economic partners situated in the Pacific and 
Atlantic side. 
The three economic crises were primarily chosen on account of their timing; they 
have a time lag of 30-40 years between one and the other and can therefore offer a 
coherent historical framework for my theoretical hypothesis. The choice of economic 
and financial downturns per se, on the other hand, is due to their very nature. Indeed, they 
are particularly well placed to provide unique insights not only into the complex trends 
and processes that shaped previous market relations, but also into the contradictions 
within them, which, ex ante, were not readily noticeable. 
All economic downturns to date have been a great source of uncertainty and, as 
such, have often marked the end of specific models of antitrust and, broadly speaking, of 
capitalism. Nonetheless, they also constitute an interesting case of analysis in themselves. 
This is because overcoming these crises may require either a new set of ideas or such a 
reinterpretation of the same ideological principles that can inspire the reorganisation of 
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material practices and institutional arrangements according to principles of efficiency or 
welfare.  
This thesis, however, does not purport to study the role of crises in institutional 
change. On the contrary, it takes crises as the trigger events that paved the way to the 
latter-mentioned phenomenon. This allows to see institutional change as resulting not 
only from the crises themselves, but also from those political and economic factors that 
likely altered the perception of economic interests. Kovacic, for instance, interprets the 
evolution of antitrust policy as a pendulum that shifts from efficiency - to welfare-
oriented approaches. These fluctuations can result in different grades of overregulation 
or, on the other extreme, in a lack of state intervention and laissez faire.6  
This is particularly apparent when taking into consideration the above-mentioned 
crises and the several modifications applied to antitrust policies. In this frame, the 
progression of antitrust policies is understood to parallel the evolution of specific 
antitrust theoretical frameworks. Indeed, from one crisis to the next, theoretical biases 
have always been there to offer a determined set of solutions to the economic troubles of 
the time by calling for different levels of state interventionism.7 For instance, the current 
recession – the causes and developments of which will be followed, for the sake of 
analytical accuracy, until the year 2010 – has manifestly questioned the world neo-liberal 
economic order. It has argued that the US neo-liberal model of political economy is no 
longer effective and its institutional framework has to be adapted to new social 
exigencies. Although a number of Chicago economists maintain that the neo-liberal 
model is still largely efficient, increasingly there are calls for change. They point to the 
                                                        
6
  William E. Kovacic, ‘Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement’, 2009, 5 Competition Policy International 1, 129–150. William E. Kovacic and Carl 
Shapiro, ‘Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking’, 2009, Competition Policy 
Centre Working Paper CPC99-09, UC Berkeley, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5zb4g387. William E. 
Kovacic, ‘Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms’, 2003, 71 Antitrust Law 
Journal 2, 377–478. 
7
  John J. Flynn, ‘Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals 
of Antitrust Policy: Introduction’, 1977, 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 6, 1182–1190. 
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prevailing new theoretical orientations that support a much wider state interventionism 
over the market in order to promote more general social welfare. Alternatively, they may 
also aim at the replacement of the old key practitioners who work in the high echelons of 
bureaucracy. In that event, the process will probably generate a new interpretation of the 
same neo-liberal ideas without necessarily challenging the core laissez faire principles of 
the current economic orientation8.   
It is probably too early to analyse any kind of change in the current crisis. Yet, 
following Kovacic’s ideas, it may be suggested that antitrust reforms should be oriented 
towards the support and the implementation of stricter regulations of the market in 
order to redress the unintended consequences of neo-liberal policies.9 However, states, in 
the face of globalisation, have been disempowered of their traditional generic function of 
promoters of the public interest and social justice.10 Hence, considering the remarkable 
international expansion of corporations and the erosion of power and legitimacy at the 
national level, it appears impractical to envision any kind of strict state intervention or 
Neo-Keynesian policy11. 
 Even though it is problematic to make any prediction as to how the current 
recession will be overcome, it is clear that such precedents as the Great Depression and 
the 1970s oil crises have caused radical changes in the application of antitrust policies. 
Here, by calling for more or less state interventionism, economic ideas have influenced 
political actors in enforcing specific antitrust institutions in line with broader political 
economic plans. For instance, the Great Depression was overcome through the 
                                                        
8
 See Henk Overbeek and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, (eds.), Neoliberalism in Crisis, 2012, International 
Political Economy Series, London, Palgrave Macmillan. 
9
  See Karl Polanyi, The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time, 1957, 
(1944), Boston: Beacon. 
10
  Philip G. Cemy and Mark Evans, ‘New Labour, Globalization, and the Competition State’, 2000, 
Center for European Studies Working Paper Series, 70, Harvard University. 
http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/evans.pdf. Martin Wolf, ‘Will nation-state 
survive globalization?’, 2001, 80 Foreign Affairs 1, 178–190. 
11
 Stephanie Farmer and Sean Noan,‘Post-Neoliberalism or Deepened Neoliberalism? The Chicago 
Public Transportation Service and Elite Response during the Great Stagnation’, 2011, 10 Perspectives 
on Global Development & Technology 1, 73–84. 
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application of Keynesian macro-economic policies, the Fordism production system and 
the Harvard antitrust model. The overall outcome resulted in a major national 
involvement in the economy in support of general welfare. On the contrary, the oil crises 
registered the implementation of a monetarist approach that, in line with the antitrust 
theoretical framework developed by the Chicago School, maintained a bold laissez faire.  
Therefore, the aim of  my research is to analyse the process of  antitrust 
institutionalisation, or, more precisely, to find out how various antitrust theoretical 
frameworks have influenced the socio-political realm, and the way social and political 
actors perceive economic interests. Put differently, this thesis aims to provide a 
conceptual and historical understanding of  antirust and its evolution in the globalising 
economy.  
Traditionally, every human action or economic transaction has been interpreted 
as an attempt to reach a final purpose or to achieve a significant profit. It follows that 
every political accomplishment or market regulation should accordingly promote specific 
outcomes, such as efficiency or social welfare. Proceeding from this general premise, 
many economists and political scholars have been analysing antitrust institutions only in 
function of the particular purpose they were meant to serve, be it economic efficiency, 
profits, welfare, market power, or the like.  
While the role of personal returns in the analysis of competition regulations 
cannot be undermined, a deeper investigation of social and economic transactions may 
demand more analysis not of interests per se, but of aspects that go beyond the practical 
but reductive characterisation of persons, organisations or governments as just interest 
seekers. For instance, such aspects as culture, faith, and other beliefs play a fundamental 
role in shaping what is conceived as a utility and, consequently, what is considered to be 
competitive or not. While actors may tend to operate rationally in order to achieve 
results, their cultural environment constantly modifies the collective perception of reality. 
12 
 
Against this conceptual background, this thesis aims to demonstrate that, while antitrust 
regulations and policies have been implemented in order to face specific market issues 
before or after the above-mentioned crises, the perception of possible solutions resulted 
from the projection of the ideas and the cultural framework of each historical period into 
the social realm. In other words, if it is generally correct to assume that governments 
design regulations in order to pursue specific objectives, however, it is also necessary to 
consider that every environment is likely to modify the social perception of needs. 
Indeed, while both economic efficiency and social welfare have traditionally been the 
object of antitrust enforcement, their meaning and relevance have varied according to 
the historical period analysed, the interpretation attributed thereto, and the theoretical 
framework of reference.  
This approach promises to be rather innovative, as there are few studies that take 
into consideration the evolution of the meaning of antitrust policy, rather than just its legal 
content or the effect on the market. Among the most relevant contributors to this 
discussion is Marc Allen Eisner, who attempted to provide an interpretation of antitrust 
institutions by studying the development of American competition policy up until 
Reagan’s economic revolution.12 Equally noteworthy is the work of Freyer who 
admirably traced the historical improvement of antitrust and competition regulations 
from the 1930s to the late 1990s in the US, Europe, Japan and Australia.13 Recently, 
Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger have published a book entitled "The Politics of 
European Competition Regulation”,14 which examines the spread of neo-liberalism 
across Europe as well as the current European response to the crisis in the fields of state 
aid, cartel prosecution and merger control.  
                                                        
12
 Marc Allen Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics: Institutions, Expertise & Policy 
Change, 1991, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press. 
13
 Tony Alan Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism, 2006, Cambridge University Press. 
14
 Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger, The Politics of European Competition Regulation, 2011, 
London and New York, Routledge. 
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In the absence of  any substantive analysis of  antitrust institutionalisation from 
the particular political economic perspective hitherto described, this research sets out to 
fill this gap in the literature by applying what I call a pan-institutional methodology, a 
synthesis of  an institutional understanding of  antitrust and sociological theories of  
isomorphism. The thesis explores institutionalism from a political, sociological and 
economic point of  view. Among the several institutional scholars, Douglass North 
appears to be the one providing the most useful definition to explain the above-
mentioned process. First of  all North solved the dichotomies dividing institutional 
economics. In fact, while old institutionalists, such as Veblen and Commons, believed 
that institutions could control individuals; new institutionalists, on the contrary, theorise 
the power of  each individual’s rationality to shape the institutional environment in 
conformity to his interests.15 Instead, according to North, institutions are ‘humanly 
devised constraints’ that rule a society by shaping human interactions and the way those 
interactions have to evolve.16 However, by simply acting, the individual can change the 
institutional framework itself  according to his necessities. Indeed, while institutions are 
the rules of  the game, organisations and their actors shape the institutional environment 
or the ‘fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that govern economic and 
political activities’.17 In other words, North maintains that institutions are the product of  
models used by actors to interpret the world around them. By not disposing of  all the 
necessary information, human beings cannot acquire a perfect knowledge and elaborate 
it, thus it is clear that those models and the institutions that derive from them cannot be 
                                                        
15
 Thorstein Veblen, The instinct of workmanship : and the state of industrial arts, 1964, New York: B. 
W. Huebsch. John R. Commons, Institutional Economics: Its place in Political Economy, 2005, 
Transaction Publishers, 58. 
16
 Douglass C. North, ‘Economic Performances through time’, June 1994, 84 The American Economic 
Review 3, 359-368, 360, Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 3. 
17
 Douglass C. North, ‘Institutional Change and American Economic Growth: A First Step towards a 
Theory of Institutional Innovation’, March 1970, 30 The Journal of Economic History 1, 131-149. 
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perfect, but they can perfectly represent the structural culture, knowledge and ideas that 
characterised a particular society.18 Although scholars have not paid much attention to 
study the process through which ideas affect policy-making, North has also the merit to 
introduce those variables in the institutional analysis.19 Hence, I found that North’s 
interpretation of the role of organisations and actors in the institutionalisation process 
could be linked to the sociological theories of isomorphism on policy diffusion. In fact, 
although the two approaches start from different theoretical basis they both outline the 
role of ideas in shaping institutional frameworks. However, in North’s prospective 
human actors use their knowledge, culture or ideas to institutionalise what are believed to 
be efficient regulations. From a general sociological point of view, instead, ideas directly 
shape individuals.  Hence, Goldstein and Keohane, by outlining the role of ideas and 
interests in shaping human actions can be the bridge between the two above-mentioned 
different interpretations.20 Indeed, they maintain the importance of interests in 
determining and leading human actions and so the institutionalisation of efficient rules. 
However, they also argue that what is efficient or not is determined by the mental 
models or the set of ideas that influence a society. This set of ideas, believes and tradition 
is what I here define as general culture or, in the words of Geertz, the “webs of  
significance that individual themselves have spun”.21 
The link between ideas and interests underlined by Goldetsain and Koehane allows me 
to use Douglas North definition of institutions, while analysing the power of ideas in the 
policy diffusion process that invested Europe and Japan. Indeed, although isomorphism 
                                                        
18
 Douglass C. North, ‘Institutional Change and American Economic Growth: A First Step towards a 
Theory of Institutional Innovation’, March 1970, 30 The Journal of Economic History 1, 131-149. 
Douglass C. North,‘Institutional Change: A framework of Analysis’ in Sven-Erik Sjostrand (ed.) 
Institutional Change: Theory and Empirical findings, 1993, Studies in Socio-Economics, M.E. Sharpe, 
Chapter 2. 
19
 John L. Campbell, ‘Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy’, 2002, 28 Annual Review of Sociology, 21-38. 
20
 Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change, 1993, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
21
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, Selected Essays, 1973, Basic Books, INC. Publishers. 
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explain how the EU and Japan where influenced by American ideas, the 
institutionalisation process à la North, permits me to understand why their general 
competition policies are different form the US one. Their peculiarities, in fact, are 
attributable both to contingent economic needs and to the influence of local cultures in 
defining what had to be considered efficient or not. In this sense, both exogenous and 
endogenous factors influenced the institutionalisation of specific rules. Moreover, in the 
case of Europe and Japan, the internalisation of US antitrust approaches within 
traditional market understanding produced a set of policies and regulations, which 
changed the way competition had to be understood and safeguarded in coordination 
with US interests. Indeed, although the literature on varieties of capitalism suggests that 
all states tend to develop a form of capitalism that conforms to their cultural, social, 
political and economic necessities. By contrast, I first argue that the US has coercively 
implanted an antitrust frame of reference in Europe and Japan and I define the process 
that came to influence competition policy in the above-mentioned countries a coercive 
isomorphic one. In this sense, the US is understood to have favoured the development 
of the European and Japanese models of capitalism – insofar as a European model of 
capitalism can be identified at all – along a well-defined track, such that it would not 
damage US commercial interests or the free-market agenda. Secondly, I maintain that, to 
some extent, Europe and Japan have voluntarily implemented antitrust policies inspired 
to US-based ideas and institutions for mimetic, normative and competitive reasons. 
Moreover, I proceed to argue that, while Europe and Japan took inspiration from the 
US, the latter never looked at their competition practices and generally gave European 
and Japanese ideas a wide berth. The absence of a reciprocal exchange in matters of 
antitrust practices is probably due to the older and more business-oriented US antitrust 
tradition. Furthermore, the creation of international organisations able to spread US-
16 
 
based ideas at a global level allowed Washington to maintain legitimacy as the antitrust 
champion.  
In order to address the research agenda set out above, my thesis focuses on the 
following questions:  
• How was the antitrust institutionalisation process formalised in different 
political-economic contexts?  
• To what extent has the implementation (internalisation) of  antitrust in Europe 
and Japan been inspired by American ideas?    
• Why could the US influence global antitrust policies, and yet not be influenced by 
the competition disciplines applied by the rest of  the world? 
 
The argument of  the thesis infolds through the following steps:    
• Antitrust institutions normally pursue efficiency and welfare. Both ideas 
and interests play a fundamental role in shaping the institutions of  
antitrust. 
• The ways in which welfare and efficiency are interpreted depend on legal, 
cultural and theoretical frames of  reference, as well as on contingent 
interests in the countries in question.  
• The notion of  isomorphism, or institutional emulation, can help us 
examine the way the US has been able to influence other countries’ 
understanding of  competition and antitrust regulation.  
• While many national antitrust laws gravitate towards their American 
origins, persistent variations in legal norms, ideological frameworks, and 
national economic cultures prevent the complete harmonisation of  
antitrust regulations, even in the age of  globalisation.  
17 
 
• The Americanisation of  antirust and institutional isomorphism in Europe 
and Japan shaped a path-dependent pattern of  competition policy in these 
countries.  
  
With this research agenda, the thesis is organised in two main parts. Part I provides a 
theoretical overview of antitrust and introduces methodological pathways for 
understanding the way ideas and interests have influenced the development of US 
antitrust policies over the course of history and determined what was to be considered 
economically efficient and welfare maximising. Additionally, it also seeks to explain how 
those ideological frameworks have shaped the evolution of competition policies in 
Europe and Japan. This part of the thesis identifies three broad paradigms that have 
encapsulated the ideas, interests and institutions of antitrust in the US during three 
distinct periods of the 20th century, as the Chicago, Harvard and post-Chicago 
approaches to antitrust.  
Within this framework, the chapters are organised in an order that will allow the 
reader to acknowledge first the meaning of competitiveness, antitrust and competition 
policy, as well as the main theoretical approach I have adopted to explain the evolution 
of antitrust policies, and subsequently the process that led to the institutionalisation of 
antitrust in the US. The documents used in the last two analytical chapters are primary 
and secondary sources. These include, for instance, a few US Presidents’ speeches used 
to further validate the relevance of the sort of antitrust evolution here hypothesised. 
Indeed, they are normally very specific statements concerning market-wide antitrust 
reforms. 
In Part II, the thesis draws on historical data to illustrate the evolution of 
antitrust and competition policy during economic and financial crises. This part of the 
thesis traces the evolution of the three main paradigms of antitrust in different national 
18 
 
(Europe and Japan) and international contexts. Specifically, the first three chapters 
describe the process of antitrust emulation and internalisation in Europe and Japan. The 
last chapter concludes the thesis with a comprehensive overview of the general dynamics 
behind the process of antitrust institutionalisation in the US, Europe and Japan and the 
global arena. 
Specifically, the first chapter in Part I introduces and explains the concepts of 
competition and antitrust policy in relation to the interests they are supposed to serve, 
namely, efficiency and welfare. It then proceeds to discuss which theoretical approach is 
best suited to the study of antitrust and its development. Most research on antitrust is 
conducted from an economic or juridical point of view and normally through the 
economic discourses of efficiency and welfare analysis. There are few studies that 
underline the political nature of competition policy, because the methodologies of most 
political analysis are generally not as precise. Hence, this thesis adopts a political-
economy approach to emphasise the very political aspects of competition policy while 
relying on the scientific accuracy of economic analysis to describe the consequences of 
each antitrust decision. 
To date, International Political Economy (IPE) is generally thought of as falling 
under any one of the classical, liberal or Marxist approaches. However, these schools are 
unable to provide an inclusive enough answer to contain and interconnect all the 
different economic and political issues raised by my research question.22 Indeed, the aim 
of this research is to understand antitrust regulations as a product of specific theoretical 
frameworks and of the interpretation policy-makers make of them in response to 
contingent necessities. Consequently, among the different IPE schools of thought, this 
                                                        
22
 Ronen Palan, ‘New Trends in Global Political Economy’, in Ronen Palan (ed.) Global Political 
Economy: Contemporary Theories, 2000, London and New York, Routledge, 1–18, 3. John 
Groenewegen, Frans Kerstholta and Ad Nagelkerke, ‘On Integrating New and Old Institutionalism: 
Douglass North Building Bridges’, 1995, xxix Journal of Economic Issues, 2, 467–475. 
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thesis adopts an institutional approach and it considers antitrust laws and policies as the 
institutionalisation of theoretical or ideological frameworks.  
The chapter proceeds to introduce a working definition of institutions by taking 
into consideration three theoretical perspectives provided by the political, sociological 
and economic disciplines. Indeed, institutions can generally be identified in different 
ways: from a political point of view they comprise a normative essence, which shapes the 
behaviours of society. From a sociological angle, they have a cognitive nature and 
therefore depend upon the socio-cultural dimension. Finally, from a strictly economic 
perspective, they can be identified as the laws and the formal or informal conventions 
and agreements that lead or direct economic performances. According to this approach, 
national regulations vary between states as each country develops its own ideological 
framework and academic theoretical structure, which in turn influences the 
institutionalisation of rules. In this view, the economic definition seems particularly well 
suited to the purpose of my research. Indeed, it defines antitrust institutions as the set of 
competition regulations and policies that, inspired by theoretical frameworks, can shape 
economic performances and respond to the main market interests of each historical 
period. 
Having defined antitrust as an institution, the second chapter conceptualises the 
evolution of antitrust within the context of the varieties-of-capitalism theories. Indeed, 
according to Hall and Soskice, a ‘nation with a particular kind of coordination in one 
sphere of the economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres 
as well.’23 The rationale of this chapter is to provide a basic understanding of the extent 
to which perceptions on how competition should be regulated diverge across the US, 
Europe and Japan and how those differences are embodied into their model of 
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capitalism. It points out that the different interpretations of competition and capitalism 
can be traced to the different cultures – and corresponding theoretical frameworks – 
across the US, Europe and Japan. In this vein, it goes on to describe the main ideas and 
schools of thought in these countries in order to show how the perception of 
competition differed between them. In essence, this chapter provides the instruments to 
understand why competition can be defined as a product of the cultural environment of 
a given social realm and how, in turn, it can influence society itself.  
Laying aside any hope of antitrust harmonisation, the third chapter describes the 
process of antitrust institutionalisation by taking into consideration the genesis of ideas 
and how this substratum is converted into institutional change. Next, it explores the 
process of internationalisation of antitrust ideas in order to understand, from a 
theoretical point of view, whether – and, if so, how – Europe and Japan came to adopt 
similar antitrust conceptions after the three crises here considered, even though their 
traditional model of capitalism was rather different from that of the US. Was it because 
of economic efficiency or was it because those antitrust ideas were so powerful that they 
could convince those countries to adopt them? If so, what is this power? How can it be 
identified? This chapter is going to address those questions. 
The fourth chapter provides the historical examples necessary to support the 
previous theoretical observations. Specifically, the development of US antitrust 
regulations is analysed chronologically by examining speeches and other primary sources 
in order to provide a better understanding of the cultural substratum influencing political 
actors and their decisions. The chapter describes the processes that characterised 
American antitrust institutionalisation during the Great Depression, the 1970s oil crises 
and the current credit crisis. It aims to describe the procedures through which specific 
economic theories influenced social reality and how, at the same time, precise economic 
interests led to the triumph of particular ways of thinking. In other words, it attempts to 
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show that ideas were as fundamental as interests in the process of US antitrust 
institutionalisation. In particular, starting from the Roosevelt administration, this chapter 
analyses Washington’s national implementation of antitrust policies through the National 
Recovery Act (NRA) plans and the final adoption of Harvard-oriented competition 
polices by Thurman Arnold. Subsequently, it investigates the two oil crises of the 1970s 
by focusing on the antitrust policies implemented by Nixon, Ford, Carter and, finally, 
Reagan. After explaining what led to the triumph of Chicago theories over the US 
antitrust culture, the chapter attempts to analyse US antitrust policies during the current 
crisis. Here, the chapter overviews Bush’s and Obama’s antitrust policies to try to 
investigate the possible institutionalisation of a Post-Chicago antitrust approach. This 
would no doubt confirm the hypothesis advanced by Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn, 
among others, whereby the current downturn, far from spelling the end of neo-
liberalism, has created the conditions for the development of a new sort of neo-liberal 
system, such as the one theorised by the Post-Chicago antitrust school of thought.24 
 Having analysed the process through which ideas are institutionalised, the first 
chapter in Part II investigates the antitrust internalisation processes that characterised 
Europe and Japan during the three crises under analysis through the sociological concept 
of isomorphism. The aim of chapter is to highlight the impossibility of pinpointing a 
single isomorphic explanation as the main cause of every antitrust institutional change 
that occurred in those two regions. Starting from the Great Depression, this section 
analyses the European Coal and Steel Community’s antitrust institutionalisation and it 
explains why this process has to be considered as led mainly by mimetic and coercive 
reasons. The analysis that follows is specifically focused on the cases of Germany and 
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Japan and it concludes that Harvard antitrust institutionalisation was unquestionably 
forced into those countries.  
The second section in the chapter turns to the processes of competitive and 
normative emulation that characterised Europe after the end of the oil crises. Based on 
my analysis, those processes were the factors that led Europe to convert its antitrust 
institutions into neo-liberal ones. As for Japan, it is argued the adoption of the SII’s 
agreement was again led primarily by force. However, competitive factors will be also 
mentioned as being partially responsible for the Japanese switch to a more neo-liberal 
system. The final part, pertaining to the current downturn, will be limited to an analysis 
of the current antitrust institutions enforced in Europe and Japan and to a brief 
examination of their main political trends. It would seem premature, and somewhat 
pretentious, to undertake an analysis of the possible antitrust trends in those countries at 
this point in time. 
The final chapter within Part I aims to conclude the thesis with a sort of chiastic 
structure. It firstly conducts an historical analysis of the processes that allowed the US to 
influence the antitrust perceptions at the global level. It is argued that, through the 
creation of international organisations, the US allowed the development of a path-
dependent process that supported the legitimacy of its antitrust ideas in the international 
arena. With that in mind, the chapter then provides a conclusive analysis of the relation 
between interests and ideas. It explains the power of ideologies and why the US antitrust 
models triumphed over other countries’ traditional practices, without being reciprocally 
influenced by them. The chapter also underlines the different characteristics of each 
isomorphic process and it emphasises how each of those models is dependent on the 
others. Firstly, by taking into account coercive isomorphism, it explains why political 
conceptualisations of power, such as in the Gramscian concept of hegemony, can only 
partially explain the triumph of US-based ideas over the international arena. For instance, 
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the Gramscian theoretical school, while linking ideological predominance to material 
strength, does not properly investigate the power of ideas per se and shows a limited 
appreciation of the role of interests25. Secondly, it claims that competition, understood as 
an isomorphic mechanism, can hardly completely explain why states adopt specific 
institutions, because it fails to demonstrate how individuals and governments can be 
considered rational actors. The theory of mimetic and normative processes, advanced 
and developed mostly by the sociological school, offers an interesting insight into how 
imitation and cultural sharing can influence the perceptions of material interests. 
However, without a proper discussion of the role of strength and competition in 
motivating human actions, this approach cannot provide an adequate explanation of the 
above-mentioned isomorphic processes.  
The chapter concludes by outlining why the sociological theory of  isomorphism 
is better suited to explain the power of  the US ideological substratum, through the study 
of  the normative, mimetic, competitive and coercive reasons underpinning every 
institutional process of  influence. However, it also maintains that, differently from what 
is held by DiMaggio and Powell, all four factors play an equal role in the process.26 The 
latter approach, leaving aside pure power-dynamics explanations of  political decisions 
and pure rational-choice interpretations of  economic strategies, allows to better analyse 
interests as the engines of  both ideas and government decisions. The conclusion, then, 
defines the influence of  antitrust ideas and the process of  antitrust institutional change 
by filtering the empirical findings through this theoretical framework. 
The assumptions upon which this research is based revolve around the fact that 
the interests pursued by antitrust initiatives are economic efficiency and welfare and that 
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the meaning of  antitrust lies in the satisfaction of  those two socio-economic needs. Still, 
the interpretation of  these interests varies between countries according to the model of  
capitalism implemented in loco. Those differences can however be attributed to the 
cultural and theoretical framework that dominates the political economic stance of  every 
country. Therefore, theoretical conceptualisations – or ideas – have the power to change 
the perception of  antitrust interests, but, at the same time, they are influenced by the 
need of  individuals to meet those specific needs. Yet, the purpose of  ideas is to inspire 
governments and social actors to enforce specific institutions so as to allow the provision 
of  contingent social necessities. It remains, however, that every country has its own way 
of  understanding and perceiving interests, which is embodied in the set of  institutions 
underpinning its own model of  capitalism. 
The analysis of this thesis unfolds in two key stages. First, I explain how and why 
certain ideas about market and competition have matured into three distinct paradigms 
of antitrust and competition policy. These paradigms are defined here as the Harvard 
(1930-1960), Chicago (1960-1990) and Post-Chicago (1990-2000) traditions of antitrust. 
Second, through historical analysis, I trace the set of processes by which each of these 
US-centred paradigms has been internalised in national political-economies of Europe 
and Japan, and the processes which have shaped the fate of the three paradigms in the 
international regulatory realm.   
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PART I 
CHAPTER 1 
 PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST 
 
According to Harvey, ‘Competition is one of those vague terms which are freely used in 
all discussion of social subjects; it conveys some meaning to all who utter or hear it; but 
this meaning as a rule is undefined and therefore inconstant; the word has different 
suggestions for different people’.27 Proceeding from Harvey’s definition, this chapter 
attempts to understand why antitrust policies can be perceived in different ways and how 
ideas can influence their evolution. Scholars such as Dabbah or Amato maintain that, 
when examining antitrust policy, it is essential to regard ideas, culture, political ideologies, 
or economic theories as the basis of what inspires politicians to enact or re-interpret 
different competition and antitrust laws.28 
Therefore, in order to explain how ideas have been able to modify political 
actors’ perceptions of antitrust or competition regulations over the course of history, we 
need to clarify the essence of competition as well as its general connotations. The 
notions of antitrust, competition policy and competitiveness are all semantically eclectic. 
They do not only refer to a condition of rivalry in the market; they are also considered 
natural promoters of economic efficiency and welfare. Thus, this chapter will first seek to 
achieve a broader understanding of those main concepts, forming as they do the 
backbone of this research.  
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Secondly, the chapter will offer a theoretical framework to explain how ideas 
influenced the evolution of antitrust policies. Indeed, competition policy can be 
interpreted as an attempt to translate into reality economic principles and ideas that aim 
at reaching not only economic efficiency, but also social welfare and other political-
economic objectives to do with fairness, democracy and freedom in the market. While 
legal, economic, or political analyses provide different interpretations of the subject, they 
all confine their investigation to the extent to which policies or regulations are 
implemented in order to satisfy specific social, economic, or political needs. In other 
words, they consider competition policy only as the outcome of specific material 
interests. By contrast, an institutional-IPE interpretation that takes into consideration the 
role of ideas provides an adequate theoretical perspective to frame the analysis of the 
above-mentioned economic concepts and antitrust policies from a more ontological 
angle. This will build upon the ideas of Douglas North who, among the many 
institutional-IPE scholars, provides the most valuable insights into how to frame a 
different understanding of the evolution of antitrust. From this perspective, it will be 
possible to argue that, while the meaning of competition is rivalry and its objective 
should be efficiency and welfare, the way regulators and politicians perceive those 
economic concepts changes according to the body of ideas that influences them.  
In conclusion, the aim of this chapter is not only to define competition as a 
condition in the market but also as a political and regulatory framework of conduct, 
whose meaning, in turn, is also determined by the relevance of ideas in the political 
decision-making process. 
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UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT 
 
The notion of competition, or market competition, dates back to the ancient world; the 
very term originates from the Latin word competitio, meaning rivalry. This ‘rivalry’ 
normally refers to the ways in which firms play in the market in order to achieve a 
particular business objective. Additionally, it can also be perceived as part of an 
individual’s free will to use his or her property in any way that does not affect others’ 
property rights.29   
Competition policy – or antitrust – can be defined as the political and regulatory 
framework that dictates the rules of conduct in the market. While most countries refer to 
the discipline that controls economic rivalry as ‘competition law’, the US uses the term 
‘antitrust’ instead. The American peculiarity is due to the different evolution of the 
meaning of the word ‘trust’ in the US. Originally denoting a common law arrangement 
whereby a property could be managed by one person or organisation for the benefit of 
another, the word changed meaning when, from the second half of the nineteenth 
century, ‘trust’ started to be associated with concentrations of economic power. Indeed, 
from the mid-1800s the US faced a time of great economic and social transformations 
that created opportunities for companies to expand and abuse their economic freedom in 
order to maximise their private interests30. Because many corporations began to create 
cartels and to name them ‘trusts’ to conceal the nature of their business, the American 
response against the formations of this kind of economic arrangements came to be 
referred to as antitrust law and policy.31 
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Although competition policy has a broader meaning than antitrust policy – as it 
may include intellectual property law, subsidies and antidumping law – in most cases the 
terms can be used synonymously.32 They both aim to foster competitive market 
conditions with a view to enhancing economic freedom, improving rivalry among 
competitors, maximising consumer welfare, promoting growth, and providing economic 
stability and social prosperity.33  
Competition policies generally institute an overall code of conduct that all 
business actors are required to observe; however, the need to limit such practices as 
mergers,34 cartels35 and monopolisations36 implies that additional regulations are 
indispensable.37 This is because laws can establish special rules of behaviour in economic 
sectors where firms are not expected to operate in the respect of competitiveness.38 It 
follows that, while the objective of competition should be efficiency and welfare, any 
antitrust regulatory framework ought to include provisions against business practises 
with high social costs in terms of loss of economic efficiency and/or social welfare.39 Yet, 
competition law could restrict individual market freedom when actors perform in a way 
that might produce negative economic externalities for the society as a whole.  
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In this perspective, antitrust regulation should not be understood as the antithesis 
of economic freedom, but as its ally: competition law, in fact, should allow industries to 
be free to invest and operate in the market without hindrance and it should avoid the 
negative externalities produced by unfair agreements and anticompetitive practices.40 
Competition regulations act as a sort of channel that contains, but does not stop or 
restrict, the flow of business activities in the market. On the contrary, its mission is to 
maximise efficiency not only of production but also of consumption, according to the 
necessities of the market. Indeed, the peculiarity of competition law lies in the fact that 
while economics is generally concerned with reaching efficiency at lower costs, antitrust 
is also concerned with competition and its effect on the markets. In other words, 
efficiency is as much an objective of antitrust as are equity or a fairer distribution of 
economic opportunities.41 That is the reason why competition policy is a fundamental 
tool in the hands of the regulator to maintain a specific kind of social order.  
 
The Meanings of  Competition Policy 
Having defined competition not only as a way to support preserve economic rivalry but 
also as a guarantee of both economic efficiency and welfare, or fairness, I believe it is 
necessary to briefly define these two concepts.  
Generally speaking, economic efficiency and welfare are strictly connected. 
Efficiency is the outcome of the competitive pressure that pushes companies to perform 
to the best of their capacity. This results in the production of goods marketed at prices 
that are in Paretian equilibrium and equal to both the marginal profits from the buyer 
side and marginal cost from the seller side. In the long term, therefore, economic 
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efficiency can enhance consumer welfare because it allows products to be sold at a price 
that maximises consumer profits. Moreover, this condition should be long-lasting 
because market actors, in conditions of perfect economic equilibrium, have no incentives 
to change their performances unless an external element modifies their status. In other 
words, under the principles of unconstrained economics, the market should move 
automatically toward this efficient and fair balance – and maintain it.42 
On the other hand, welfare is defined as the sum of consumer and producer 
surpluses and, in economics, it is an important indicator of whether an action is 
economically optimal for society or not43. According to Massimo Motta, consumer 
surplus is, in fact, given by the difference between the value attributed to a product by 
consumers and the price it is purchased for. In contrast, producer welfare results from 
the profit producers register upon selling goods or rendering services. Hence, rising 
commodity prices reduce consumer welfare while increasing producer welfare. However, 
the reduction of consumer benefits is never inversely proportionate to producer benefits, 
once these are enjoyed. Briefly put, higher prices cause customers to lose more than what 
manufacturers gain.  
Producers can normally play with prices if they have market power or, in other 
words, if they are able to choose their own prices without taking competitors into 
account. This favourable condition can allow a big company to become a monopoly and 
sell the same good for a higher price. Yet, firms, in the absence of any rivals or in case 
they enjoy a dominant position or sell an exclusive product (one that is non-substitutable 
with any other), may also decide to sell goods at a price that is below their marginal costs. 
Not only would this practice deter other companies from entering the market, but it 
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would also make it impossible for them to survive the competition. Admittedly, firms 
only have some degree of price setting freedom and cannot generally exert absolute 
market power. However, when markets are characterised by price inefficiencies, the 
regulator should intervene and make sure that competition is respected by avoiding the 
rise of restrictive business practices.44 The abuse of market power by firms is typically 
cited as the reason why competition law should prosecute those anti-competitive 
behaviours that raise the possibility of unfair prices and reduce general social welfare.45 
Nevertheless, apart from controlling market trends, competition policy ought to enhance 
welfare by fostering economic freedom, rather than blocking it. The protection of 
economic freedom can translate either in laissez-faire policies or in the defence of those 
smaller firms that have fewer possibilities to invest in the market. The latter practice does 
not necessarily imply recourse to protectionist measures. On the contrary, it may ensure 
the possibility for everyone to be active in the market and not to be limited by the power 
exerted by big corporations. However, as it will be discussed in the following chapters, 
both the power and the extent to which antitrust law should or should not intervene in 
the market depend on how welfare is conceptualised in each country. This varies 
according to the interests perceived by a state, its local culture, and the predominant 
ideas of the time. Indeed, Robbins maintains that defining welfare as the sum of 
consumer and producer surpluses per se is not very precise because it does not allow for a 
distinction between the benefits produced by material and immaterial goods. For 
instance, some professions, such as doctors and teachers, create a kind of wealth that is 
not quantifiable and cannot be quantitatively measured. On the contrary, there are 
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material products, such as drugs, alcohol or cigarettes, which may enhance economic 
gains but reduce social benefits, rather than fostering them.46 Against this background, it 
is very difficult to provide a precise and consistent definition of welfare, since it is not 
easy to identify social utilities and negative externalities. The impossibility to even 
quantify social benefits or general efficiency partly explains why the ways in which 
economic interests are pursued vary according to the country taken into consideration, 
especially its culture, believes and the resulting theoretical framework of reference. These 
factors make a compelling case for a deeper investigation into the different ways of 
studying and understanding antitrust. 
 
How to analyse antitrust 
As previously pointed out, competition can be defined both as a condition in the market 
and a political and regulatory framework of conduct, whose meaning, in turn, is 
determined by the relevance of the interpretation of such economic concepts as welfare, 
efficiency or fairness in the political decision-making process.47 Traditionally, both the 
judicial and the economic approach developed in the courtrooms and in academia have 
always been fruitful in defining antitrust policies and it may even be possible to identify a 
sort of intimate bond that links them to the study of market competition.48 However, 
while they provide a material background on the evolution of antitrust, their analysis is 
limited by the fact that they do not explain the empirical mechanism by which the very 
ideas that were implemented and applied changed, in turn, the perception of reality and, 
once transposed into appropriate regulations, influenced policy-outcomes.  
An economist would indeed evaluate antitrust policies by applying an analysis of  
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efficiency or social utilities to any given fact, thereby assessing the evolution of  antitrust 
as simply the outcome of  the pursuit of  economic interests in each historical period. 
However, while the quantified empirical evidence offered by that kind of analysis seems 
to be able to provide some sort of order and to square potential policy effects with actual 
reality, it fails to explain why specific antitrust institutions develop instead of  others. 49 In 
other words, it cannot clarify why particular interests or particular interpretations of 
efficiency prevail over others at any given time. That would also escape any legal analysis. 
Indeed, a judicial perspective would be limited to the study of  the legal framework where 
rules should or should not be applied and competition would be considered an element 
that exists per se in the market. If  traditional economic analyses of  regulations focus on 
how to obtain efficiency in the market through antitrust policies and how to balance 
economic benefits with social welfare, judicial studies typically deal with the legal 
application of  competition law and the violations thereof. However, none of  those 
approaches brings into focus the evolution of  the meaning of  antitrust itself. 
In this sense, economics and law are undoubtedly useful to appreciate the 
technical effects of antitrust regulation on the market; nevertheless, for want of a 
problem-solving approach, neither of the two questions ‘the existing order of things’, nor 
do they challenge the ‘prevailing discourses against the background of which competition 
policy is formulated’.50 Besides, those approaches are also often accused of concealing, 
and limiting our understanding of, ‘the profoundly political nature of competition 
policy’.51 Apparently, the reason why politics is not often encountered in the study of 
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antitrust is linked to the fact that politics does not offer a quantifiable definition of its 
assumptions. 
Political considerations, indeed, are hardly measurable and the lack of any 
mathematical or empirical consistency may cause political biases to go unnoticed or not 
be properly accounted for.52 However, it is not possible to exclude ‘political values’ of 
any sort from the study of antitrust and, even though its role has been underestimated, 
politics is still present in any antitrust consideration. According to Giuliano Amato, 
‘antitrust law has not been invented by technicians of commercial law […] nor by 
economists themselves. It was instead desired by politicians […]’.53 As a product of 
political desire and implementation, antitrust policy cannot just be understood as the 
outcome of a rational calculation of economic efficiency. Rather, it is best understood as 
the result of the interpretation of specific political-economic interests by political actors. 
However, political studies do not supply a coherent analysis of how those interests are to 
be perceived and why. In fact, by simply taking into consideration the social meaning of 
antitrust, without any of the economic or legal precision, they produce vague and less 
notable findings.  
It follows that neither a pure economic-juridical analysis nor a political one is 
sufficient to understand antitrust and its effect on society, because none of them can 
simultaneously take into consideration the role exerted both by ideas and by material 
interests in influencing political decisions processes. Indeed, antitrust policy cannot only 
be interpreted as the set of regulations implemented to allow the achievement of precise 
interests; it can be also defined as the product of ideological frameworks identifying the 
‘metaphysical constructs of rules stating what the law is and the ethical constructs of the 
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reasoning stating what it ought to be’.54 In order to comprehend the profound meaning 
of each antitrust rule, it is necessary to investigate their process of conversion into 
regulation and the role played by doctrines and ideas that shape the perception of real 
necessities. The antitrust decision-making process and its translation into laws remain 
often ambiguous and concealed behind abstruse legal concepts or complex market 
analyses. However, every time a policy is adopted or a court judges an antitrust case, a 
specific interpretation of a broader theoretical framework is applied to reality in order to 
respond to a precise social-economic issue.55 In this framework, any antitrust regulation 
can be understood as a concrete response to well-defined necessities, which is however 
embedded in a theoretical interpretation.  
In order to study antitrust from this particular viewpoint, it is necessary to 
examine it through a political-economy methodology. IPE deals with the analysis of the 
interrelation between politics and economics.56 This approach is not so innovative; until a 
century ago, according to Frieden and Lake, all the most prominent economic thinkers, 
such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, did not distinguish economics 
from politics, but considered economics as ‘eminently political’ and vice versa. In this 
view, since economics deals with the system of ‘producing, distributing and using wealth’ 
and politics ‘is the set of institutions and rules by which social and economic interactions 
are governed’, a proper antitrust analysis ought to consider both points of view.57 As IPE 
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may be approached from a number of theoretical perspectives, the thesis will illustrate 
which specific approach is best suited to frame the complex interrelation of economic 
interests, political decision-making processes and ideas that shapes the social 
construction and formulation of antitrust policy.58 
 
ANTIRUST AND IPE 
 
International Political Economy is the discipline that studies the ‘interplay of economics 
and politics in the world arena’.59 Specifically, IPE offers analytical tools to investigate 
political decision-making processes and their economic effects.  
According to Keohane, IPE can be defined as the set of theories that examine the 
dynamic interaction behind the pursuit of wealth and power. It explores the relations 
between the substantive core of economics, including the ideas of production and 
exchange of marketable means of want satisfaction, and the political dynamics connected 
with the exertion of power.   
IPE is associated with any situation where economic actors exert power over one 
another and where the economy becomes a political affair. This includes the majority of 
international interactions; indeed in the real world the ‘most significant issues are 
simultaneously political and economic’.60  
In the past 50 years, the study of IPE has advanced significantly, moving from a 
peripheral and undefined niche to become a central social science discipline, alongside 
other established fields such as Politics, Economics and International Relations.61 Indeed, 
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most attempts to analyse the complexity of the world have been dominated by traditional 
disciplines, which, however, are unable to understand, the different sides of global 
scenarios, from a more multifaceted perspective.62 For instance, Robert Gilpin uses the 
term IPE to indicate a discipline focused on the relation between states and markets 
through ‘an eclectic mixture of analytic methods and theoretical perspectives’.63 From a 
critical viewpoint, Susan Strange maintains that IPE is concerned with ‘the social, 
political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, 
exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein’.64  
Generally speaking, IPE is a discipline that covers the domains pertaining to 
international politics and international economics, as economics or politics per se cannot 
define global market without being too abstract.65  Usually, it covers a various range of 
issues dealing with the interaction between governments and markets across countries. 
Those can include the analysis of rational individualism, as in the case of liberalism, or 
the debates around the role of power in determining economic strength and vice versa, 
as in the case of realism and Marxism.66 Historically, realism, liberalism and Marxism 
have dominated the dialogue within IPE for several years.67  However, IPE will be used 
here not to analyse the simple interrelation between power and the economy, but to 
understand the origins of the economic and political preferences, or interests, that 
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characterise a given group in a given society and how and whether ideas can provide 
mental models to interpret and eventually modify social interests.68 Antitrust policy and 
regulations are studied as illustrative examples of how ideas, beliefs and general 
theoretical frameworks can influence the general social way of perceiving reality.  
Despite the differences in the theoretical routes adopted, what is common to the 
traditional IPE schools is that they analyse the relations between power and economics 
only by reference to such elements as material incentives, the fight for achieving power 
and wealth, and inequalities among social groups and classes.69 Traditional IPE 
approaches have a limited ability to analyse the role of theories and economic beliefs in 
influencing the policy-making process. In other words, by drawing attention to power 
and material conditions, they tend to underestimate the latent pressures exerted by 
shared ideas and beliefs over the policymaking process and global political-economic 
trends. Additionally, they do not regard those elements as socially constructed 
coordination devices able to influence the ways in which agents interpret the material 
reality around them and the consequent political and economic outcomes.70 Indeed, 
classical IPE scholars understand international relations as a rivalrous process in an 
anarchic international arena where states use their power to maximise their welfare and 
vice versa. Within this framework, individual interests are rarely considered, as welfare is 
interpreted and understood only in terms of national prosperity. Although those classical 
schools paid a huge contribution to the development of the discipline, they construct 
very rigid models based on the concepts of power and supremacy. These two elements 
are perceived as the sole factors that allow, or indeed drive, countries to achieve a 
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dominant position in the international arena. Hence, since welfare came to acquire the 
very broad meaning of national wealth and the achievement of satisfaction, those 
scholars did not engage with a deeper analysis of interests and did not explain what 
causes and engenders satisfaction.71 Similarly, the liberal political-economic approach 
interprets market trends, and therefore competition, both as a result of rational 
necessities and as the consequent outcome of a sort of middle ground whereby 
consumers and producers promote the maximisation of their economic incentives, while 
maintaining a perfect equilibrium among their different wills.72 Again, there is neither a 
discussion of rationality per se nor a discussion of the role of ideas or social beliefs as 
determining factors of social rationality.  
By contrast, scholars of Marxism understand competition as the driving force of 
the capitalist system.73 In particular, Neo-Gramscian scholars have been among the most 
successful proponents of a Marxian approach to IPE. They conceive reality as a dialectic 
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process, in which every social arena, such as the market, is the result of an ontological 
primacy of social relations of production and knowledge dominance. In contrast to 
traditional IPE mainstream perspectives, ‘Neo-Gramscianism’ breaks with state-centrism 
and maintains that both state formation and interstate politics are to be perceived and 
analysed as moments within the transnational dynamics of capital accumulation and class 
formation.74 As Robert Cox puts it, each society is characterised by a specific 
hierarchically ordered configuration of productions modes. The latter generate a 
particular understanding, and therefore a specific configuration, of social forces, which in 
turn determines the structure of the state and its position in the international division of 
labour at the global state-system level. Thus, there is a sort of duality between production 
and the understanding of production modes formalised through institutions.75 
Consequently, the Neo-Gramscian approach is particularly instructive in that it considers 
the role of ideological and moral elements, transformed into ‘universal’ procedures by a 
ruling class, as a determining factor in constraining subordinate groups into an existing 
order. Power, per se, is not the product of coercive actions exerted by the state, but rather 
the result of the diffusion of specific institutionalised relationships inside a social arena. 
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In other words, hegemony is based on a form of consent, which is only in the last 
instance sustained by the coercive apparatus of the state. 76 
Neo-Gramscian transnational historical materialism offers a relatively coherent 
framework for the analysis of trends in global political economy; furthermore, the 
importance attributed to ideologies and moral elements is particularly relevant for my 
analysis. Yet, the limit of this approach, like the other classical ones, rests on its tendency 
to engage too much with the creation and construction of a rigid and omni-
comprehensive general framework for understanding international power dynamics 
without engaging with the strength of knowledge and culture per se.  
Nonetheless, the role of ideas is significant in the study of antitrust because the 
institutional framework that regulates market competition seems to be determined less by 
power than by interests. In turn, these are perceived through a specific social way of 
understanding and observing reality and reflect, at the same time, material necessities 
based on the market, which is itself an institution.77  
In light of the above, this thesis is going to adopt an institutional IPE approach; 
this discipline seems able to offer enough room to engage with the analysis of how ideas 
shape realities by being institutionalised into formal or informal market practices. This 
appears to be the optimal loophole for the study of this process as antitrust, when not 
analysed according to a purely economic or juridical approach, is typically approached 
from an institutional perspective. In fact, it is not at all accidental that many of the most 
important institutional scholars, such as Commons or Corwin Edwards, were, at some 
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point, engaged with the study of antitrust. Specifically, old institutional scholars were able 
to influence many other theoretical areas by applying the outcomes of their research. For 
instance, as underlined by Marc Tool in his prominent paper, the theories related to 
pricing behaviours in imperfectly competitive markets have to be re-conducted to the 
regulatory framework developed by those social networks defined by old institutional 
models.78 
In conclusion, the analysis of antitrust policy through institutional IPE will allow 
for a better understanding of its evolution. Indeed, the development of competition 
cannot be studied only by considering the rivalry dynamics that characterises the pursuit 
of power and economic interests by economic and political agents. On the contrary, in 
order to appreciate the evolving meaning of antitrust, it is necessary to investigate its 
process of institutionalisation. This can be done not only by highlighting the influence 
exerted by culture, beliefs and ideas, but also by taking into consideration the role of the 
state as the leading actor of the regulatory and political trends of a country.79   
 
SOCIO-POLITICAL APPROACHES TO ANTITRUST 
 
Institutionalism can offer a solid theoretical framework for examining antitrust models 
and their practical implementation. Competition can be analysed as a pattern of 
behaviour, as a body of theoretical models and as a set of empirical regulations that settle 
the market according to specific necessities – and the three are not mutually exclusive. 
For instance, the different antitrust policies adopted by the US cannot only be 
interpreted as a set of antitrust working rules in response to the economic necessities of 
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the time: they were also institutional frameworks that reflected a particular set of 
economic ideas. Moreover, competitive behaviours cannot be interpreted as the product 
of an absolute profit-maximising rationale; rather, they result from a specific 
interpretation of reality, which changes according to the historical period, the 
geographical context and the local institutions.  
However seemingly uncontroversial, this point needs emphasising as contrary to 
institutional IPE scholars, traditional approaches towards competition – such as those 
advanced on the one hand by Marx and on the other by scholars such as Milton 
Friedman – tended to see competition as a process through which business actors were 
forced to choose the most effective means of maximising their profits and to inexorably 
push less efficient rivals out of the market. As Hodgson points out, the ‘strategy, 
structure and goals of the firm are uniquely determined by competition’.80 While this is 
generally correct, this view lacks a more in-depth understanding of the whole rivalry 
process. As underlined by Tomlinson, profit cannot be considered the unique cause of 
the growth or decline of firms. While profit is the objective, the possible ways to achieve 
it, as well as the possible strategies to adopt, are legion. In this sense, the behaviour of 
firms proves to be highly variable in that they implement different manoeuvres, 
calculations, rationales and practices.81 Following from this, Hodgson goes on to assert 
that there is a variety of modalities through which competitiveness is pursued because, as 
argued by Cyert, March and others, actors are most of the time ‘profit-seeking and not 
strictly profit-maximising’.82 This allows the adoption of several practices in accordance 
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to the cultural contexts in which economic actors operate or to what Veblen defines as 
habits. It follows that since culture varies from country to country, the practices of firms 
differ accordingly and are formalised into different institutions. 
In this view, an institutional IPE approach can be used to build a theoretical 
framework of reference that would allow a more in-depth understanding of actors’ 
particular modes of sensory perception. In other words, institutional IPE would provide 
us with efficient instruments to comprehend how actors perceive reality and build 
regulatory frameworks to constrain or enable particular practices. The advantage of this 
approach lies in its flexibility and potential adaptability to all social contexts. On the 
contrary, traditional IPE tends to create a fixed and theoretically perfect system, where all 
actors are understood as following the same rules.  
Hence, it is easy to understand the critiques of neo-classical and Marxian IPE 
theorisation of capitalist systems. Indeed, although their contribution to our 
understanding of general economic systems is invaluable, their incapacity to engage with 
individuals and individual choices remains a strong limitation. Indeed, they take up a 
purely rational stance on social-economic transactions, whereby rules are stacked into 
rigid normative schemes of understanding reality. On the contrary, human behaviour, 
and the way people perceive reality and respect rules, is constantly transformed according 
to the surrounding social, historical, cultural and economic context.  
In this sense, an institutional interpretation of competition is fundamental since it 
can offer the lenses through which we see reality in all its complexity.83 Institutions 
become the necessary tool to understand the existing variety of different forms of 
capitalist and, in this specific case, competition practices as they are not only the 
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backbone of market economy and competition, but also a product of social contexts and 
cultures that do not pre-exist the market, but rather follow from it.84  
Although institutions are interpreted according to different perspectives, one of 
the things that connect almost all the different approaches is the impossibility of 
recollecting everything to an abstract and absolute rule. It was the institutional 
sociological school to specifically address this issue. For instance, Durkheim rejected the 
existence of universal laws by maintaining that 'between the confused multitude of 
historic societies and the single, but ideal concept of humanity, there are intermediaries, 
namely social species'.85 Weber, too, affirmed the necessity of constructing a theoretical 
framework to understand reality through, not universalistic concepts, but ideal types, 
which, like Durkheim's social species, were more flexible than the classical universal laws 
applied before him.86 This suggests that although the interpretations of institutions differ, 
the impossibility of categorising evolution through unifying principles is an idea shared 
by virtually all of them.87  
  Institutions can be defined as the structure that delineates the anatomy of a 
social realm; they constrain human behaviour but, because they evolve, they do not 
consist of permanent and absolute dogmas. They are a set of formal and informal rules 
that shape political-economic and social interactions by limiting or enabling particular 
patterns of behaviour and are the product of a specific ideological, cultural and 
theoretical substratum.88 Institutions provide some structure but, at the same time, they 
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also reflect the general ideas of a given social context. They are not fixed, but change 
and, by changing, they modify human reality and its rules. 
Antitrust law fits perfectly into this definition. While its objective is to develop 
competitiveness by limiting or fostering the individual freedom to operate in the market, 
its institutionalisation depends on the main ideological context behind the policy-making 
process of every government.  
However, the limitations of this approach are to do with the broad nature of the 
institutional concept itself. As pointed out by Arrow, trying to provide a precise 
definition of institutions is not only practically impossible but also useless, as the nature 
and meaning of institutions change according to the theoretical background adopted. 89 
Moreover, ‘the only idea common to all usages of the term […] is that of some sort of 
establishment of relative permanence of a distinctly social sort’.90  Koehane defines the 
concept of institution as a ‘general pattern or categorisation of activity or a particular 
human constructed arrangement, formally or informally organised’.91 For instance, 
language, currencies, systems of weights, measures and conventions can be considered 
institutions typical of a given country or a given society.92 The term ‘institution’ also 
encompasses a wide range of organisations, such as the WTO, and international 
agreements, such as the GATT, Bretton Woods and the like, but it can also refer to laws, 
norms and ad hoc regulations.  
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According to Scott, institutions are multifaceted systems and they include, in and 
of themselves, cognitive constructions, normative rules and regulatory structures that 
supply stability and meaning to social behaviour.93 Normally, each social science 
discipline analyses institutions according to one of those perspectives. Thus, scholars in 
politics and economics tend to consider a more normative/universalistic and regulatory 
approach, respectively; sociologists, on the other hand, prefer to underline the role of 
cognitions in influencing human behaviour and, therefore, institutions. 
Yet, because the objective of this research is to analyse antitrust policies during 
economic and financial crises, the theoretical framework here adopted will favour an 
economic approach as opposed to a purely sociological or political one. Indeed, an 
economic point of view seems particularly suited for a more accurate analysis of how 
political actors, however inspired by ideas, institutionalise antitrust policies with the 
deliberate intention of pursuing specific interests in the market. Nonetheless, since 
institutional IPE encompasses and combines different social-scientific perspectives, the 
next sections will briefly introduce the main differences among them and it will 
subsequently explain why this thesis will adopt what I call a ‘pan-institutional’ approach. 
Indeed, while some elements of economic institutionalism seem best suited for the aims 
of this research, other disciplines can also provide alternative tools of analysis and offer 
valuable interpretations.  
 
Institutionalism: a Political Approach 
The first attempt to analyse economic and juridical institutions from a political 
perspective was developed by historical-institutional scholars. This approach, while 
hardly a political theory on its own, counts as a compelling conceptualisation of 
institutional development through time, in that it attempts to identify and create 
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theoretical models for the sequence of events that shape political processes.94 According 
to Scoot, the first political institutional approach was developed in the 19th century, when 
scholars such as John Burgess, Woodrow Wilson and Westel Willoughby started to apply 
a juridical and philosophical analysis to the historical evolution of political institutional 
frameworks, which included formal organisations, informal rules and the procedures that 
shaped social behaviours.95 While John Burgess investigated American democratic issues, 
Wilson analysed the structures, functions and forms of political systems and Willoughby 
provided some critiques to the different theories concerning the origins of the state, the 
nature of law, and sovereignty.96 These authors are commonly identified as the pioneers 
of historical institutionalism because their analysis encompassed the study of the state 
and how state institutions structure interests and power relations around political 
actors.97 Outside of this circle, however, historical institutionalism hardly generated any 
interest in political science and its study was only picked up at the beginning of the 
1980s, with the advent of a new historical-institutional wave. At that time, many scholars, 
such as March, Olsen and Hall, began to investigate the extent to which institutions 
could shape political strategies, influence political outcomes and empower social 
actions.98  
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Institutions were not considered as a simple sort of agreement or structure 
created by individuals; they were also rules with an autonomous character: they provided 
codes of behaviour and conduct and legitimised specific beliefs or ideas among society 
by specifying what had to be expected from a particular situation.99 
Such attention to the role of temporality was crucial for understanding and 
comparing political events. According to the above-mentioned scholars, while the 
rationale behind every political action, as well as the nature of the constraints under 
which individuals act, varies constantly over time, these changes are influenced by 
previous events. In this sense, an historical analysis becomes essential for a proper 
understanding of politics because each decision and political action is conceived as a 
reflection of previous ones, rather than just as a mere result of interests or of the 
contingent constraints of the time.100 Usually, policymaking systems tend to be 
conservative and to defend their status quo through institutions that create enduring 
patterns, thereby making any alteration of the political configuration difficult.101 
Historical institutionalism, indeed, interprets public policymaking and political change as 
a distinct process. Generally speaking, policy-making follows previously established 
paths, while radical political change, and therefore institutional modification, occurs 
during the ‘formative moments’ that punctuate long periods of stability.102  
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The main critique levelled at historical institutionalism relates to its rigid 
normative nature. Indeed, while the investigation of past and current events seems to 
offer a clear frame of reference, it only provides a limited comparative analysis of 
different institutional frameworks, which does not allow for a sufficient examination of 
institutions themselves or of the ways in which those elements conceal and limit the 
boundaries of individual actions.103 In other words, by describing policy change as a 
process tied to institutional alteration – which, in turn, depends upon an intermittent 
path-dependent process – historical scholars tend to analyse political events according to 
a retrospective analysis that conceals the profound complexity of decision-making 
process in times of change.104 
The historical school has found its main theoretical rival in the behaviourist 
school, which from the beginning of the 1930s started to develop an alternative approach 
to the interpretation of policy change. Those scholars attempted to separate politics from 
philosophy, and to rebuild political science as a theoretically guided empirical discipline. 
In other words, ‘behaviourists argued that in order to understand politics and explain 
political outcomes, analysts should focus not on the formal attributes of government 
institutions but instead on informal distribution of power, attitudes and political 
behaviour’.105  
According to those scholars, actors have a fixed set of preferences and tastes, so 
their actions are led by the need to maximise these utilities, rather than by impersonal 
historical forces. Here, the role of political institutions is fundamental in solving 
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collective-action dilemmas because, while an individual action can be efficient for the 
single individual, it can be detrimental for the community as a whole. Hence, institutional 
arrangements need to adjust regulatory boundaries so as to guarantee complementary 
behaviours, avoid the rise of negative externalities and reduce uncertainties.106  
By understanding institutions as a rational form of governance, rational-choice 
theorists from the New Institutionalism School, such as Moe, Shepsle, Weingast and 
Johnsen, have recently adopted an economic-oriented neo-institutional model to study 
political structures.107 Indeed, in the political arena, much as in the market, individuals are 
seen as acting in pursuance of their personal interests. According to Moe, economic 
organisations and institutions can be explained in the same way: ‘they are structures that 
emerge and take the specific forms they do because they solve collective-action problems 
and thereby facilitate gains from trade. They are good things. They make every-one 
involved better off’.108 Similarly, Herbert Simon maintains that every single action is 
rational and that any behaviour ‘can be adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to 
the situation’.109  
The rationalistic approach has also been used in International Relations to 
emphasise the conditions and the extent to which cooperation at a global level is possible 
and to investigate the function of international institutions in that context.110 As Simon 
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argues, by combining the principle of substantive rationality with the range of individual 
convenience and his or her expectations, it is possible to hypothesise the outcomes of 
actual human behaviour. Indeed, individual reason is always contextual to contingent 
factors and to the acquisition of imperfect or limited information. Hence, the rational-
choice approach is fundamental in contributing to the understanding of institutionalised 
behaviours in politics and in international relations.111  
The main critiques of this approach revolve around the fact that it tends to 
consider politics from a social science perspective, in its description, for example, of the 
voting process as directed towards the maximisation of interests – when in fact political 
dynamics are far more complex as they are generally inclusive of many other elements, 
such as material resources, power, competitive dynamics among actors, interests, and 
legitimacy. Moreover, politics cannot always be interpreted as an extension of economics, 
as it involves dynamics that cannot be solved through the principle of utility. Political 
decisions, for example, can be dictated also by cultural and ideological patterns.  
In conclusion, it is possible to identify two major and opposite interpretations of 
institutions in political science: one associated with historical institutionalism and one 
derived from rational choice theory. The political analysis of institutions, however, even 
in its rational-institutional version, tends to interpret institutions more as a 
normative/universalistic system, and it does not conceptualise them in a more precise 
frame. Therefore, even though institutional economists such as Douglas North employ 
the concepts of path dependence and rational choice, traditional historical 
institutionalism seems to provide an interpretation of institutions that is too soft and 
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broad to be applicable to the very technical nature of those antitrust laws and polices 
analysed here as the outcome of different antitrust theoretical frameworks. 112    
 
Institutionalism: a Sociological Approach 
Sociology has invested more effort than politics in analysing the deep interactive 
dynamics between individuals and institutions and the set of formal or informal rules that 
constrain their behaviour. For example, Cooley and Hughes link the very existence of 
institutions to individual legitimisation; in other words, institutions become real only if 
they are supported and used as a behavioural reference by social actors.113 Specifically, 
according to Cooley, institutions are symbols produced by human interactions because 
they are the cause of specific behaviours and, at the same time, the effect of human 
conduct.114 Similarly, Hughes understands them as a set of beliefs able to regulate the 
behaviour of those who share the same set of symbols and discourses. According to him, 
the limitation and the constraint of actions on the part of institutions is guided more by 
the individual’s internal perceptions than by direct external norms.115 In Europe, too, 
scholars of the likes of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber examined the notion of 
institutions. In Durkheim's later works, institutions are described as social systems of 
beliefs, or collective representations. They are a product of human interaction but, at the 
same time, they are perceived as coercive rules by single individuals and they are realised 
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only in individuals.116 Although Weber has never directly used the term institution, his 
work is permeated with a concern for understanding how cultures and beliefs determine 
society. In his view, in order to appreciate the essence of each social action it is necessary 
to comprehend the meaning that mediates it. For instance, although he strongly believed 
in the importance of economic models, he was convinced that in order to comprehend 
the development of economic transactions it was necessary to understand the historical 
and cultural environments where they took form. Indeed, by analysing specific and 
concrete events and by abstracting their characteristics, scholars could create ideal-types 
that can be used to better understand social interactions and the social realm.117 
Following Weber, Talcott Parsons defined institutions as a system of norms that 
not only regulates social interactions, but also defines them: ‘Thus, institutions, in so far 
as they regulate the relations of individuals to each other, become a fundamental element 
of social structure which consists precisely in such a set of determinate relations of 
individuals’.118 On the one hand, individuals obey institutions because the latter exert a 
sort of moral authority over society. On the other hand, an institutionalised action 
acquires a moral meaning because it becomes internal to the set of beliefs that 
characterises a particular society.119 To advance this school of thought further, the new 
institutionalism in sociology has started to analyse the importance of cognitions more in 
depth. For instance, Berger and Luckmann, inspired by the work of George Herbert 
Mead – who stressed the importance of symbolic systems in giving meaning to social 
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interactions – emphasise the role of knowledge in defining the social realm.120 In their 
view, reality, as understood by society, is a human construction, a product of social 
interaction; consequently, ‘institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a reciprocal 
typification of habitualised actions by types of actors’.121  
Languages, symbols and cognition are crucial in defining the ways in which 
reiterated actions evoke stable and similar meanings in the self and in others, thus 
becoming institutionalised processes of social interactions.122 This approach has recently 
been followed by many International Relations scholars, such as Friedrich Kratochwil 
and John Ruggie, who underline the importance of the ‘inter-subjective meanings’ of 
international institutional activities.123 In their view, in order to understand international 
political dynamics and behavioural changes, it is necessary to understand how people 
think about institutional norms and rules and the discourse they engage in. Proceeding 
from Max Weber’s notorious assumption that ‘we are cultural beings, endowed with the 
capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it 
significance’, Ruggie and social constructivist scholars revolutionised IR theories.124 
According to their view, the “inter-subjective” dimension of human actions creates a 
class of facts that do not exist in the physical world. These are classified as social facts, or 
as explained by philosopher John Searle, facts that subsist within an institutional 
framework because social actors believe in them. Because of the existence of humanly 
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created facts such as money, assets or marriages, Ruggie denied the absolute reliability of 
utilitarian and neo-utilitarian theories and maintains that interests can be socially 
constructed, and thus influenced by beliefs and ideas.125  
Apart from those IR authors, other influential sociological contributions come 
from DiMaggio and Powel. These scholars have turned attention from institutions per se 
to the concept of organisation, interpreted as a structure that defines social goals. 
Specifically, by maintaining that different set of structured establishments can share 
similar institutions, DiMaggio and Powel started to analyse the dynamics that influence 
institutional change inside organisations and why those tend to assume similar 
structures.126 To them, organisations’ isomorphism, or the tendency to assume similar 
connotations, can be explained according to three mechanisms: a coercive, a mimetic and 
a normative one.127 These will be better described in the following section. 
By following Talcott Parsons’ interpretation of states as organisations, the 
concept of isomorphism will be used in the following sections, where and when 
applicable, to understand why specific antitrust ideas have been adopted by Europe and 
Japan, even though their own traditional theoretical perspectives and cultural contexts 
were different.128 However, the analysis offered by the old and specifically the new 
sociological institutional school is too focused on the dimension of knowledge and 
culture and it tends to identify institutions with cultural belief systems operating in a 
specific environment. By denying, or just disregarding, the role of interests or social 
necessities in influencing the social realm, sociological institutionalism lacks the 
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fundamental empiricism required to conduct a deep analysis of antitrust and its 
implication on the policy-making process. 
 
Institutionalism: An Economic Approach 
Having generally defined the political and sociological institutional constructions, this 
section will introduce the economic interpretation of institutionalism. This approach 
seems to be particularly suitable for the analysis of antitrust as it provides a much more 
precise explanation of institutions and because it takes into consideration the role of 
interests in influencing actors’ decisions. 
 The earliest economic institutional arguments were developed in Germany and 
Austria in the late 19th century as part of a general debate on the scientific method 
(Methodenstreit). Indeed, building on Kantian and Hegelian philosophical insights, a group 
of economists, later identified as the historical school, challenged the idea that economics 
could be reduced to a set of collective laws. On the contrary, according to Gustav 
Schmoller, one of the most prominent historical scholars, economics follows the rules 
shaped by the cultural and historical substratum of the social realm. 
Despite some theoretical differences, Austrian economist Carl Menger explained 
the existence and the development of political, legal, or social institutions through a 
model of individual behaviour.129 For instance, he considered the creation and 
institutionalisation of money the result of individual necessities. In his view, since barter 
economy had the inconvenience of not reflecting demand and of creating the need for a 
‘double coincidence of wants’, individuals started to use a prominent good or commodity 
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to facilitate exchange with others. Once the usage of this commodity began to spread, it 
became a sort of informal prototype of money, which led to the emergence of the 
institution of money itself.130  
Many of those ideas were embraced and further developed by American 
institutional economists, who are generally identified as the old and new schools of 
institutionalism.131 For instance, while criticising conventional economic models for 
being too abstract and for neglecting to address the issue of historical change, the old 
school of institutionalism understood institutions, and their evolution, as a constant 
process of change influenced by a complex structure of social and economic issues.132  
Although sympathetic to Marx's analysis of capitalism, Veblen, one of the most 
prominent scholars of old institutionalism, maintained that the problem of both the neo-
classical and the Marxian interpretations of reality was the absence of any tangible 
connection between the role of human beings acting in a definite capitalistic structure 
and the leading motivations that should push them to act in a certain way. Specifically, 
Veblen moved away from the neo-classical and Marxian understanding of capitalism as 
well as from those rational-behaviour theories that had dominated 19th-century Western 
thinking. Indeed, as Hodgson, in agreement with Veblen, pointed out, ‘human agents do 
not gravitate to a single view of the truth simply on the basis of empirical evidence and 
rational reflection’, thus, there must be another explanation of human actions.133 Hence, 
Veblen took inspiration from pragmatist philosophers such as Charles Sanders Peirce 
and from the concept of habit.134 Peirce maintained that habits and customs – not 
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intellect and sensations – had to be considered at the basis of any theoretical 
interpretation of reality and therefore at the foundation of all science. Specific habits 
must be interpreted as habitual patterns of thought, which construct a sort of general 
framework used by social actors to attribute particular meaning to the world. In other 
words, habits are the products of beliefs and they materialise ideas into accepted 
practices. By linking thought to actions and ideas to practices, Peirce had the merit of 
dissolving the Cartesian division between mental projections and physical experiences.135 
Following from this, Veblen maintained that institutions are ‘settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of men’ that constrain human behaviour but are not a product 
of its instincts or propensities. In fact, they are determined by usual and customary ‘ways 
of doing and thinking’ originated by material technological and economic means.136   
In other words, Veblen and the old school understood institutions as a set of 
rules that becomes effective once they turn into shared habits of thought and 
behaviour.137 Habits are common tendencies or inclinations that forge the way of 
thinking of a particular social realm; they can be created by repeated patterns of 
behaviour, but cannot be identified as behaviour in and of themselves. Indeed, a ‘habit is 
a disposition to engage in previously adopted or acquired behaviour or thoughts, 
triggered by an appropriate stimulus or context’.138 Habits determine the malleability of 
individuals’ preferences; the habits of today determine the institutions of tomorrow by 
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shaping ‘men’s habitual view of things’’ through the selective and coercive processes 
established by institutions themselves. 139 Indeed, the institutional channelling and 
constraining of behaviour results in the construction of new habits on the part of social 
actors. In other words, institutions limit human actions on the one hand and, on the 
other, favour the development of new habits. In fact, according to Hodgson, ‘people do 
not develop new preferences, wants or purposes simply because “values” or “social 
forces” control them. What does happen is that the framing, shifting and constraining 
capacities of social institutions give rise to new perceptions and dispositions within 
individuals. Upon new habits of thought and behaviour, new preferences and intentions 
emerge’.140 Hence, the role of individuals is minimal in developing institutions and the 
institutionalisation process itself acts as a sort of deus ex machina. 
 Following Veblen, John R. Commons interpreted institutions as social structures 
that are uniquely characterised by their capacity to change the purposes and preferences 
of social actors.141 However, moving on from the previous static and holistic approach, 
Commons regarded institutions as the framework where the transactions made in social 
groups are regulated by a set of working rules or laws that fixes the boundaries of 
individual actions.142 Institutions, in Commons’ analysis, have a broader meaning and 
their evolution depends on a constant deliberative collective decision-making process. 
Their shape results from the working rules of transactions that are set out by society in 
order to establish the rights of future ownership of physical things, to constrain 
economic power, or to liberate individuals from the coercion of others. 
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In other words, Commons understood social order as the result of collective 
institutions where transactions, as the main moment of social interactions, are the unit of 
analysis.143 Indeed, every transaction reflects the principle of an institution controlling, 
liberating, and expanding individual action.144 It follows that institutional change is 
caused by the institutional environment and that institutions act as constraints as well as 
catalysts for change in the economic structure.145 In other words, while the modification 
of institutions is spontaneously influenced by the evolution of customs, norms and rules, 
at the same time, the collective role of governments and court is fundamental in shaping 
institutions through legislatures.146 
Both Veblen and Commons singled out the importance of change as one of the 
principal objects of study in economics. However, Veblen adopted a more evolutionary 
perspective and emphasised the role of technological change in modifying economics 
and economic performances. Commons, instead, stressed the centrality of transactions 
made by social groups in ‘giving, taking, persuading, coercing, defrauding, commanding, 
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obeying, competing (and) governing, in a world of scarcity, mechanisms and rules of 
conduct’.147 
While Commons and Veblen considered institutions as the imposition of 
collective rules over individuals, the emergence of new generation of institutional 
economic scholars challenged this holistic approach and shifted attention to the 
individual himself.148  Like its older counterpart, the new institutional economics (NIE) 
analyses the social, economic and political institutions that characterise everyday life. 
However, similarly to neoclassical economics, new institutional theories are constructed 
upon methodological individualism. Indeed, every neoclassical economic analysis was 
principally based on the primary role of single actors and on the consequent deduction 
that every social outcome can be explained through the study of individual choices. 
According to this approach, since human beings were considered to be rational profit-
maximising players and to operate constantly in the most efficient way possible, 
collective outcomes were expected to be always optimal. 149 
Not only do new institutional scholars consider individuals as the centre of their 
analysis, but they also believe that all social phenomena, including institutions and 
governance structures, can only be analysed through the study of human beings’ 
behaviour and their perfectly rational calculations. In this framework, institutions are 
created not only to serve social actors’ interests, but also to limit and, at the same time, to 
enable the ways in which desired ends become achievable.150 
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However, differently from neoclassical economics, NIE scholars maintain that 
although individuals are rational, they live in the context of uncertainty; thus, while their 
outcomes are always satisfactory, they are not constantly and perfectly efficient.151 
Accordingly, individuals and organisations try to operate in the most suitable way by 
repeating usual practices. In other words, instead of acquiring new information every 
time a transaction is forthcoming – as postulated by the neo-classical model – social 
actors usually tend to comply with standard or tested patterns of behaviour, which may 
not produce perfect outcomes but are sure to generate acceptable results.152 
In the main, NIE – also known as new economics of organisations or new 
institutional economics – focuses on those arrangements that modify or otherwise affect 
the institutional environment, namely the ‘rules of the game’, such as political or judicial 
decisions, laws and regulations, and the institutions of governance – in other words, the 
way the game is played by markets, economic actors and firms.153  As mentioned supra, in 
contrast to the old institutional school, NIE scholars adopt a strict methodological 
individualism. Indeed, even though they do not deny the importance of collective facts 
such as corporate culture, organisational memory, and the like, they understand those 
phenomena more as the outcome than as the explanation of historical events.  
For instance, Ronal Coase asks why some economic transactions, instead of 
following a price-mechanism dynamic, tend to comply with a sort of regulatory 
framework or a hierarchical enforcement mechanism. In his analysis, this is because the 
transactions that follow the price mechanism have always a cost in terms of the 
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negotiation times and procedures necessary to conclude separate agreements, therefore 
actors may prefer to adopt usual practices in order to save resources and obtain a 
satisfactory result.154 In fact, since individual rationality is limited by uncertainty, 
transactions are usually made within an organisational framework, as this is likely to 
provide a sense of control and security.155 
Coase’s transaction-cost approach originates from Oliver Williamson’s work. 
Williamson studied the dynamics of hierarchical relations and vertical integration that 
characterise transactions in certain industries. In his analysis, structured relations and 
institutions originate when actors, engaged in particular transactions, manage hardly 
deployable goods. As Hendrik Spruyt maintains, ‘when transactions are frequent and 
assets are specific, the individual firms involved in the transactions will demand greater 
formal governance structures’ and, therefore, institutions. 156 
In light of the above, New Institutionalists have moved the centre of their 
analysis from the nearly omniscient neo-liberal homo-economicus of rational choice theory to 
a homo psycologicus that does not always act efficiently and does not have complete market 
information.157 Since decision makers cannot be assumed to be omniscient, they can be 
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described as ‘intendendly rational, and not hyperrational’.158 In other words, NIE 
theorists refuse the neo-classical assumption that individuals have access to perfect 
information and apply unbounded rationality when operating in the market. On the 
contrary, individuals have limited mental capacities, face the uncertainty of unexpected 
events and sustain transaction costs to acquire information, which is never perfect. 159 
Because of this endemic incertitude, actors create institutions to make the market more 
predictable, to facilitate economic transactions and to foster cooperation. Those 
institutions can be formal ones, such as constitutions, laws, contracts and regulations, or 
informal ones, such as culture, beliefs and habits. They are not only analysed and studied 
as constraining or determining factors, but also as the product of individual choices. 
They are the outcome of specific decisions and their characteristics reflect deliberate 
necessities and contingent interests.160 In other words, NIE studies how those 
institutions are created, how they work and develop, and how they shape production and 
exchange trends. Moreover, it investigates also the evolutionary nature of such 
arrangements by analysing the extent to which they modify the rules of the market 
game.161 In Kenneth Arrow’s words, NIE tries to answer questions that neoclassical 
economics does not address; in fact, the scope of ‘the new institutional economics 
movement […] does not consist primarily of giving answers to the traditional questions 
of economics – resource allocation and the degree of utilisation. Rather, it consists of 
answering new questions, why economic institutions have emerged the way they did and 
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not otherwise’.162 Indeed, both Arrow and Williamson ascribe the growing influence of 
NIE to the recognition of the basic assumption of neoclassical economics as the 
condition of scarcity in the market.163 However, New Institutional Economics, by trying 
to expand the range of applicability of neoclassical theory, reinterpret the role of 
individuals in decision-making processes.164 As individuals have become the centre of 
analysis, institutions begin to be explained only in reference to their behaviour. Because 
actors have different tastes, ambitions, intentions and ideas, the social realm and its 
institutional establishment cannot be understood only by considering collective 
organisations. On the contrary, in order to comprehend institutional change, it is 
necessary to explain individual behaviour.165   
However, according to Hodgson, individual choices or behaviours need to refer 
to a general and shared conceptual framework in order to make sense of the world. In 
other words, each action or transaction cannot be perceived as the result of human 
rationality, in a context of imperfect information, without a general frame of reference. 
‘Individual choice requires a conceptual framework to make 
sense of the world. The reception of information by an individual 
requires a paradigm or cognitive frame to process and make 
sense of that information. The acquisition of this cognitive 
apparatus involves processes of socialisation and education, 
involving extensive interaction with others. As well as language, 
these interactions require other, pre-existing institutions. 
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Individual choice is impossible without them. We cannot 
understand the world without concepts and we cannot 
communicate without some form of language.’166 
 
Even though Douglass North, one of the founding fathers of NIE, did not completely 
deny the neoclassical assumptions of perfect rationality and profit- maximising 
behaviour, he strongly criticised them.167 To be sure, by advancing those interpretations, 
he provided a sort of bridge between the different schools.168 Accordingly, he interpreted 
institutions as the ‘humanly devised constraints’ that govern a society by shaping human 
interactions and the way those interactions evolve.169 ‘They are made up of formal 
constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of 
behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically 
economies”.170 
In North’s perspective, the actions of single individuals are controlled by 
institutional framework; however, the individual, simply by acting, can change the 
framework itself to suit his own necessities. ‘Economic change is a ubiquitous, on-going, 
incremental process that is a consequence of the choices individual actors and 
entrepreneurs of organisations are making every day’.171 Indeed, while institutions serve 
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as the rules of the game, it is organisations and their actors that shape the institutional 
environment, i.e. the ‘fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that govern 
economic and political activities’.172 In this sense, Douglas North’s conceptualisation of 
institutions is in line with old institutionalism, Commons and new institutionalism. As 
individuals have the ability to change the institutional structure that constraints them 
according to their needs, the overall outcome of their actions can create an efficient or 
inefficient institutional structure that can only be understood and evaluated by reference 
to the ideologies and the historical specificity of that particular period.173  
In contrast to the neo-classical school, North does not interpret institutions as 
instruments of efficiency. On the contrary, he emphasises the role of incentives in the 
operation of the market as well as of political and legal systems. He maintains that such 
factors as imperfect information and transaction costs can alter the rules of the game, 
thereby producing an outcome that does not in fact favour those who are expected to 
benefit most from it. Efficiency may be an outcome of institutions, but institutions are 
themselves the product of models that human beings use to interpret the world around 
them. Lacking access to all the necessary information, individuals cannot acquire, let 
alone elaborate, perfect knowledge. It follows that those models, and the institutions that 
derive from them, cannot be perfect, although they can perfectly represent the structural 
culture, knowledge and ideas that characterise a particular society.174 In common with the 
prominent American economist Corwin Edwards, who outlined the importance of 
ideology in explaining the diverse international patterns of antitrust regimes, North 
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maintains that individuals or organisations may often hold different perceptions of self-
interest because of their ideological differences, and may therefore produce outcomes 
that can be either economically productive or adverse.175 Consequently, political or 
economic actors who can directly or indirectly shape outcomes through short-term 
decisions may be responsible for long-term economic transformations. Those decisions 
inevitably reflect the ideas, ideologies, and beliefs that characterise a particular social 
realm, which in turn frames them into a logical political-economic theory.176 Hence, ideas 
and ideologies, as well as their logical theoretical organisation, play a very important role 
in shaping those models of understanding reality; they may be created by social actors, 
and reflect their modes of thinking, but they can in turn shape their actions by being 
converted in appropriate institutional environments.177 
 
Antitrust, Institutions and Pan-Institutionalism 
Traditionally, scholars have focused their interests either on the juridical technicalities of 
antitrust law or on the empirical economic effects of specific antitrust regulations on the 
market. Yet, they have omitted or denied the political elements and institutional aspects 
of competition regulation.  
The institutional aspect of antitrust deals with the economic theories and 
frameworks of reference that, by influencing the substratum of internal political decision-
making processes, allows the enforcement of laws and the determination of the 
boundaries of social economic actions. However, to speak about the institutional aspect 
of antitrust can generate confusion: not only regulations, but also general policies, courts 
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decisions, international agreements, and many other formal and informal relations can 
each be considered an institution, or at least the product of the evolution of one.178  
Consequently, it is necessary to adopt a specific working definition. According to 
Douglass North, institutions are characterised by formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, 
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. The term constraint per se can 
partially explain the nature of antitrust law. Indeed, firms, while competing in the market, 
try to make an effective use of the scarce resources they have in order to acquire higher 
profits. However, in order to obtain efficiency it is necessary to build an institutional 
framework able to contain – but not stop – individual actions.179 This is the mission of 
antitrust institutions: to set out rules of competition that constrain the behaviour of 
economic actors, while maximising efficiency and welfare.  
To this end, Commons’ institutional analysis is perhaps the most complete, as he 
argues that the role of the central government, or of collective actions, in defining 
institutions is more than a mere constraint. It is, at one and the same time, a form of 
coercion and liberation of the individual action from unfair competitive practices 
adopted by other economic actors.180 In other words, the ‘regulatory  and collective 
institutionalism of Commons assumes a man-made social order with a high degree of 
constructivism’.181  
Commons integrates his economic analysis with a more cognitive one. In his 
view, institutions reflect and, at the same time, conceal society, being as they are both 
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constraints and instruments. However, building on Commons’ insights, Douglas North 
maintains that the nature of pursuable interests changes according to the social 
conventions and ideologies that are predominant in a specific period. For instance, in the 
case of antitrust regulations, if in the Keynesian era it was convenient to avoid the rise of 
mergers, in the neo-liberal period, on the contrary, it was rational to demand the exact 
opposite. Indeed, economic change and the rise of new interests can be the result of an 
‘interplay of institutions, reality and perceptions: institutions shape reality; reality shapes 
the perceptions of actors, who, in turn, gradually change the institutions of the respective 
society’.182 
The constructivist elements underlined by North allow to switch the analysis 
towards a sociological interpretation of policy diffusion, which, in turn, can offer an 
interesting key of analysis for understanding the nature and the development of antitrust 
institutions in Europe and Japan. Indeed, while North can brilliantly describe the essence 
of the antitrust institutions here analysed, he does not explain the process of institutional 
diffusion that invested Europe and Japan.  
Nonetheless, by giving great emphasis to the cognitive aspect of institutionalism, 
sociologists interpret cognitions as a determining factor of social regulations and this 
might be in an ontological and epistemological conflict with what Douglas North 
maintains. In fact in North’s prospective human actors create institutions to pursue their 
interests and, in doing that, they are inspired by their mental models. Sociological 
scholars, instead, attribute great importance to ideas, which, according to them, directly 
forge reality and so individuals.   
However, I believe that a pan-institutional approach can overcome those 
epistemological differences. By following Goldstein and Keohane, pan-institutionalism 
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outlines that both ideas and interests can play a central role in shaping human actions.183 
Indeed, while interests are fundamental in leading to the institutionalisation of efficient 
rules, ideas determine what is believed to be efficient. In other words, ideas are the 
glasses human actors use to see and understand the realm. They do not create reality but 
they are the instrument that allows a better comprehension of what are the pursuable and 
efficient interests among several.  
By linking ideas and interests, pan-institutionalism allows to overcome the above-
mentioned ontological and epistemological dichotomies and to apply Douglas North’s 
definition of institutions to the study of antitrust, while using sociological theories to 
understand the diffusion of competition policies in Europe and Japan. For instance, the 
isomorphic model developed by DiMaggio and Powell provides interesting insights into 
the process by which states tend to adopt similar institutions. Isomorphism can explain 
why Europe and Japan adopted similar paths in the regulation of competition even 
though their conventional understanding was different. Additionally, the concept of 
path-dependence developed by historical-institutional scholars is fundamental in tracing 
the evolution of antitrust policies throughout different historical periods and in 
determining whether and how past decisions influenced present dynamics. However, 
while this approach has the merit of offering a clear frame of analysis, its understanding 
of antitrust is limited by the fact that it does not consider political actors and their 
inclinations as key elements in defining institutions. Indeed, over the course of history 
antitrust regulations have been shaped by policy makers according to their interests, 
which are always dependent on the social contexts and the ideas framing them. The role 
of politicians, then, cannot be underestimated because political decisions and the ideas 
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inspiring them are the main promoters of institutional change.184 Hence, path 
dependence won’t be interpreted as a unique trail to be followed but, as it is maintained 
by Bernhard Ebbinghaus, it will be considered as a ‘road juncture’, where actors can shape 
their future by choosing the path they see fit.185  
In this sense, pan-institutionalism by attributing importance to both ideas and 
interests in influencing human actors’ decisions can allow a deeper comprehension of 
how antitrust institutions develop in the course of history. On the one hand, Douglass 
North’s interpretation of institutions, being consistent with Commons’ ideas, offers a 
clear definition of what are antitrust institutions. On the other, some of the cognitive 
aspects underlined by North can be used to reinterpret the traditional sociological 
understanding of ideas by introducing the role of interests in the analysis of policy 
diffusion. In fact, the sociological school per se cannot perfectly explain the reason why 
certain antitrust approaches developed because it does not consider economic interests 
to be relevant in determining institutional change. However, isomorphism theories can 
provide a clear explanation of why Europe and Japan adopted certain antitrust policies. 
Moreover, the path dependence aspect underlined by some of the political theories can 
explain why Europe and Japan still maintain their peculiarities in the regulation of 
competition. Indeed, since past actions influence present conditions, the European and 
Japanese traditional way to perceive interests and market needs will always influence their 
policies.  
In conclusion, a pan-institutional approach overcome the methodological 
differences underlined above because it uses elements developed by the three schools to 
understand how interests push individuals to pursue an institutional change and how 
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ideas help to figure out how to efficiently reach them through institutions. In fact, while 
antitrust regulations may have been adopted because they were economic efficient, it is 
also true that economic interests, and therefore efficiency, change according to the social 
conventions and ideas developed in society. Those ideas can developed because of 
isomorphic influence by an external country or because they are part of a tradition, 
which will always influence local political choices. The modalities explaining how this 
happens will be better elucidated in the following chapter. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Hence, within the institutional IPE framework, competition policy, having both 
economic and political objectives, can be understood and investigated from different 
angles. For this reason, this thesis will apply what I defined here as a pan-institutional 
approach by combining elements of political, sociological and economic institutionalism. 
In fact, as outlined supra, economic institutionalism, especially in the version espoused by 
Douglas North, seems to offer a clearer definition and a more structured theoretical 
framework for analysing antitrust both as simply a law, an agreement or a policy and as a 
theoretical model. On the other hand, the sociological point of view provided by Powell 
and DiMaggio is best suited to explain the adoption by Europe and Japan of institutions 
that paralleled the ones enforced by the US. At the same time, a political perspective on 
institutions may shed some light onto how mechanisms of path dependence have 
frequently impeded a complete assimilation of US antitrust norms in Europe and Japan. 
Indeed, as will be explained in the historical chapters, while it is true that Europe and 
Japan adopted antitrust approaches similar to those of the US, it is also true that the 
structure of competition policy and law in those countries is completely different from 
the American one. This can be explained by looking at the local ideological or cultural 
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framework that underpins their model of capitalism and that is therefore inherently 
unique and difficult to change. In conclusion, a pan-institutional approach, by integrating 
different perspectives, promises a better understanding of the role played by ideas and 
interests in shaping national and international antitrust institutional frameworks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 ANTITRUST: VARIETY OF APPROACHES   
 
The choice of  an institutional approach to study the development of  national and 
international antitrust institutions invites an extended explanation of  the theories of  
‘varieties of  capitalism’. Theories of  varieties capitalism are key to understand how and 
why particular antitrust regulations developed in the US, Europe and Japan in the wake 
of  the crises here discussed. As Hodgson pointed out, varieties-of-capitalism theories 
portray socio-economic systems as a ‘combination of  multiple types of  subsystems or 
modes of  production’.186 Their importance lies in the fact that ‘neither neoclassical, nor 
Hayekian nor, to some extent, Marxian economics’ were able to detect the existence of  
impurity principles in each capitalistic system. Furthermore, none of  those theories could 
explain how the presence of  those peculiarities in each capitalistic model made each 
economic organisation different from the rest.187 Indeed, according to Nolke and 
Vliegenthart, theories on varieties of  capitalism have in fact been driven by the awareness 
that the specific institutions of  each system of  capitalism diverge from one another and 
that these dissimilarities are not accidental, but related to precise cultural and behavioural 
bonds.  
Besides leading to the development of  a very ‘sophisticated, holistic, and easily 
understandable picture of  the institutional complexity of  advanced capitalism’, these 
assumptions are also relevant in the context of  antitrust, as they are easily applicable to 
the analysis of  the evolution and the internationalisation of  the antitrust institutional 
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sets.188 With this in mind, this chapter aims to define the meaning of  ‘varieties of  
antitrust’ and to clarify the different cultural and theoretical backgrounds from which 
market and antitrust institutions developed. Here, institutions refer to the set of  formal 
or informal practices and regulations governing the specific structure of  a capitalistic 
system. As an institution, therefore, antitrust can be an effective tool to lay bare the 
model of  capitalism in each country.  
For many years now, scholars have been investigating how different models of  
capitalism come to be embodied in any given country. Their theories conceptualise the 
structure of  every model of  capitalism as depending on the institutionalisation of  both 
traditional practices and cultural backgrounds and as reflecting the empirical necessities 
of  each economic environment. In this vein, the variety of  antitrust systems seems to 
reflect different theoretical conceptualisations and cultural understandings of  efficiency 
and welfare, which shaped antitrust institutions themselves as much as the general 
structure of  local capitalistic systems. Consequently, an analysis of  the main ideas 
underpinning national understandings of  competition and competitiveness is also 
provided. Indeed, it is because of  their different cultural and ideological traditions that 
the US, Europe and Japan could develop distinct antitrust institutions and maintain 
structural peculiarities in their antitrust regulations.  
 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND VARIETIES OF ANTITRUST 
 
The development of antitrust policies and regulations in the US, Europe and Japan can 
be interpreted as a result of the evolution of traditional theories of competition. This 
evolution, however, can be contextualised in the specific variety of capitalistic structures 
of each country. As advanced by Weber and Marx, models of capitalism are determined 
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by economic institutions, which, in turn, are defined by the system of values, culture, 
norms and politics of each country. In other words, specific institutions are embedded in 
specific economic systems.189 Similarly, Hall sustained that states, having adopted 
particular types of institutions in one sphere of their economy, tend to enforce similar 
practices in other areas as well. In short, national institutional frameworks may not 
develop arbitrarily, but tend to follow a precise path.190 The evolution of competition 
cultures and their implementation into appropriate policies, in fact, reflect the need to 
reach those general objectives of economic growth and welfare that are shared also by 
the specific variety of economic structures of each country.191  
Proceeding from this assumption, it may be possible to talk about ‘varieties of 
antitrust’ because, despite the strong influence from the US, those countries developed 
their own form of policy according to their previous traditions. For instance, together 
with the American Harvard School, the role of the German Ordoliberal School has been 
important in inspiring European competition policy.192 In this vein, even though the US 
has profoundly influenced common competition policy in Europe, this system cannot be 
assimilated to the American one. On the contrary, its strong German roots have allowed 
Europe to maintain a typified competition policy. 
Varieties of capitalism is a theoretical framework that explains why countries all 
over the world have applied and enforced capitalistic systems through different 
institutions, which, in turn, reflect specific – and local – logics of growth and interests.193 
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Historically, therefore, there has been a fluctuating process of convergence among the 
different systems, as each institutional structure has tended to evolve along similar lines; 
however, each country has managed to remain distinctive according to a path-
dependence ratio.194 Chandler and Schroter, among others, maintain that this process has 
favoured a sort of Americanisation of other countries’ capitalistic systems.195 In contrast, 
Hall and Soskice point out that the variety of capitalistic structures demonstrates the 
inconsistence of a single neo-liberal culture. In this view, each country has developed its 
own interpretation of liberal or neo-liberal capitalism and its own institutions to develop 
it. These scholars have even identified specific ideal-types of capitalistic structures. 
According to Hall, the US is a liberal market economy (LME), also referred to as 
‘competitive capitalism’ by Chandler or ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ by Albert, while Germany 
is a coordinated market economy (CME), also known as cooperative or Rhenan 
capitalism.196 For its part, Japan reveals traces of cooperative capitalism.197  
Even though, to some extent, Germany and Japan can be ascribed similar 
institutional frameworks, such as long-term cooperative relations among economic actors 
and minor attention to short-term allocative efficiency, they also exhibit several 
differences. For instance, after World War II, Japan enforced certain political economic 
arrangements with a view to overcoming Western competitiveness, while West Germany 
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focused on building and strengthening national cohesion and social solidarity. In this 
context, Japan can be identified as a developmental model, while Germany may rate as a 
consensus economy.198   
Beside these historical evaluations, the LME and CME models have more 
generally been defined as a set of institutions that either regulate or constrain market 
interactions so as to preserve, or to reach, a sufficient degree of equilibrium.  
While the LME model is identified with neo-liberal policies, the CME model is 
characterised by the presence of social and political institutions engaged directly with the 
shaping mechanisms of economic actions.199 In liberal market economies (LME), firms 
that aim to be as efficient as possible have to rely on market means and to modify their 
economic strategies in conformity with market trends. For instance, as will be 
exemplified in the next sections, regulatory regimes, such as the US, have been 
historically more tolerant of mergers and acquisitions; by the logic of this approach, if a 
firm is not competitive enough, it simply has to be absorbed by another one in order to 
promote efficiency and, along with it, social welfare.200 By contrast, in coordinated 
market economies (CME), firms resolve market problems through strategic interactions, 
which non-market institutions, such as the apparatus of the state, normally support. In 
other words, public institutions play a pivotal role in helping the regulation of the market 
and in leading economic transactions. In these economies, competition, general 
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economic policies and institutions are not only dictated by considerations of pure 
efficiency, but also by such non-market, but still very much economic, indicators as 
general welfare.201  In Germany, and more broadly in Europe, the term ‘welfare’ is often 
conceptualised as the achievement of individual freedom from market power through a 
fair access to basic resources. Differently, in Japan, the concept of welfare entails the 
necessity of the nation to safeguard national enterprises from competitive outsiders that 
would damage local businesses and generate negative externalities for the society as a 
whole. 
Scholars engaged with sociological, political and economic disciplines have been 
analysing these typological constructs of capitalism in order to understand how they 
come to create structural frameworks that perpetuate the difference between them.202 
The kind of analysis advanced by Hall and Soskice as well as by Chandler makes specific 
reference to the role of firms and private enterprises in the construction of specific 
capitalistic structures. Chandler, in his analysis of market development from 1850 to 
1970, concludes that firms and markets, by evolving together, shape industrial outcomes 
and frame capitalistic prototypes of modern industrial economy. According to Schröter, 
Chandler’s analysis demonstrates ‘how profoundly business systems influenced the 
development of the society and vice versa’.203 In other words, ‘institutional structure 
follows firm strategy’.204 In the same vein, Crounch and Streeck maintain that 
globalisation may produce an international arena made up of capital regimes that will not 
vary according to national policies, but rather according to market and private 
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necessities.205 However, Hall and Soskice observe that it is ‘unrealistic to regard the 
overarching institutional structures of the political economy […] as constructs created or 
controlled by a particular firm. Because they are collective institutions, a single firm 
cannot create them; and because they have multifarious effects, it may be difficult for a 
group of firms to agree on them’. 206 Following Calvert, Hall and Soskice maintain that 
governments play a very important role in coordinating firms’ desires, necessities, and 
interests within a common supra-structure.207 Companies are expected to construct 
strategies using the advantages offered by just such supra-structures. In short, the 
institutional arrangements of each country are not under the control of firms (even 
though they can be inspired by them), but are the result of state regulatory actions.208 
Similarly, Streeck observes that the state plays a fundamental role in enforcing the 
institutions that, beholden to a specific theoretical frame of reference, shape a distinctive 
model of capitalism.209 The approach developed by Streeck is easily applicable to the kind 
of research conducted here. This is because the analysis of antitrust institutions deals 
with the kind of decision-making process conducted by states in their attempt to act in 
accordance with a shared theoretical frame of reference and to enforce policies that 
respond to particular market problems or conditions. 
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By pursuing this theoretical line of enquiry, it is possible to maintain that the US, 
Europe and Japan have been characterised by a distinctive set of institutions developed 
to face market issues in distinctive ways. In this respect, each of those states has adopted 
a model of capitalism in conformity to the variety of antitrust framework to which the 
country subscribes. However, since antitrust regulations have first been adopted by the 
US, and only later enforced in Europe and Japan after the Allies’ intervention in the 
post–World-War-II era, it is hard to deny that the foundations of antitrust regulation in 
those countries have been at the very least influenced by the US. 
Because of the heterogeneity of its membership, Europe cannot be identified as a 
cooperative capitalism in toto. Nevertheless, it is often thought of as a conservative 
‘continental’ model, in no small part comparable to the German system. Generally, this is 
applicable in the antitrust context and also in the way in which market and welfare are 
regulated.210 In other words, the general European competition framework can be 
described as a cooperative capital structure of German origins, where the state mediates 
between the necessity of maintaining economic freedom and that of safeguarding citizen 
welfare.  
Although the Japanese model is to some extent akin to the German one, the 
influence of US antitrust culture on the one hand and Confucian traditions on the other 
make it a sort of hybrid. Generally, Tokyo attributes a moral value to competition and it 
tends to enforce it more by fostering internal rivalry than by merely opening the market 
to external investments.  
Every model of antitrust is embedded in a specific model of capitalism, and its 
evolution goes in line with the general development of capitalistic practices. However, 
while it is clear that antitrust models contribute to typifying national varieties of 
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capitalism, it is less clear what kind of ideas influenced them in particular. Hence, the 
following sections will address the economic theories that have helped to shape national 
antitrust frameworks. 
AMERICAN COMPETITION POLICY AND ANTITRUST 
 
The US is the country where all the major contributions to the theorisation of antitrust 
were first put forth and applied. The development of antitrust policy dates back to July 2, 
1890 when President Benjamin Harrison signed Bill S. 1, which later became known as 
the Sherman Act, the first antitrust law applied in the American territory.211 Even though 
the Canadian antitrust law, namely the Canada’s Combines Investigation Act, was 
promulgated before the Sherman Act, it was less rigorous and never quite received the 
same degree of public attention.  
Initially, the decision to address trusts through an appropriate regulation was very 
controversial, hard to justify and strongly resisted. Indeed, in light of  the liberal 
environment where American companies used to operate, the Sherman Act raised the 
spectre of  a condensed form of  state interventionism over the market.  
The debate on whether antitrust should regulate competition was finally settled 
once it became obvious that in order to protect the efficiency of  the American market it 
was necessary to fix the boundaries of  companies’ freedom and to avoid any 
concentration of  economic power that could negatively affect individual economic 
opportunities and consumer welfare.   
By the middle of  the twentieth century, antitrust regulation started to be accepted 
as the ‘American religion’, the ‘Magna Carta of  Free Enterprise’, or the ‘Bill of  Rights’ 
that would preserve – not limit – the possibilities of  economic initiative.212    
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As soon as antitrust became widely accepted, a political, economic and juridical 
debate on how deeply antitrust should regulate the market began to develop. From that 
moment, American policymakers had to learn how to balance the necessity to maintain 
freedom in the market with the need for regulation. The advent of  economic crises, 
namely the Great Depression, the oil crises and the current credit crunch, caused several 
shifts in the enforcement and application of  competition law and policy. In this respect, 
the promotion and implementation of  different theoretical approaches by the American 
government over the course of  history can be interpreted as an oscillating pendulum. 
That is because American perspectives on how antitrust is to be interpreted and adopted 
have repeatedly changed in attempts to safeguard competitiveness and tackle economic 
downturns.213 
Among the various causes of  the three economic crises, it is necessary to include 
the malfunctioning of  particular antitrust policies and the symptomatic failure of  the 
theoretical approaches of  reference. In this context, the U.S. government has been trying 
to intervene in the market through a new set of  antitrust institutions in an attempt to 
change the way business activities are conducted and, therefore, to correct the 
deficiencies of  the system.  
This was not the only cause of  the three economic downturns; the failures of  
distinct antitrust approaches and institutions can be linked to the broader inefficiency of  
the economic system as a whole. In addition, those shifts in the application or 
interpretation of  antitrust policy paralleled shifts in many other policy areas.214 For 
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instance, the particular antitrust institutions applied after the Great Depression by 
Thurman Arnold were inspired by a more Harvard-oriented theoretical approach. Yet, 
this theoretical approach can be incorporated into a broader interpretation of  market 
regulation that finds affinities in the Keynesian and Fordist models. Similarly, the Chicago 
theories implemented in the 1980s by Reagan through appropriate institutional 
arrangements reflected a more general neo-liberal system. 
 Hence, in order to appreciate the role of  the different antitrust institutional 
frameworks before and after the crises of  the 1930s, the 1970s and of  the present years, 
it is important to conceive every alteration of  antitrust institutions as a product of  
alterations of  the theoretical frames of  reference.215  
 
Anglo-American Perspectives on Competition 
The outbreak of the Great Depression in the early 1930s inevitably questioned the faith 
in the ability of the neoclassical perfect-competition model to provide macroeconomic 
stability and equity. The growth of large corporations, which became predominant in 
Western markets but contrasted the perfectly competitive and entrepreneurial firms 
described in the neoclassical model, only reinforced those doubts. In fact, the 
identification of industrial concentrations and cartels as one of the causes of the 
recession, as well as of the rise of fascist regimes, led academic researchers to explore 
new economic models in search of effective antitrust policies that could offset the under-
consumption and recessionary trends of the late 1930s.216 
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These new economic models emerged out of marginalist economic theory. By 
drawing attention to the behaviour of agents in the market, marginalism proved to be 
more receptive of the new economic necessities than the Smithian theoretical tradition. 
The classical approach, while largely coherent and well structured, was poorly applicable 
to the reality of the time because it was mainly based on an economic landscape featuring 
actors as small enterprises with low initial investment and little product differentiation217. 
Marginalism explicitly questioned the effectiveness of laissez faire in favour of its 
own theory of competition.218 Building on the neoclassical economic approach, scholars 
like Alfred Marshall and his student Joan Robinson began to develop new competition 
models based on the idea that markets can reach an equilibrium where prices are above 
the competitive level and competition can be constrained by entry barriers.  
According to Marshall, when demand is low, concerns of spoiling the market can 
result in a scenario where firms do not cut prices. By not reducing the level of prices, 
companies can eventually experience growth in the long term and enjoy economies of 
scale. Once their profits start to rise, the internal economies of firms would then lower 
average costs of production and prices would decrease, beneficing consumers. Marshall 
believed that by growing strong, a firm could ultimately establish a monopoly, but that 
this condition would not last. He maintained that a firm is like a family; while the father 
invests time and energy to grow his business, his children, spoiled by the condition of 
welfare they have become accustomed to, do not work to develop it further and so the 
company loses market power. To overcome the inaccuracies in Marshall’s model, and on 
the back of previous studies conducted by the Italian jurist P. Sraffa and by R.F. Khan, 
Joan Robinson introduced in 1933 the concept of imperfect competition. This 
challenged the notion of pure competition and affirmed the existence of market 
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imperfections.219 In her Economics of Imperfect Competition, Joan Robinson argued that, 
unlike neoclassical economic thought, a marginalist analysis could demonstrate how 
perfect competition is not the norm and monopoly is not an exception. On the contrary, 
‘it is more proper to set out the analysis of monopoly, treating perfect competition as a 
special case.’220 
Robinson’s work was the first methodical application of marginalist approach to 
product-differentiated markets.221 In her view, both perfect and imperfect competition 
models are characterised by an open market where there are no barriers to entry or exit. 
However, contrary to perfect competition, the imperfect competition model allows 
buyers and sellers to deal with highly differentiated products so that they can exert a 
certain level of discretion over prices. In other words, because companies produce 
slightly differentiated goods, they can also decide the price of each commodity. This 
discretion allows firms to charge higher prices without losing competitiveness, as in the 
case of the perfect competition model. Indeed, those firms may opt to sell fewer 
products while charging marginally higher prices or vice versa; the uniqueness of their 
goods allows them to stay in the market and to avoid head-to-head competition.222 
Robinson claimed that corporations, in virtue of this kind of functional differentiation, 
could only maximise their interests by subtracting wealth from those who could not 
differentiate their output, notably the labour force. For that reason, soon after the 
publication of her book, she became one of the foremost followers of Keynes. 
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A few years later, Edward Chamberlin developed a monopolistic competition 
model. This was based on a synthesis of monopolistic and competitive theories and on 
the idea that large corporations that enjoy differentiated products, excess capacity and 
considerably fixed investment costs in specific equipment may end up dominating the 
market.223 Chamberlin maintained that the idea that competition cannot entail 
monopolies was wrong, as markets are normally constituted by a combination of the 
two. From this perspective, the model of imperfect competition appeared exceptionally 
realistic, because situations of perfect competition subsisted only in markets where a 
number of firms produce an almost identical commodity.224 However, according to a 
marginalist approach, perfect competition – or the condition where prices are driven by 
marginal costs and where goods are produced at the most efficient rate possible – was 
not a normal effect of the market; it was an exceptional one, which could only be exerted 
through government intervention.  
Chamberlin's monopolistic competition model soon became one of the most 
elegant approaches of the time. By incorporating functional product differentiation into 
competitive economic models, he maintained that ruinous competition could affect only 
those industries that, unable to differentiate their merchandises, could only compete on 
price level. Monopolistic competition allowed firms to differentiate their outputs, charge 
higher prices and sell fewer wares. However, in the face of stiff competition, those firms 
were compelled to invest in the differentiation process because other companies would 
eventually duplicate what they were producing and sell the same manufactured articles at 
a lower price; this would limit firms’ ‘monopolies’ over their own goods. 
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These two models, along with the broader marginalist approach, apart from 
strongly challenging the classic idea of perfect competition225, became of fundamental 
importance for the development of the Harvard school of thought.226 From the vantage 
point of a more empirical perspective, this school refused to take into consideration the 
perfect competition model because of its inapplicability to practical reality.227 
The Harvard School gained ground in the aftermath of the Great Depression and 
World War II, when Keynesian economic theories started to be used to rebuild 
macroeconomic assets and Fordist principles began to be applied across the productive 
system. 
 
The Great Depression and the Rise of  the Harvard School 
According to Kovacic, the theoretical dispute animating the intellectual basis of US 
competition policy has revolved for many years, or at least until the 1970s, around two 
schools of thought: the Chicago and the Harvard. While the Chicago School started to 
influence more persistently US antitrust policy during the 1980s, the Harvard School 
inspired the antitrust trends that dominated the economic thinking toward competition 
from the 1940s through the 1970s.228 
Since the 1930s, the Harvard School, specifically Edward S. Mason, developed a 
‘structuralist approach of competition analysis’ based on the idea that markets may fail to 
be efficient because the behaviour of sellers and their performances are not persistently 
rational. As early as 1937, Mason claimed that monopolies are a structural and not a 
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behavioural problem of market economy; indeed, since pure competition rarely exists, 
the majority of market has de facto monopolistic elements: ‘Such markets, which may be 
said to be purely competitive in the sense of being completely devoid of any element of 
control over price, are comparatively rare. In most markets some sellers or buyers (or 
both) exercise some degree of control’.229 
Because such control is perfectly compatible with the existence of some degree 
of competition, it is the responsibility of public policy not to eliminate monopolies, but 
to differentiate those market conditions and business practices that maximise public 
interests from those that do not.230 Building on this, Bain added that competition might 
not be workable in concentrated oligopolistic industries.231 Consequently, together with 
Mason, he developed a model that formally attempts to relate industrial structures to 
their performance, i.e. their degree of competitiveness. The powerful evaluation tool that 
resulted from their research is known today as the ‘structure-conduct performance’ 
(SCP) paradigm. According to Harvard economists, the number of sellers and the size of 
their activities are what make up the structure of any market. The latter component is 
influenced by such factors as the existence of mergers and acquisitions, product 
differentiation, and conditions of entry into the market. The behaviour of sellers can be 
either pro- or anti-competitive and their consequent performance has profound effects 
on the distribution of goods, on the level of efficiency in terms of costs and 
technological progress, and on consumer welfare. However, as Hovenkamp explains:  
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Firms in concentrated industries with high fixed costs could not avoid 
comparing their prices with those of rivals and determining whether to 
match or undercut them, or they could not avoid deciding whether a new 
product differentiation in a market was necessary to their own success or 
how others might meet it. This conduct was in turn thought to dictate 
performance. Given an expression in which structure entails conduct and 
conduct entails performance, conduct itself dropped out as a variable of 
interest. One could predict performance simply by knowing something 
about structure.232 
 
According to Bain, the US market was subjected to high levels of concentration, which 
would never grind to a halt; on the contrary, it would tend to increase.233 This 
phenomenon could be made worse by a flexible antitrust policy permitting mergers and 
acquisitions among firms. Yet, governments can re-establish competition by using 
regulations, laws and other institutions to avoid the emergence of such anticompetitive 
practices as mergers, cartels, or price agreements, which have a deleterious effect on the 
market.234 Indeed, if competition is not perfect, public intervention represents the only 
way to make it workable.235 
Economist J.M. Clark developed the concept of workable competition in the 
1940s. In essence, he held that, since pure competition is not applicable to reality, the 
only effective action that policy can pursue is not to make it perfect, but to make it 
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‘workable’.236 Given that competition is not purely perfect, functional differentiation 
advanced ‘some of the healthiest vases of workable competition in large scale 
industry’.237Indeed, competition based on prices and not on products, in a market 
characterised by imperfect knowledge, will damage the sellers and the quality of goods.  
As Vanderbilt University economist George W. Stocking argued, ‘Pure 
competition is not generally attainable’ and ‘pure monopoly rarely exists’.238 In this sense, 
insofar as perfect competition is not applicable to reality, governments should intervene 
through the law in order to adjust imperfect competition and eliminate anticompetitive 
forms of conduct, which have a negative impact on economic trends.239 This follows the 
theory that if it is not possible to achieve the ideal result, it is better to try to reach the 
second-best solution by using the law to discipline market operations.240 The ‘workable 
competition’ model supported the development of American antitrust policy as a set of 
rules that should preserve and serve competition in the market.241  
As illustrated in the following chapter, the Harvard School developed a much 
stronger competition approach in the 1940-50s, which inspired US antitrust regulation 
until the beginning of the Oil crises of the 1970s. Especially in merger policy matters, the 
SCP model led the US government and the courts to adopt a stricter approach. 
Examples of Harvard’s influence over antitrust policy-making are, first, the 1950 Celler-
Kefauver Act, which amended section 7 of the Clayton Act and extended the application 
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of merger controls over cases of market dominance, and, second, the 1968 Merger 
guidelines approved when Harvard-trained economist Donald F. Turner became the 
head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.242  
The success of the Harvard School model can also be linked to a broader wave 
of new economic thinking, such as Keynesianism and Fordism, which was generally 
oriented towards the development of general welfare. In other words, while marginalism, 
and later the Harvard school of economic theory, inspired the regulation of competition 
in the international market towards a more welfare oriented approach, Keynesianism and 
Fordism dictated policies pertaining to production and social wellbeing. This theoretical 
framework led to the development of a post-war international liberal economic and 
productive system based on government intervention against market dysfunction. This 
order, established during the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, is usually identified as the 
Golden Age of capitalism, because it supported the development of the international 
economy by fostering the diffusion of shared liberal values and by promoting, in the 
majority of industrialised capitalist countries, especially in Europe and Japan, the 
development of institutions modelled after the American tradition.243 
 
Neo-liberalism, Chicago School and the Oil Crises 
The oil crises of the 1970s underlined the ineffectiveness of the liberal model as applied 
during the Golden Age. Indeed, in addition to the economic stagnation caused by oil 
shortages, the US also had to face the kind of competition from Europe and Japan that, 
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since the 1950s, had been rising ‘from the ashes of World War II’.244 In order to face the 
economic downturn, Washington appraised a number of different theoretical responses 
and policies. These included proposals for increasing the level of state intervention in the 
market or for developing national economic planning, guarantying full employment and 
protecting investors and consumers.245 However, despite those ‘state-centred’ ideas, by 
the early 1980s the pressure exerted by major business leaders and lobbying groups 
representing all segments of business capital was accommodated by the rise of neo-liberal 
theories that advocated a greater reliance on the market allocation of resources and the 
reduction of state interventionism in the economy. 
Neo-liberalism can be generally defined as a model, or ‘paradigm’, built upon 
classical and neoclassical liberal economic theories. According to Foucault, neo-liberalism 
was primarily driven by the devolution of state power in favour of self-regulating free 
markets, and it was taken as the model of ideal government.246 In the US, this economic 
approach was translated into political reforms that emphasised the importance of 
individual freedom of choice and allowed a transnational circulation of capital.247 
The first methodical expression of neo-liberal economic ideas dates back to the 
Mont Pelerin Society. The Mont Pelerin Society was founded in 1947 under the aegis of 
the economist Friedrich August von Hayek, an influential member of the early 20th-
century Austrian School of Economics. In contrast to Keynesian ideas of state 
interventionism in the economy, the Society believed in self-regulation and in a market-
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oriented economic system driven by a ‘free society’. According to Hayek, since economic 
freedom is as important as political liberty, government interventionism cannot be 
considered as a simple attempt to control material production; rather, it counts as a 
serious venture of despotism. 
The Chicago School of Economics shared the neo-liberal principles advocated by 
Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society and thus supported the body of antitrust reforms adopted 
by Reagan in response to the crises.248 Reinterpreting competition in a dynamic way, the 
School developed a ‘behaviouralist approach’ of antitrust policy inspired to the 
neoclassical price theory and based on the faith in the long-term efficacy of the market 
mechanism.249 According to an economic Darwinist interpretation, developed by Stigler 
in his 1964 seminal article Theory of Oligopoly, the market is an arena where different firms 
compete freely, namely without any governmental or public intervention, and where only 
the best players survive.250 In this context, the essential role of competition is to allow 
more efficient firms to ‘take business away from the less efficient’.251  
Indeed, the Chicago School, resting on the neoclassical assumptions about the 
rational behaviour of market participants, rejected the idea propounded by the Harvard 
School that economic actors do not always act rationally.252 On the contrary, actions that 
were originally considered inefficient or anticompetitive were believed to promote, rather 
than harm, competition. As the Chicago School postulates the ability of markets to ‘work 
themselves toward the competitive solution’, government intervention was considered 
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hardly, if ever, effective.253 State intervention could be tolerated only in case of cartels 
fixing prices, mergers creating monopolies, and dominant firms pricing predatorily. All 
other practices, such as vertical agreements and price discriminations, which would not 
damage consumer welfare, were to be permitted.  
As a result, the best antitrust policy is the one that guarantees and does not 
negatively affect the effective possibility to compete. Market has in fact the capability to 
adjust itself since competition among companies can undermine inefficient economic 
behaviour. 
As one of the prominent exponents of the Chicago School, Robert Bork, argued: 
the principal meaning of competition law and its original intention was consumer 
protection, therefore ‘consumer-oriented law must employ basic economic theory to 
judge which market structures and practices are harmful and which beneficial’.254 
However, the Chicago School definition of consumer welfare deals with economic 
efficiency, not with wealth transfers from producers to consumers. Even when 
anticompetitive arrangements as mergers or acquisition decrease general utilities, they are 
still considered convenient and legal as long as they promote economic efficiency.255 
The Chicago school of  antitrust analysis is interpreted by many economists as 
one of  the most structured, elegant and coherent theory of  antitrust regulation.256 Its 
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optimism and pro-market confidence inspired the main reforms applied by President 
Reagan in antitrust policy and became the theoretical base for a neo-liberal stage of  
capitalism that favoured the rapid development of  big corporations.257 For instance, in 
1986 the US government enforced the Merger Modernization Act, which, by amending 
section 7 of  the Clayton Act – the one previously revised by the 1950 Celler-Kefauver 
Act – allowed corporations to easily reorganise their business activities through mergers 
and acquisition.258 
 The crisis of the 1970s caused the collapse of the Keynesian economic system of 
the Golden Age and favoured the development of new capitalistic institutions that, from 
the beginning of the 1980s, would become intellectually and ideologically dominant in 
leading the new neo-liberal stage of capitalism.259 The Chicago institutional framework 
represented not only the basis upon which the US could overcome the crisis, but also the 
structure through which the rest of the world started to regulate the market in order to 
‘re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation’.260 
 
The Post-Chicago School 
The Chicago School antitrust theories dominated American antitrust regulations and 
international economic working rules for almost three decades. This doctrine was so 
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entrenched in the American ways of doing business that even though the Clinton 
administration went some way to challenge it, the Chicago approach endured until the 
Bush presidency, when the world economy was shaken by the outbreak of the worst 
financial crisis since the 1930s. 
The credit crunch has been principally caused by the international spread of a 
mortgage crisis linked to the US housing construction sector. However, the wide-ranging 
permissive policy towards mergers applied in the previous years, by allowing big 
companies to acquire enough shares to control the financial sector, resulted in a general 
overturn of governmental policies and in a well spread systemic risks that  led to the 
crisis.261 
After his election in 2008, President Obama had to face a difficult economic 
situation. Not only did the US seem to have lost its economic power, as other countries 
such as China, India and Brazil were – and are – growing much faster than the West, but 
its neo-liberal model of capitalism, the one that had been adopted by (and that benefited) 
much of the rest of the word, turned out to have contributed to a deep recession in the 
US. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, President Obama has acknowledged the necessity 
to enforce new antitrust institutions in order to face those market problems and the 
approach that he is apparently keen to use is a so-called Post-Chicago one. The Post-
Chicago School can indeed represent ‘another swing to [the] antitrust ideological 
pendulum’ because, by having less confidence in the capacity of markets to face the 
‘strategic anticompetitive behaviours’ of dominant firms, it significantly re-established the 
belief in the effectiveness of government intervention. 262 
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This school of thought developed at the end of the 1970s, during the ‘height of 
Chicago School influence’, when some economists started to criticise the absolute 
efficiency of a laissez-faire antitrust approach and to call for a new antitrust policy. 263 
Those academics developed a model that did not challenge or refute the Chicago-School 
doctrine per se. On the contrary, neo-liberal principles were used as a starting point for a 
new model that more effectively responded to market imperfections as well as mergers 
and other anticompetitive practices.264 
While Post-Chicago scholars trusted the effectiveness of free markets, they also 
believed that its internal dynamics were much more complex than those conceived by a 
traditional Chicago-School perspective. In their view, the extreme dynamism of global 
commercial trends had produced more anticompetitive practices and antitrust-violation 
cases than tribunals and courts were able to judge upon. Thus, Post-Chicago researchers 
accepted the free-market assumptions of the Chicago School, but also recognised the 
necessity to explain competition procedures in a far more complex market environment. 
This led to the adoption of methodologies and research approaches based on 
econometrics and game theory.265 
The Post-Chicago School econometrics analysis can be linked to the Harvard-
School structure, conduct, and performance model because it is based on the statistical 
interpretation of the effects of anticompetitive practices, such as how a merger can affect 
prices. For instance, network theory derives from the analysis of the behaviour of 
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companies operating in the technological sector. Most of the time, the production 
activities of those firms, which is usually very dynamic, is submitted to specific standards 
that are dictated by a dominant corporation. Although this process of standardisation of 
production can create economic benefits – indeed, final products can be interchangeable 
– it can also cause the exclusion of outsider competitors. Network theory can help to 
shed some light on whether the gains in network effects overcome the negative 
externalities.266  
The form of game theory used in network analysis is based on the study of firms’ 
goal-oriented strategic plans. In other words, Post-Chicago researchers analysed how 
firms can be expected to act and how they anticipate the behaviour of other enterprises 
in order to calculate the best possible choice for all the players. The game model can be 
cooperative and non-cooperative. In cooperative game theory models, competitors can 
decide to make binding agreements, which restrict their feasible strategies, but help them 
obtain medium gains. On the other hand, non-cooperative games theory is based on the 
assumption that firms cannot communicate, let alone cooperate, and therefore adopt 
strategies that result in a suboptimal equilibrium. This game theory approach is different 
from previous models because it is based on the assumption that competitors make their 
decisions on the basis of other players’ strategies. 
Even though the Post-Chicago model has been applied in a number of court 
trials over the past few years, many scholars found it to be inconsistent and hardly 
applicable to reality as it lacks a coherent and unified theoretical body.267 Currently, it is 
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probably too early to predict whether the Post-Chicago model will soon be dominating 
the field of US competition regulation. Yet, Christine Varney, the current head of the US 
Antitrust Division, has recently maintained that the actions of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) were likely inspired by Thurman Arnold, who was the first to foster ‘a sustained 
program of antitrust enforcement on a nationwide scale’.268 However, it is very unlikely 
that Obama will be able to enforce Harvard-oriented regulations; the Merger Guidelines 
adopted in 2010 are a perfect illustration of this dilemma: on the one hand, they have not 
consistently reformed the material but, on the other, they have introduced a more 
flexible interpretation of mergers.269 Even so, while still based on the 1982 version, the 
Guidelines surely reflect an on-going trend of change in merger enforcement practices.270 
It may be argued that Obama is trying to promote Post-Chicago antitrust institutions 
based on efficiency analysis, but not on outright laissez faire. 271 This could reflect the 
general economic regulatory trends emerging within current neo-liberal policies.   
 
EUROPE AND JAPAN: ALTERNATIVE COMPETITION THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Since the approval of the Sherman Act in 1890, the US has been one of the main 
promoters of competition policy. Even though examples of European or Japanese 
antitrust regulations date back to the interwar period or earlier, those countries only 
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developed an appropriate competition system after World War II, when the US 
intervened directly and leant on them to adopt a body of regulations suitable to its own 
economic and political interests.  
For instance, in 1957, Western European nations ratified the Treaty of Rome, 
whose antitrust measures resulted in a reinterpretation of the Ordoliberal principles 
suggested by Harvard professor Robert Bowie. Similarly, in 1947 Japan enforced an 
Antimonopoly Act, which was the outcome of a long negotiation between the Allied 
forces and the local government.  
Although the US has repeatedly attempted to shape competition policy in those 
countries, they managed to maintain the institutional peculiarities that typify their model 
of capitalism. Most scholars of competition policy, such as Eleanor Fox, consider the 
process of antitrust harmonisation among the US, Japan and Europe as a chimera. To be 
sure, the process may be still on-going, and many antitrust rules are indeed similar on a 
textual level, but fundamental differences remain.272 
The difficulty in promoting a unique international antitrust system is related to 
the differences of economic and juridical structures across different countries. For 
instance, while European states (with the exception of the UK) have generally adopted a 
civil law system, where the rule of law counts more than the rule of reason, the US has a 
common law system. This can explain why European interpretation of competition was 
usually not as oriented towards economic efficiency as the American one. Indeed, the 
Commission and the Court of Justice, in interpreting any violation of competition 
regulations, focused mainly on the extent to which a particular economic behaviour was 
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at odds with European laws, rather than how profitable it was in terms of economic 
performance.273  
Moreover, although Japan has a constitution, its Confucian traditions influence 
the way the administration understands and interprets reality. For example, even though 
Japanese legislation envisages criminal sanctions and prosecutions in the form of fines or 
imprisonment, they have been barely applied in over thirty years of antitrust law 
enforcement. This trend can be explained by the fact that Japanese firms’ fears of losing 
their reputation has typically led them to follow the recommendations of the Japanese 
Fair Trade Commission, to admit their violations, and to directly subject themselves to 
possible sanctions. In fact, according to Kawashima Takeyoshi, Japanese law can be 
compared to an heirloom samurai sword: it is to be held dear but not to be made use 
of.274 
Apart from the juridical system per se, the major obstacles to antitrust 
standardisation are represented by culture and traditions and the way efficiency and 
welfare are interpreted and perceived in each country. For example, one of the aims of 
the European competition regulations is to develop a common market by breaking down 
trade barriers between European member states. This would guarantee efficiency and 
promote welfare. In fact, the cardinal values of European regulations are embodied not 
only in the principle of free movement of goods and people, but also in the strict control 
of beggar-your-neighbour policies. This is normally enforced by limiting and controlling 
those anticompetitive practices, such as concentrations, dominant positions and national 
grants, that may be detrimental to the general effectiveness of the common market. This 
European propensity may be linked to the influence of the German Freiburg’s vision of 
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economics that exalted the need to protect individual freedom from government and 
market despotisms. In particular, the Freiburg school has historically aimed at creating a 
political economic structure, which had to position itself into a sort of middle way 
between the pure American liberal system and the Soviet one: a model, in which the state 
would, at the same time, protect and enhance individual freedom in the market through 
the application of appropriate rules.275  
Although the feeble competition tradition, which has characterised Japan prior to 
any US intervention in the country, the essence of Japanese antitrust policy lays in the 
necessity to foster efficiency and welfare by safeguarding the internal market from 
external pressures. Competition among companies operating in the same environment 
guarantees efficiency in and of itself; indeed, since losers are socially inacceptable, firms 
have to perform to the best of their capability. Even though the introduction of an 
antimonopoly law attenuated this trend, these ideas could not be completely repudiated 
as they stood as the basis of Japanese culture.  
Thus, it is safe to argue that those competition systems are indeed different: they 
are products of specific cultural and political frameworks and, although they might 
pursue similar interests, they employ different means to reach them. Hence, before 
investigating the role of American antitrust theories in the construction of those 
competition regimes, I believe it useful to first explore the meaning of antitrust in those 
countries. This can only be done by analysing how welfare and efficiency were conceived 
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and obtained in those countries according to their local antitrust theoretical 
conceptualisations. 
 
European Competition Policy 
European competition policy does not only have a slightly differentiated structure, as 
compared to the US antitrust regulatory body, but also a very different meaning. 
According to Gerber and others, the essence of European Competition policy lies in the 
necessity to foster primarily the political and economic integration of the member states 
in the common market.276 Above all, European competition law was designed to defend 
the economic freedom of market players, regardless of their economically efficiency. The 
reasons for this stems from the necessity to prevent the aggregation of big businesses 
that would harm the economic performance of smaller competitors and ultimately 
reduce market integration.277 For this reason, European competition policy is the sole 
policy area where the Commission – a central bureaucratic organ that is not influenced 
by the national interests of member states – exerts a preponderant power. 
The history behind the European competition policy as well as its theoretical 
background dates back to the Ordoliberal movement. Originally, Ordoliberalism 
encompassed many different schools of thought that were generally identified as liberal. 
However, as the Freiburg School was the most influential among them, after the end of 
World War II, the whole Ordoliberal movement began to be identified mainly with this 
specific school of thought. 
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Even though the first general idea of a body of laws that would protect 
competition developed in Austria a century ago, it was the Freiburg scholars, and among 
them Walter Eckon, who debated and developed its arguments under the aegis of the 
1920s Weimar Republic. For instance, Eckon suggested a rather innovative competition 
model, which underlined the necessity of enforcing a set of national competition laws 
able to direct the market without limiting individual freedom to invest. At the time, this 
approach was rather original considering the protectionist and mercantilist policies 
adopted by the majority of European countries. 
Apart from the Freiburg researchers, other scholars also contributed to the 
development of Ordoliberalism. For instance, the ideas of Wilhelm Ropke, and of his 
followers, were often regarded as part of Ordoliberalism as they had been heavily 
influenced by the Freiburg School.278 However, even though Ropke shared its 
fundamental principles, he adopted a more humanistic point of view at the expense of 
the technical and doctrinal approach developed by the Freiburg School. The school 
influenced economist Alfred Muiller-Armack as well, although his ideas were more 
oriented towards a social-market structure where economic welfare had to be equally 
redistributed in society. Nevertheless, the differences between the social-market 
economic model and the Ordoliberal one were minimal, so much so that many 
researchers used the terms interchangeably.279 
What is often referred to as the third branch of Ordoliberalism is known as the 
classical, or ‘pure’, liberalism approach. This was in large part developed by Friedrich von 
Hayek, the founder of the Mont Pelerin Society and the scholar who inspired the 
Chicago School. Even though Hayek generally agreed with Euckon’s assumptions 
concerning the importance of competition, he rejected any active role of the state in 
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fostering and maintaining the best possible conditions for competition because he 
believed in the neoclassical hypothesis that the market is self-adjusting.280   
On the back of this vast theoretical framework, the first European competition 
law was approved in Germany in 1923 in order to face the post–World-War-I crisis and 
to develop a fair economic system that would help to restore the German market and to 
face inflation problems.281 According to the Ordoliberal school, competition played a 
fundamental role in fostering the development of a free market economy and 
consequently of economic development, individual freedom, and price stability.282 In 
advancing liberal assumptions, they theorised the necessity to use an appropriate 
‘constitutional framework’ to protect individuals from the authority of the state and to 
safeguard the society as a whole from the power exerted by private economic actors.283 
In other words, Ordoliberals, by applying a sort of Kantian approach to 
economics, emphasised the importance of enforcing an ad hoc legal framework to 
preserve individual freedom from excessive political controls or unfair economic 
dominance. 284 Accordingly, competition law had to fix the boundaries of individual 
actions and build a sort of behavioural system of reference that would not limit but 
enhance competition with a view to promote economic progress.285 Thus, the means of 
competition policy lay in the prevention of any kind of economic abuse by those firms 
that understood economic rivalry not as a way to foster their profits but as an obstacle to 
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their business interests. In fact, according to Walter Eucken, one of the central problems 
of modern economic thought and its institutional application was the general detachment 
from the social and political reality. In other words, while classical economists, such as 
Adam Smith, interpreted economics as a discipline imbedded in the legal and the political 
system, over the course of the nineteenth century liberal theorists started to lose sight of 
the political and social necessities of the time and began to focus purely on laissez-faire 
economics.286 
Because it linked competition not only to economic efficiency but also to the 
kind of economic welfare that could be obtained through political freedom and market 
equality, the Ordoliberal School could be argued to simply have sprung up in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. The collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise to power of 
the Nazis resulted in the exclusion of the much too liberal Freiburg scholars from the 
economic regulatory process. 
To be sure, Ordoliberal thinkers envisioned an institutional change that would 
restructure society as a whole. In their rejection of past economic models, they attempted 
to build a sort of third way between democracy and socialism and between American 
capitalism and Soviet economic planning. On the one hand, they accepted classical liberal 
principles of competition and economic freedom as necessary for economic welfare; on 
the other, they advanced liberalism and drew attention to individual economic welfare, 
rather than efficiency, and freedom, rather than state control. In other words, 
Ordoliberal scholars dreamed of a society where the state had to protect, not to limit, 
individual economic and political freedom and had to do so through a general public 
dispersion of power so as to ensure the broadest participation to the decision-making 
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process.287 In addition, competition had to be ‘complete’, i.e. markets should ensure firms 
enjoy equal levels of influence in order to prevent any possibility of coercion between 
them.288 
Although the application of Freiburg competition ideas into appropriate laws 
proved to be too weak to resist the Nazi protectionist and cartel-oriented propaganda, 
the German experience was fundamental in developing adequate legislation in the rest of 
Europe and in sparking debates on the effectiveness of competition regulation.289 
Yet, a true revival of Ordoliberalism began only after World War II, when the 
US, by identifying cartels as one of the reasons that allowed the Nazi regime to acquire 
power, started to revaluate Ordoliberal economists and compelled Germany to adopt an 
Anti-Cartel Law based on a combination of Freiburg ideas and American antitrust 
principles. Ordoliberalism has remained one of the main sources of inspiration of 
European Competition Policy ever since. 
Thus, it is undeniable that European competition policy has a very different 
history and a dissimilar approach from American antitrust policy; however, it is also true 
that the US has always tried to influence European regulation over competition 
regulation. For instance, the first European antitrust law enforced through the European 
Cool and Steel Community was drafted by Harvard School professor Richard Bowie and, 
according to Jean Monnet, was an adaptation of the Sherman Act principles to a 
European context.290 Thus, the resulting competition policy would partially reflect a 
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European tradition of thought, such as the Ordoliberal one, while complying with the 
American wish to abolish cartelisation in Europe. This instrumental use of a European 
theoretical framework represented the beginning of American direct and indirect 
guidance over the European institutionalisation of competition policy. The extent and 
depth of this influence will be analysed in the following chapters. 
 
Japanese Competition Policy: Theoretical Foundations 
 
Japan, too, can be argued to have a cooperative capitalistic structure; even the 
feeble competition tradition that has characterised the country prior to any US 
intervention seems to follow this route. The peculiarity of the Japanese economic system 
lies mainly in its Confucian tradition, which encourages particular forms of economic 
activities and a different understanding of market issues from the one inspired by the 
Western Christian tradition.291  Confucian influenced over Japanese society became very 
strong during the Sakoku period. Literally Sakoku means “closing the country” and it 
refers to the two and a half centuries when the federal government -Tokugawa shogunate 
(bakufu)- severed links with the outside world. 292 In fact, since the 1630s, the 
enforcement of five directives limited the rights of Japanese to leave their country, 
prohibited Christianity and authorised the expulsion of Europeans with the exception of 
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a limited number of Dutchmen, who were transferred from Hirado to Deshima in 
Nagasaki bay.293 This closure was led more by a political decision than a real cultural 
threat. Indeed it was believed that the spread of Christianity was a weapon used by Spain 
and Portugal to back their influence over the region.294  As a result of the Tokugawa 
Bakufu era and the extreme closure from the outside western world, allowed Japanese 
market to develop a national distribution system that would overcome regionalisms and 
to be more strongly influenced by Confucianism principles. This is very important 
because the spread of Confucianism, understood in Japan as an ethical system rather 
than a mere religion, provided the cultural tools that would give origin to the Japanese 
capitalist spirit. In fact, by stating that frugal behavior was a noble behavior, 
Confucianism taught to the Japanese society the first prerequisite for capital 
accumulation: make efficient economic decisions to foster savings. According to 
Roderick MacFarquhar and Morishima, Confucianism had a similar role to the rise of 
Japanese economy to Protestantism in the West, with the only difference that Confucian 
economic man “works hard and plays hard, buys much, but saves more".295  
The Confucian recipe for economic success lies not only in frugality but also in 
good governance.296 Good governance was associated with filial devotion, humaneness, 
and ritual decorum. Thus, on the one hand frugality allowed Japanese society to start a 
process of savings, which in turn allowed the beginning of a capital accumulation and 
investments practices. On the other hand, since Confucius’ understanding of good 
governance is based on the transposition of good family behaviour onto a macro-level, 
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these conducts symbolize the main practices that a state should apply in leading its 
country. It should in fact maintain filial devotion by providing for social stability. It 
should also foster humaneness by respecting social fairness and class positions. Lastly, it 
should preserve ritual decorum by encouraging dignity and responsiveness among its 
citizens.297 
Hence frugality and the above mentioned governance practices resulted in 
economic policies with developmental functions. While business actors had to work, 
save and reinvest, the state had to coordinate the economy and maintain socio-economic 
equilibrium. Thus, it had to take into consideration the will and interests of industrial 
groups, encouraging competitiveness among national businesses, and leading the 
industrialisation process.298 The government could influence the type and the frequency 
of investments as well as the direction and diffusion of technological innovation. It had 
to coordinate companies’ activities according to a national plan of industrial and 
economic reconstruction, which would privilege long-term growth instead of short-term 
efficiency in order to turn the Japanese economy into a leading economic force in the 
international arena. In doing so, the state would abide by all the Confucian principles 
while guiding the developmental process of the Japanese economy and fostering 
competition among firms. The Japanese economy was indeed characterised by a sort of 
business networking system among the main industries: the kereitsu.  
Until the 1990s, thanks to the intense competition among the kereitsu members 
and the state direct investments into industries and technologies, Japan has been growing 
at the rate of a so-called economic miracle.299 The Confucian economic structure that has 
created a cooperative economic model survives still today. Despite the many attempts to 
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completely open its market to external interventions, Japan still remains attached to a 
traditional interpretation of competition and efficiency based on close government ties 
with enterprises, powerful bureaucracy, and business networking.300  
Contrary to what is generally believed, the first example of Japanese competition 
policy was not introduced by the US; indeed, Japanese regulation over competition dates 
back to the sixteenth century when the rakuichirazuka policies promoted by Oda 
Nobunaga (1534-1562) and Toytomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) allowed the country to 
abolish unions and eliminate local customs barriers and market fees.301 As Hideaki 
Kobayashi, the Deputy Secretary-General of Japan Fair Trade Commission, has stated in 
one of his speech to the American Bar Association: 
Everyone who studied high-school-level Japanese history knows 
the phrase, “raku-ichi-raku-za”, “raku” meaning easy or liberal, “ichi” the 
market, and “za” the guild or trade association. In total, it means 
“liberalizing markets and liberalizing guilds”. This was the policy taken up 
by Oda Nobunaga, a warlord who started the process of reunification of 
war-torn Japan. It was pushed further by Toyotomi Hideyoshi who 
completed the reunification. The purpose of the policy was (i) to abolish 
customs duties levied on people entering the market in each city, and (ii) 
to abolish monopolistic privileges, which trade associations had enjoyed. 
All this took place, as a matter of fact, between 1570 to 1600. So we 
Japanese had competition policy in the late 16th century. Could someone 
tell me when the Pilgrim Fathers got to New England?302 
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Apart from those first attempts to enforce adequate competition regulations, the 
real opening towards the western world was forced by the 1858 American Commodore 
Matthew Perry’s “gunboat diplomacy”, which pushed Japan to abandon its isolationism.  
The consequent 1867 Meiji restoration allowed Japan to switch towards a strong policy 
of openness and westernisation.303  It is at this time that such concepts as market 
economy and economic freedom gained currency, together with a first understanding of 
the Western classical economic theories and the idea that free competition could 
promote economic welfare and efficiency. A West-oriented legal system was adopted and 
many treaties were signed between the Japanese government and its Western 
counterparts: little by little, Japan allowed its markets to experience and join the Western 
competition game.  
Thus, the merit of the Meiji’s government was to open Japan and to integrate its 
tradition with a necessary measure of modernisation. In this vein, Japan started to use 
industrial policies to catch up and compete with the West by reducing import restrictions 
and other tariffs. However, a close relationship between the government and businesses 
resulted in national subsidies to the developing entrepreneurial class and allowed the 
formation of cartels to counterbalance excessive competition. According to David 
Landes:  
It was the State that conceived modernization as a goal and 
industrialization as a means, that gave birth to the new economy in haste 
and pushed it unrelentingly as an ambitious mother her child prodigy. And 
though the child grew and developed its own resources, it never overcame 
the deformity imposed by this forced nurture.304 
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In fact, the economy mainly developed thanks to those industry associations that allowed 
Japan to be economically efficient and to use private resources to promote welfare by 
solving public problems such as unemployment, recessions and high start-up costs. The 
power of industrial associations was so great that from 1931 to 1940 Japan heavy-
industrial growth rate was steeper than any other developed nations.305 
In this sense, the meaning of competition in Japan was very similar but at the 
same time also very different from the Western one; the Anglo-Saxon tradition of free 
competition and its rejection of any government intervention were both considered 
harmful. In contrast to the Western culture, traditional Japanese interpretation of 
competition encouraged efficiency and welfare through the implementation of internal 
competition among local enterprises, which were at the same time protected by the state 
from any external economic menace. Those practices, which from an American 
perspective were considered collusive and anticompetitive, helped to strengthen Japanese 
competitiveness. Indeed, since 1853, when the US started to force the country to open to 
foreign trade, the strong relation between government and business firms had 
safeguarded the internal market even more than protectionism.  
The Japanese strategy consisted in the partial adoption of European and 
American technology, education and institutions, while retaining its own traditions. 
Accordingly, Japan developed a unique capitalistic system, characterised by the 
coexistence of property rights and extensive government interventions in the economy. 
The Japanese internal market was mostly controlled by the Zaibatsu, a group of holding 
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companies structured in an oligopolistic organisational system, which was owned by 
members of single families, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Furukawa, 
and Okura.306 
This approach toward competition was dictated by a more general Japanese 
Confucian idea of order and harmony, where the exertion of power had to be centralised. 
Thus, since the market mechanism and laissez faire were not compatible with any kind of 
central planning, free competition was not considered the best strategy for economic 
development because it rewards luck, recklessness and unscrupulousness and because it 
creates losers.307 As explained by Naohiro Amaya, unlike in the US, where if someone 
fails he or she can still have the possibility to rebuild his future somewhere else, in Japan 
it is very hard for people to accept and deal with failure.308 Hence, Japanese Confucian 
traditions were transferred to the management of the market: the state exerted a strong 
power over business practices and provided protection for local enterprises from 
external threats; at the same time, this system encouraged order and cohesion among 
companies, by fostering efficiency and competitiveness among them.309 
 However, as will be better explained in the historical chapters below, over the 
course of history, the US has been challenging the Japanese competition system time and 
again. Indeed, the US has been pushing Tokyo to partially abandon its restrictive 
interpretation of capitalism, by coercively imposing ad hoc antitrust institutions in the 
form of law or bilateral agreements. However, Japan has also found it convenient to 
adopt a few Western antitrust conceptions. Even though those external influences – 
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whether coercively imposed or voluntarily applied – have forced Japan to reform its 
antitrust system several times, the core institutional structure of the Japanese competition 
system is still maintaining its peculiarities. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
From a varieties-of-capitalism (VoC) perspective, it is possible to maintain that each 
country develops specific institutions according to its cultural background and its 
particular economic interests. Generally speaking, the US model of capitalism has been 
identified as a liberal system, whereas Germany and, in part, Europe, or at least 
continental Europe, have been considered  cooperative models of capitalism as they were 
originally influenced by Ordoliberal principles of state interventionism. Japan, too, 
despite its hybrid system, could be identified as a cooperative system, as the government 
in Tokyo has always played a very strategic role in managing the economy and enhancing 
market performance.  
In this vein, the varieties of antitrust institutions and competition cultures of US, 
Europe and Japan can be ascribed both to the different models of capitalism as well as to 
the national or local way to perceive concepts such as efficiency and welfare. For 
instance, European competition law is more concerned with the direct enhancement of 
the common market through the promotion of fairness and general welfare.310 By 
contrast, US antitrust law is usually more focused on the promotion of efficiency, which 
is believed to create welfare on its own311. Indeed, an efficient society seeks to maximise 
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the values of each economic action and thereby creates higher standards of living within 
the limits of with its available resources.312 Accordingly, the role of antitrust law should 
lie in the implementation of freedom in the market and not in the direct protection of 
economic actors. In Japan, on the other hand, the role of competition is not explicitly 
one of protecting consumers. This objective is in fact subordinated to the goals of 
ensuring that businesses are not harmed and that jobs are not threatened by what 
Japanese economic policymakers view as excessive competition or free market.313  
Hence, while the nature of antitrust lays in the promotion of fair market rivalry, 
which would allow all the members of society to participate and profit of market 
investments’ possibilities, its real application changes according to cultural background. 
Therefore, it can generally be maintained that antitrust is the institutional tool used by 
governments to define the limits of business conducts according to what is conceived as 
efficient or socially beneficial by the general background and the economic necessities of 
each country. The institutionalisation of specific antitrust approaches indeed goes in line 
with the characteristic of the different models of capitalism.  
Despite the difference in the way capitalism, and specifically competition, is 
perceived and institutionalised, this thesis will demonstrate that a process of antitrust 
internalisation and internationalisation has pushed – or allowed, depending on the stance 
taken – for the adoption of specific antitrust regulations and conceptualisations by 
Europe and Japan, which has modified their antitrust institutions. Indeed, as it will be 
better explain in the next chapter, processes of ideological diffusions have contributed to 
alter traditional interpretation of market and trade practices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 ANTITRUST: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS AND CHANGE  
 
It is evident that the role of  culture, beliefs and, more generally, of  ideas is fundamental 
in determining the general background upon which specific models of  capitalism 
develop. Ideas seem to be extremely influential tools in shaping reality. In Hall’s words, 
John Maynard Keynes once observed that the ‘ideas of  economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than 
is commonly understood’.314  
In order to understand the evolution of  antitrust institutions and the models of  
capitalism that evolved in the aftermath of  the above-mentioned crises, one should 
investigate the policy-making process that determined the institutionalisation of  specific 
decisions and how each of  those political choices was necessarily influenced by the 
beliefs political leaders hold about macroeconomic dynamics.  
In this sense, it is essential to analyse the specific functions played by ideas in this 
process. Even so, the scholarly attention received by ideas should by no means 
overshadow the role of interests. For instance, historical institutionalist Peter Hall, in his 
analysis of the influence of economic ideas on the Conservative Thatcher governments 
of the 1980s, maintained that the bold changes that invested the UK during those years 
where caused by major clashes among economic needs. Specifically, the shift from 
Keynesian policy to neo-liberalism was justified by the rise of new interests that were not 
pursuable through the previous political imprinting because of the incapacity of the old 
ideological structure to provide the basic tools to understand the crisis. However, ideas, 
and the consequent policy paradigms constructed by policymakers, are the means 
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through which it is possible to mobilise alliances, foster collective action and, at the same 
time, maintain the fundamental requirements for the two latter conditions. While material 
circumstances may help to discern what is possible and what is needed, policy paradigms 
are the only beacons of  clarity in any given political struggle.315  
Academics have long tried to balance the capacity of both material and 
ideological elements to influence policy outcomes; nonetheless, many scholars, such as 
Blyth, have criticised ‘ideas-matter’ enthusiasts for ignoring the important role of 
interests as determinants of change.316 In fact, according to Blyth, ‘attributing a change in 
behaviour to a change in ideas is tenable only if  it is counter factually demonstrated that 
the change could not have occurred without the ideas. The lack of  such a methodological 
check is a weakness on two counts.’ 317  
As a result, the main critique on the part of the functional-interest supporters is 
that the role of ideas in influencing policy-making is largely epiphenomenal. Indeed, 
according to a functional approach, every time there is a situation of  instability, actors 
modify the institutional framework in order to maximise their interests. Ideas have a 
purely utilitarian role: individuals, specifically political actors, use them to build strategies, 
pursue specific utilities, and overcome problems. The capacity to enact reforms depends 
on the policymakers’ capability to construct ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’ 
discourses and, in this process, the ideological frame of  reference does not shape 
interests; these exist per se, as part of  the individual free will.318 However, according to 
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Vivien Schmidt, discourses, as a set of ideas, serve to promote an ‘interactive consensus 
for change’, as they may be a ‘reflection of the interests of key policy actors and an 
expression of institutional path dependencies’. They also ‘exert a causal influence on 
policy change, serving to overcome entrenched interests and institutional obstacles to 
change by altering perceptions of interest and showing the way to new institutional 
paths’.319  
Furthermore, in each historical period, ideas and discourses have been used to 
formulate strategies and to respond to specific social and economic necessities. However, 
at the same time, they have also defined actors’ perceptions of  the costs and benefits of  
particular political choices and influenced the way they identify achievable objectives.320  
Therefore, both ideas and interests have a causal weight in the explanation of  
human actions; indeed, while each individual acts rationally to pursue his or her interests, 
their rationality is always influenced by the social beliefs of  the time.321 In the case of  
antitrust, it is evident that the interests pursed by competition regulation and reflected by 
theories revolve around the maintenance of  an effective level of  competitiveness in the 
interest of  efficiency and welfare. Nonetheless, the way in which efficiency and welfare 
are perceived, and therefore institutionalised, are determined by ideas. For instance, 
Roosevelt, along with his successors, made references to Keynes and the Harvard School 
theories to justify the embedded liberal economic order they wanted to create in order to 
foster efficiency and social welfare so as to kick-start growth. Similarly, Reagan’s 
business-oriented reforms were supported by the neo-liberal views held by the Chicago 
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School and were meant to promote efficiency by liberalising market transactions. In this 
sense, ideas and interests are always intrinsically linked and never mutually exclusive. 
Ideas 'do not float freely'; on the contrary, they develop through individual 
interactions within the social environment and they can be theoretically organised by 
schools of  thought. 322 What makes the mechanism evolutionary is the fact that not all 
ideas survive; they are implemented into policy only if  they are ‘politically salient’, in 
other words, only if  they respond to specific and contingent necessities.323 Therefore, 
although it is assumed that all political decisions are driven by specific interests, the 
definition of  interests, such as the achievement of  economic efficiency or welfare, is 
influenced by the cultural, theoretical, and ideological background of  each specific social 
organisation. Still, the dilemma of  why and how some economic beliefs will likely define 
interests and others will not, needs further analysis.   
 
ECONOMIC IDEAS, CULTURE AND ANTITRUST THEORIES 
 
Scholars have not paid much attention to the study the process through which ideas 
affecting policy-making and thus become powerful tools in themselves.324 As outlined 
above, the traditional Gramscian approach emphasised the material nature of  ideologies 
and their capacity to originate apparatuses or institutions. Indeed, the effectiveness of  the 
role played by ideas has been subordinated to the existence of  a hegemonic class capable 
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to use its knowledge dominance to legitimise its own supremacy.325 From a Gramscian 
perspective, many scholars, such as Cox and Gill, have related such analysis of  culture, 
belief  and knowledge to the study of  hegemony in the international arena without taking 
into account the power of  ideas per se in originating specific policy choices.326 
 The second common approach in the analysis of  ideas is behaviourism, 
especially the rational-choice versions, which, however, do not directly investigate the 
role of  ideas in the process of  institutionalisation. While ideas are taken as facts, in 
particular as a rational response to economic necessities, the concept that receives most 
attention is institution, as well as its effect on the market in terms of  interest-seeking 
behaviour. In other words, there is no need to analyse ideas, because ‘behaviour can be 
adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to the situation’.327 As maintained by 
Goldstein and Keohane, the rational explanation of  beliefs and policy outcomes 
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questions the influence of  ideas on policy-making.328 Similarly, Sikkink argues that the 
prevalence of  interest-based explanations of  political decisions underestimated the role 
played by ideas and that ‘much theoretical energy is expended demonstrating that it is not 
necessary to know what political actors think in order to explain how they will act’.329  
Rational-choice analysis has been criticised because its interests-based model has 
repeatedly failed in explaining or predicting policy outcomes so a large number of  
scholars, from different political economic backgrounds, have begun to take into 
consideration the role of  ideas and the power exerted over the social realm.330 For 
instance, traditional rational-choice proponents such as North and Knight have started to 
abandon a purely behaviourist angle for a broader approach in which emphasis is given 
as much to the role of  material needs as to that of  ideas.331 
Reflectivists, too, consider the impact of  ideas in explaining international 
dynamics. Specifically, they study the process through which language, culture and beliefs 
can impose constraints on the individual ability to define and act in line with objective 
interests. Indeed, according to Wendt, interests are not as exogenous to social actors as 
rationalists maintain; rather, they are an endogenous part of  individuals. In this sense, 
knowledge itself  becomes the subject of  analysis.332 
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However, the reviews provided by reflectivists are most of  the time too abstract 
and therefore lack empirical foundations. Hence, the theoretical line adopted in this 
chapter will follow the one outlined by Goldstein and Keohane. These scholars do not 
reject rational-choice theory and strongly believe that individuals are driven by the will to 
fulfil their needs; however, they do not underestimate the role of  the ideological 
substratum. In their view, ideas and interests play an equal role in determining social 
actions and are never mutually exclusive.333  
Generally, ideas, economic ideas or economic knowledge are the set of  shared 
values that determine the social understanding of  how the market should work or be 
regulated and what the objectives to be reached should be.334 They comprise social 
conventions as well as theories; indeed, the latter only represents the logical organisation 
of  ideas by experts. Goldstein and Keohane have formulated a workable definition of  
‘idea’ by splitting the concept into three different components. They have identified 
principled beliefs, which allow the distinction between right and wrong, causal beliefs, 
which ‘derive authority from shared consensus of  recognised elites’, and ‘world views’ on 
how theories influence what should be regulated and how.335 
Accordingly, a principled economic belief  might, for instance, underpin the 
moral necessity to avoid market concentrations in order to allow for equal participation 
in the market. A causal economic belief  can be thought of  as the conviction that 
antitrust regulations will reduce anticompetitive practices. Lastly, world views normally 
denote a general ideological framework, such as the sort of  liberalism embodied in the 
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Harvard antitrust theory or the kind of  neo-liberalism of  the Chicago School. The 
definition of  ‘economic ideas’ used in this thesis encompasses all three aspects. Indeed, 
ideas become a powerful tool for policy-making when the principled, causal or 
worldwide beliefs they embody are used by political actors to define the directive of  a 
specific policy, to provide precise goals to be reached, or to define possible solutions 
through embedded political institutions. In fact, according to McNamara, political actors 
use those shared beliefs as a ‘crucial guidance’ because they provide them with the 
means-end knowledge for setting up macroeconomic policies. In this sense, ideas work as 
‘flashlights’ that delineate a framework of  reference for policymakers to follow.336 
It is possible to argue that the power of  ideas is ascribable to their ability to 
promote what philosopher Thomas Kuhn defined as a paradigm shift, i.e. the capacity to 
transform the way people live and understand the social realm.337 This happens when 
ideas become shared beliefs and are supported by specific elites. Indeed, the choice of  an 
ideological framework is not politically neutral, but always influenced by the interests of  
the actors involved in the decision-making process.  
In conclusion, the variety of  antitrust institutions, which reflects the variety of  
models of  capitalism, is a product on the one hand of  the material interests pursued and 
on the other hand of  the set of  ideas that influence the decision-makers’ perception of  
reality. Hence, European, Japanese and American individuals pursue efficiency and 
economic welfare by acting in specific, distinct ways. This modus operandi is determined by 
not only the specific economic needs or interests that individuals wish to pursue, but also 
by their cultural background. Indeed, ideas, theories and the general understanding of  
reality inspire political actors to institutionalise specific practices. At the same time, 
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however, the very existence of  interests requires political actors to look for possible ways 
to reach them. Considering the importance of  political actors in the construction of  
institutions, the following section will analyse their role in the institutional process. 
 
INSTITUTIONALISATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
Douglass North maintains that the actors involved in the process of institutional 
change are the decision-makers of institutional organisations. At a macro-level, it is 
possible to interpret these ‘organisations’ as political organisations or ‘the complex of 
political parties and interest intermediaries that stand at the intersection between the state 
and society in democratic polities’.338 The actors, on the other hand, can be thought of as 
the politicians and the experts of national political discourse at any given time.339 Their 
knowledge and their ability to manage political discourses give them the legitimacy to 
represent social interests, to frame state policy, and to influence the public perception of 
social issues.340 Gourevitch suggests that policymakers are influenced by a combination 
of ideas and that their actions are a reflection of such principles.341 In other words, the 
choices made by those actors are determined by their ‘mental models’, i.e. the 
combination of ideas and culture that defines their way of thinking, understanding and 
perceiving reality.342 Indeed, culture can generally been defined as the ‘raw material in the 
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on-going crystallisations of institutions in a society’. 343  In this sense, from a reflectivist 
point of view, it is possible to define society's forms as culture's substance. Indeed, 
according to Goodenough, society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or 
believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members. So culture consists of 
the  “(i) criteria for categorizing phenomena as meaningful stimuli, (ii) criteria for 
deciding what can be, (iii) criteria for deciding how one feels about things (preferences 
and values), (iv) criteria for deciding what to do about things, (v) criteria for deciding how 
to go about doing things, and (vi) the skills needed to perform acceptably”.344 Hence, 
culture is the set of criteria for regulating society and defining its institutions; it is a 
socially established structure of meaning. However, it is not clear how culture can be 
changed and what is the role of individual actors in this process.  
Hence, I believe that the most workable interpretation of culture is the one 
provided by Geertz. Geertz points out that culture is the ensemble of “webs of 
significance that individual themselves have spun”.345 I think this definition is the most 
complete, because it provides an intuitive interpretation of culture, which is considered a 
product of individuals’ manipulation. It is also an inclusive definition, because the webs 
of significance at the basis of a cultural environment defining individuals way of 
behaving, can refer to several elements such as ideas, theories, habits. Moreover, while 
human beings are lead by their culture, they are also active in shaping and reshaping it 
according to their interests or needs.  
In the context of antitrust, it is possible to say that experts, or political actors, 
have to conjure up new ideas and so modify the cultural framework of reference because 
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the social realm constantly presents problems that need to be solved. According to Hall, 
it is however too simplistic to assume that antitrust experts theorise antitrust ideas as 
impartially as neutral analysts who try to interpret reality and transmit their knowledge to 
policymakers.346 However, it is also excessively cynical to consider theories as merely a 
means to justify specific political strategies or interests. 
As the Romans used to say, in media stat virtus: there is a sort of  equilibrium 
between the duty of  experts to transmit knowledge and the will of  political actors to 
fulfil their agenda. On the one hand, experts employ their expertise to access and 
influence the policy discourse, while on the other hand political interests are mediated by 
the cultural environment where they develop.347 Consequently, it is hardly possible to 
separate ideas from interests, because interests derive and develop from specific cultural 
and theoretical conceptions. As Woods argues, ‘it is true that different sets of  economic 
ideas promulgate and legitimate different sets of  interests. However, this is not to say 
that ideas are no more than an embodiment of  interests. […] Actors redefine their 
interests in the face of  new institutions or ideas’.348 
In the context of  US antitrust policy, the process of  antitrust institutionalisation 
involves many actors, both experts and practitioners; a sort of  ‘policy community’ 
defined by John Kingdon as a group of  ‘specialists’.349 Following Heclo's definition, it is 
also possible to name this community as an issue network, or a ‘shared-knowledge group 
having to do with some aspect of  public policy’.350 
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This antitrust community, or issue network, consists primarily of  past and 
present policymakers, members of  the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Antitrust Division (DOJ), lobby groups, corporations and courts. The knowledge they 
shared is antitrust knowledge. However, because the juridical interpretation of  antitrust 
has been increasingly influenced by economics, it is possible to maintain that the debates 
around antitrust theories and its institutionalisation have been framed primarily in 
economic terms. Thus, economics, or rather the language of  economics, is the shared 
body of  knowledge that unites the community of  experts and that governs the 
interaction of  its members. With that in mind, the history of  the different economic 
schools of  thought can be thought to trace the ideological material that has influenced 
throughout the decades the institutionalisation of  antitrust policies and the consequent 
evolution of  the various models of  capitalism. This process is always implemented by the 
same experts that, upon becoming part of  the policy-making process as members of  the 
Federal Trade Commission or the Department of  Justice, are able to promote specific 
competition policies. The appointment of  these practitioners is normally a duty of  the 
President of  the United States; once again, this selection is obviously influenced by 
contingent political and economic reasons, interest groups, and business corporations.  
For example, the nomination of  Thurman Arnold as head of  the Antitrust 
Division of  the Department of  Justice by Roosevelt in 1938 was driven by the felt need 
to re-launch American free competition by means of  a new antitrust program.351 Inspired 
by a marginalist-structural perspective, Thurman Arnold wanted to raise the impact of  
the Sherman Act by prosecuting national and international cartels, which were 
considered the cause of  the Great Depression. Accordingly, under Arnold’s 
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administration, the first extraterritorial application of  antitrust was made against one of  
the most important cartels of  the time: the Aluminium Company of  America (Alcoa).352 
Arnold's campaign against cartels marked a significant change in American 
antitrust policy. By promoting principled beliefs of  free market and free competition, 
Arnold also spread the causal beliefs about the need to establish a more rigid control 
over international cartels, considered one of  the causes of  the recession. Moreover, 
through the extraterritorial application of  antitrust and anti-cartel laws, he contributed to 
the worldwide triumph of  the liberal principles embodied in the Harvard antitrust 
school. In those years, Thurman Arnold had gained a large number of  legal victories 
against the monopolization and price-fixing practices of  American and foreign firms.353 
From this angle, Arnold can be considered an expert who was directly invited to join the 
political arena by a political actor (Roosevelt) in virtue of  his expertise.  
In contrast, Chicago-School theories were the main inspiration for the reforms 
adopted in the 1980s by Baxter and Miller on their appointment by Reagan at the head 
of  the FTC and the Antitrust Division. The Chicago School became the theoretical 
foundation of  the institutions that envisaged a neo-liberal stage of  capitalism. For 
instance, in 1986 the US government passed the Merger Modernization Act. This Act, by 
amending section 7 of  the Clayton Act, affected the efficacy of  merger policies so as to 
‘not interfere with the ability of  American firms to freely reorganize through mergers 
and acquisition’.354 
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The causal belief  of  Reagan’s neo-liberal antitrust policies lay in the conviction 
that by allowing a growth in concentration, or a merger, within certain economic sectors, 
big corporations would rapidly develop and restore an American economic dominance 
over the international arena.355 The liberalisation of  markets promoted by what became 
known as Reagonomics was meant to strengthen enterprises headquartered in the United 
States, which in the 1980s allowed the US to control 36.8% of  the world total output in 
manufacturing and 51.5% in services.356 Moreover, those corporations contributed to the 
worldwide expansion of  the American antitrust approach that indirectly strengthened the 
influence of  the Chicago School and of  Reagan’s antitrust policy on other states’ 
competition regulations.  
In conclusion, it is possible to define the actors that facilitated the 
institutionalisation process of  antitrust as an issue network that promoted the conversion 
of  specific antitrust ideas into proper institutions. After the above analysis of  the genesis 
of  ideas, their transposition into theory, and the actors that are involved in the process, it 
is now necessary to explain how theories are institutionalised in such times of  change as 
the Great Depression of  the 1930s, the Oil Crises in the 1970s and the current 
downturn.                              
The role of  Crises in Institutional Change 
Each of  the three crises discussed here represents a very interesting example of  
the power of  antitrust ideas over the US decision-making process in times of  cultural, 
political, and economic changes. All of  them gave way to an exceptional historical 
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juncture that witnessed profound transformations in the institutionalisation of  antitrust. 
Yet, in order to understand their role in the process of  institutional change, one should 
first question their nature and their meaning.  
Giving a precise definition of  crises is notoriously difficult; Colin Hay himself  
maintains that crises are one of  the most understudied concepts in political theory.357 
Blyth provides us with a very interesting definition: he associates crises to situations of  
Knightian uncertainty since their exceptionality makes agents incapable of  recognising 
and pursuing their needs. 358 As interests cannot be immediately recognised, they become 
‘something to be explained’, rather than something that can help explain or resolve the 
crisis itself.359 In this context, social actors, or issue networks, take it upon themselves to 
analyse the situation and come up with a general notion of  what the crisis is all about. 
The constant interplay between agents and their environment provides society 
with a first basic institutional mechanism for overcoming uncertainty. 360 Here, ideas play 
a pivotal role, in that they offer a diagnosis of  the problem and a shared interpretation of  
the causes of  the crisis; in addition, not only do they identify what has to be done, but 
they also provide institutional resolutions with the necessary legitimacy to become 
workable. 
Although the analysis offered by Bay and Hay is very coherent and well 
structured, interests are not interpreted as the mere outcomes of  ideas. They are instead 
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conceptualised as co-participants in the formation of  those institutional reforms that are 
inspired by the predominant ideological framework. In other words, ideas, like a pair of  
lenses, allow individuals to see more clearly how they can achieve their objectives. 
Interests, on the other hand, require individuals to think about how to reach them, 
thereby allowing the development of  ideas.361 According to this interpretation, the 
Knightian uncertainty described by Blyth does not deal with interests themselves, but 
with how to pursue them. In this sense, ideas and interests play a crucial role in causing, 
and therefore in offering, an interpretation of  the crisis. On the one hand, crises are due 
to the fact that the institutional framework does not reflect or follow the new economic 
interests. In other words, since human rationality is not perfect, institutions may fail to be 
efficient and crises are the manifestation of  deficiencies within the system. On the other 
hand, ideas provide different solutions and interpretations on how to reach new 
objectives and overcome the downturn; these suggestions, if  shared, become 
institutionalised into institutional frameworks.  
Hence, crises themselves are not the main cause of  change, but rather the outcome. 
What plays a strategic role in the institutional revision is not the crisis per se, but the 
perception of  failure. In other words, the awareness of  institutional inefficiency, in terms 
of  the extent to which interests can be achieved, pushes social groups to develop or 
reinterpret ideas in order to understand their environment, to reduce uncertainty, and to 
offer solutions that are in turn re-institutionalised.  
It is not always the crisis itself  that generates the need to push for institutional 
change, but it is the perception of  failure, along with the instability of  political 
institutions, that creates room for change. In other words, when a political institution is 
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thought to be crumbling, political actors may try to adopt new policy prescriptions.362 
However, while the insight of  failure is a necessary condition, it is no guarantee of  an 
effective modification in the set of  institutions of  a given country – and neither is a crisis 
per se. For instance, not all the institutional changes in the US antitrust policies that are 
here analysed have followed an economic crisis.  
While the enforcement of  the Sherman and Clayton Act were anticipated by 
economic difficulties, these could not be associated with a real crisis. Yet the adoption of 
Harvard-oriented ideas, after the Great Depression, or of the Chicago ideas after the oil 
crises, can be understood as the necessity to embrace a different economic vision to 
respond to the new economic interests that were emerging out of the economic 
downturns. Since those crises manifested the inadequacy of  the entire institutional 
settlements, or mode de régulation, in every political economic aspect, the changes applied in 
the context of  antitrust were in accordance with the enforcement of  general economic 
policies.363 For instance, while Harvard ideas were institutionalised into competition 
policies that promoted general welfare, Keynesianism was translated into social policies. 
In the same way, Chicago principles gave birth to a more laisse-faire antitrust approach in 
accordance with neo-liberal economic policies. Similarly, while the current crisis appears 
to have not triggered any major institutional change, it has forced political leaders to 
wake up to the need for reforms. However, adapting institutions to the exigencies of  the 
economic system is not automatic and requires time.364  
In conclusion, while crises do not ensure institutional change, they embody the 
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general conditions and prerequisites for generating one.365 Indeed, when there is a crisis 
involving historical, political, economic or cultural variables, individuals look for a 
modification of  the relevant institutional arrangements.366 Furthermore, because 
economic and financial crises represent a downturn not only of  economic and financial 
transactions but also of  the knowledge structures that shape the social realm, every 
economic downturn can potentially produce an ideological change.367  
 
Institutional Change: When, How and Why? 
As outlined above, crises, by varying the dynamics of  social transactions, can be a source 
of  institutional adjustments driven by the new ideas, or knowledge models, that shape 
the way individuals or organisations perceive their environments.368 However, what 
motivates political actors to modify the institutional framework is not the crisis itself, but 
the opportunity to overcome the general feeling of  failure. Those opportunities usually 
originate from external changes in the environment or from the acquisition by the 
individual of  new knowledge that becomes part of  its mental model, or construction. 
From a strictly economic point of  view, the most commonly perceived source of  
institutional revision is generally linked to the modification of  prices; however, changes 
in taste also come into play. Moreover, knowledge per se can transform the mental model 
of  individuals, thereby compelling them to reshape the institutional environment. 
According to North, institutional alterations are always linked to internal and 
external factors. However, the need for change is normally triggered by an external 
factor, specifically one that is perceived to be too costly for individuals. In this context, 
                                                        
365 Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy, 1993, Cornell University Press, 13. 
366 Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy, 1993, Cornell University Press, 13. 
Albert S. Yee, ‘The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies’, 1996, 50 International Organization 1, 69-
108.  
367
 Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth 
Century, 2002, Cambridge University Press 10. 
368
 Peter A. Hall ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain’, Apr. 1993, 25 Comparative Politics 3, 275-296, 289. 
138 
 
actors would compare the costs and benefits of  structural variation within the existing 
institutional framework and, in doing so, they would employ the ‘set of  beliefs’ – i.e. the 
revolutionary ideas – of  their historical moment. While these sorts of  institutional 
change normally preserve the core of  the institutional system, they are still likely to lead 
to a modification of  formal rules or to a progressive alteration of  informal social norms 
and behaviour.369 
This process of institutional change may be linked to a path-dependent 
mechanism whereby every action that occurs in a particular environment is the product 
of previous some behaviour. Indeed, because each political or economic establishment 
has its own structure, and because this structure shapes the mental models of the 
individual inside of it, every change is likely to depend on previous choices. Moreover, 
because organisations’ members are usually apprehensive about external factors that 
would make them lose power, they might try to adjust the institutional framework in 
such a way as to maximise their interests, protect their assets, and serve their past 
decisions. Those assumptions are in line with the theories of varieties of capitalism, in 
which economic structural models are normally considered embedded in the general 
cultural environment and where, despite recurrent institutional modifications, a complete 
alteration of the model as a whole is difficult to come about. However, changes can 
happen; it typically occurs when parties inside the organisation are not able to find a 
compromise and thereby let the entire institutional framework collapse.370 
Sewell defines path dependence as a process where past actions shape the future 
because ‘what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes 
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of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’.371 In this sense, what happens 
at time ‘one’ is related to what happens at time ‘zero’. Consequently, every political 
change set in motion to respond to contingent social and economic exigencies follows 
the trail established by past decisions. Indeed, according to Weir and Skocpol, ‘policy 
legacies’, or ‘meaningful reactions to previous policies’, shape the interests that political 
actors pursue at any moment in time.372 
In political studies, the concept of path dependence is normally applied to 
emphasise the role of specific patterns of timing, sequences and events in producing 
social outcomes and influencing political development.373 According to Bernhard 
Ebbinghaus, the different interpretation of path dependence can be encapsulated in two 
metaphors: the first one is that of an unplanned ‘trodden trail’ where every spontaneous 
action is consistently shaped by previous behaviours without any possibility for 
individuals to consciously modify it. The second metaphor is one of a ‘road juncture’, 
where actors can shape their future by choosing the path they see fit.374 
The notion of path dependence and its consequences over social processes of 
change can therefore be interpreted in different ways. Indeed, while the first model 
underlines that each institution evolves spontaneously according to a structure traced by 
past actions, the second approach, by positing the existence of alternative choices, 
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affirms the possibility of individuals to have a say in the development of institutions and 
in the process of institutional change.375 
The theory of path dependence has been developed from the Polya urn model, a 
mathematical modelling technique that demonstrates how past events can determine 
future change. According to this approach, once an action is repeated and reiterated in 
time, it is more likely to shape future performances.376 Following this pattern, the old 
school of institutionalism suggests that because habits and patterns of behaviour shape 
individual choices, institutional change is similarly shaped by the environment according 
to the direct consequentiality of previous actions. 
However, according to a more evolutionist interpretation of institutional change, 
individuals matter in the alteration process insofar as they can decide which ‘road 
juncture’ they wish to take. In the process of institutional construction, individuals are 
influenced by their framework of thought, in other words, by the ideas, ideology and 
culture of a particular environment as well as by how they all come to be theorised into a 
single logical system. In this respect, knowledge is fundamental in determining which 
institutions are going to be built.377 
According to Judith Goldsetin, once an idea is selected to be the theoretical 
framework of reference, it will leave its ‘vestiges’. In other words, ‘political rules and 
norms formed in response to and in support of an economic idea fundamentally 
influence the environment for future political choices’.378 Consequently, the institutional 
changes registered in the US during and after the above-mentioned crises have been 
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possible because of the development of new ideas, which, once incorporated into 
appropriate theories, have been used as frameworks of reference in political decision-
making. Both the Great Depression and the Oil Crises, for example, have been 
characterised by the development of antitrust theories that have inspired the main 
institutional change within the US model of capitalism. 
 
Internationalisation of Institutions 
Having understood the process of institutional change and the role of crises, I believe it 
is necessary now to examine why institutions can be implemented at a global level, and 
why and how institutional arrangements can be formalised internationally. In other 
words, it is essential to explain why the European Union and Japan came to adopt similar 
antitrust approaches to those of the US, even though their ideological frameworks of 
reference and models of capitalism were completely different. 
The internationalisation of antitrust institutions can be understood through the 
analysis of the process of policy diffusion as the basis of the spread and the 
institutionalisation of specific ideas. The first scholars to attempt an analysis of policy 
diffusion among US states, in the first half of the 20th century, were McVoy and 
Davis.379 According to Gilardi, McVoy interpreted US states as ‘policy laboratories in 
which innovations can be tested and, if successful, spread across the country’.380 Several 
other intellectuals, such as Gray, Walker, Berry and Berry, or Rose and Bennett, have 
later brought the study of policy diffusion to a regional or cross-national level.381 In their 
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analysis, policy diffusion, besides creating an institutional environment for achieving 
specific interests, increases the legitimacy of specific patterns of behaviour and shapes 
actors’ understanding of the social realm. At an international level, this can be assimilated 
to what Kehoane and Nye defined as an international regime, i.e. a network of rules that 
regulate and control the behaviour of actors. 382 From this perspective, the study of 
policy diffusion may shed some light on the way antitrust policies have been 
institutionalised and emulated outside the US.383  
The mechanisms of policy diffusion are thoroughly explained by the sociological 
theory of organisational isomorphism. Although theories related to isomorphism are 
normally applied to general organisations, it is possible to interpret these as political ones, 
to assimilate them to states, and ultimately to explain why Europe and Japan adopted 
antitrust policy connotations and regulatory structures similar to those of the US.384 For 
instance, Talcott Parsons defines organisations as ‘a social system oriented to the 
attainment of a relatively specific type of goal, which contributes to a major function of a 
more comprehensive system, usually the society’. 385 Similarly, Aldrich identifies them as 
‘goal-directed, boundary-maintaining, activity systems’.386  
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Organisations can be described as the structure that defines actors' goal 
orientations;387 thus, it is possible to consider the state an organisation itself or 'a 
bureaucratically organised administrative structure empowered to govern a geographically 
delimited territory'.388 However, while it is plausible to interpret the state as an organised 
unit, states or governments themselves differ from normal organisations because they 
can exercise authority over the latter. Even so, the state can be described as a special 
organisation with unusual powers but normal internal dynamics. 
The theory of organisational isomorphism can be interpreted according to two 
different schools of thought. From a sociological perspective isomorphism is a mimetic 
or normative process in which organisations tend to copy each other. Mimetic 
isomorphism occurs as a response to uncertainty, for instance when organisational 
technologies are poorly understood, or when the goals are vague, or again, when the very 
environment creates uncertainty.389 In other words, in a situation of uncertainty 
organisations tend to follow similar patterns, which are believed to be successful. The 
advantage of this approach is that it can provide a convenient and practicable solution 
with little expense.390 Indeed, while the organisation that is imitated may not be aware of 
being taken as a model, it directly or indirectly allows other groups to take advantage of 
its more advanced expertise and to borrow its practices. Moreover, as Alchian maintains, 
the process of imitating can per se originate innovations, which might allow the 
organisation to become, in its turn, a successful model of reference.391 For instance, the 
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Japanese trajectory of modernisation was a mimetic process. Indeed, since the Meji 
Restoration in 1867, Tokyo promoted several industrial policies to catch up and compete 
with Europe and the US.392 Japan partially emulated American economic institutions by 
integrating the concepts of competitiveness or economic efficiency with its traditional 
government control over the economy.  
For instance, the concept of competition was incorporated with the one of 
Confucian social order. This resulted in the government encouraging the development of 
cartelising practices, such as the Japan Paper Manufacturers Federation and the Japanese 
Cotton Spinning Federation, in order to promote economic efficiency and maintain 
control over trade practices.393 By copying Western capitalistic models, Tokyo adjusted 
liberal and neo-liberal systems in a way that was convenient to its interests. As a result, it 
produced new schemes and methods to understand capitalism. This explains why the 
Japanese model of capitalism differs remarkably from the German one, although they are 
both considered coordinated ideal-types. 
Normative isomorphism, in contrast, originates primarily from 
professionalization. According to DiMaggio and Powell as well as Larson and Collins, 
professionalization is characterised by a specific body of knowledge and a ‘market of 
services’.394 In other words, actors within organisations have similar backgrounds, and 
they tend to share similar ideas concerning the various problems at hand: this allows 
them to develop similar worldviews.  
Those ideas are then internationally diffused through the networking processes 
developed by the actors involved in professional and trade associations, which become 
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the de facto ‘empirical arena’ where ideas are spread.395 Professions can be defined as 
structures, which link the production of knowledge to its application while establishing a 
cognitive framework that legitimises its own autonomy.396 Professionalization, in turn, 
becomes a source of organisational isomorphism through universities and professional 
networks. On the one hand, formal education allows individuals to share a corpus of 
specific knowledge, to become part of a specific professional group, and to understand 
things by reference to similar concepts. On the other hand, the creation of professional 
networks allows models to be diffused very rapidly because their members share the 
same frames of reference regarding the ways to solve problematic situation.  
As will be better explained in the following chapter on the internationalisation of 
antitrust, the creation of the International Competition Network by the U.S. in 2001 can 
be considered an attempt to build an arena where antitrust practitioners can share 
information. Indeed, the establishment of the ICN and its study groups has allowed the 
development of a form of normative isomorphism among states that has led to processes 
of harmonisation between antitrust practices.397 
Differently from the sociological perspective, population ecologist scholars 
interpret isomorphism as a competitive phenomenon, which ‘involves pressures toward 
similarity resulting from market competition’.398 Building on Durkheim and Hawley, 
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Hannan and Freeman point out how competitive pressure forces organisations to adopt 
similar patterns of behaviour and parallel structures in the interest of economic 
efficiency.399 For instance, US liberal market institutions have spread around the world 
because the Anglo-Saxon liberal model of capitalism was considered to be the most 
efficient one.400 Even though the current financial crisis has been caused by a similarly 
extreme interpretation of this model, whose superiority is now in question, many 
countries are still hard-pressed to find alternatives.  
Since the competitive explanation has failed to clarify why specific models are 
adopted despite being inefficient, many scholars, including Kanter, DiMaggio and 
Powell, have tried to offer other explanations to supplement the institutionalised 
interpretation of isomorphism.401 With reference to utopian communities, Kanter 
suggests that, while the concept of institutional isomorphism is a useful tool to 
understand organisational life, it is limited. Indeed, organisations do not copy and 
compete among themselves just to obtain better economic results or performances; there 
are also other elements that need to be taken into consideration when investigating the 
process of organisational homologation: political power and institutional legitimacy are 
two of them.402  
In a nutshell, coercive isomorphism occurs when an organisation is in a 
condition of dependency from another one because the latter can exert formal and 
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informal pressure. 403 This pressure can come in the form of persuasion or it can be a 
simple invitation to adopt a collusive arrangement.  
The most powerful organisation can exert pressure over the weaker one to 
compel it to conform to its cultural, ideological standard. In fact, according to Pfeffer 
and Salancik, coercive isomorphism can be understood as a resource-dependency model. 
Organisations are obliged to homogenise their characteristics because they find 
themselves in a situation of dependency from those who can provide resources.404 
Thus, according to Di Maggio and Powell, the effects of mimetic, normative and 
coercive mechanisms on the social realm are not always easily identifiable because they 
can coexist and can cause organisational isomorphism by operating through different 
routes.405 In the same vein, this thesis will demonstrate that the competitive mechanism is 
equally important and can coexist with the sociological definition of isomorphism; in 
fact, states can adopt similar patterns also for competitive reasons. Both economic and 
sociological approaches emphasises that material resources or competitiveness per se 
cannot totally explain the internationalisation of ideas, and therefore of antitrust 
ideological frameworks and institutions. However, taken together, all of the isomorphic 
mechanisms may be instrumental to better understand why, in the wake of the three 
economic crisis here considered, Europe and Japan, despite their different traditions in 
terms of economic ideas and theories, implemented a very similar approach to the one 
adopted by the U.S. Indeed, even though their models of capitalism were and are 
different from the American one, it is not possible to deny that their antitrust regulations 
have been directly and indirectly influenced by the US. 
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Hence, the development of an antitrust institutional isomorphism in Europe and 
Japan can be explained not only in terms of the power relations with the US, but also 
through mimetic, normative or competitive mechanisms. For instance, an example of 
coercive isomorphism is the US intervention in post-war Germany and Japan. At the 
time, those countries were in a situation of dependency from the US in terms of financial 
economic aid and protection. In this context, the U.S. could compel them to adopt 
specific competition policies in order to abolish the level of cartelisation and 
protectionism that were believed to have caused both the recession and the war. In 1957, 
Germany adopted the Restraint of Competition Act (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), which complied with the American antitrust tradition by 
declaring cartels and trade-restricting combinations illicit.406 In Japan, by contrast, the 
Antimonopoly Law was passed in 1947 as part of the process of post-war market 
opening promoted by the US.407 Moreover, the US-driven construction of antitrust 
institutions, in turn, set in motion a normative mechanism of isomorphism, as those 
countries started to adopt a similar language of reference.  
McNamara singled out another example of mimetic and competitive mechanism. 
In his analysis, the adoption of monetarism by Germany after the oil crises of the 1970s 
and the achievement of efficient economic results were vital to persuade policymakers in 
other countries to implement similar schemes.408 This can also be seen in the promotion 
of Chicago-oriented antitrust policies in the UK and later in the European Union, which 
had traditionally followed a very different pattern. For instance, the enforcement of the 
                                                        
406
 Ulf Boge, ‘Competition Law in Germany’, Vinod Dhall (ed.), Competition Law Today, 2007, 
Oxford University Press, 299. see also Volker R. Berghahn, The Americanisation of West Germany 
Industry, 1946-1973, 1986, Cambridge University Press, and Marie-Laure Djelic, Exporting the 
American Model: The Post-war Transformation of European Business, 1998, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
407
 Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘The Antimonopoly Law of Japan’, in Edward Montgomery Graham, J. David 
Richardson (eds.), Global Competition Policy, 1997, Institute for International Economics, chapter 5, 
151-190. 
408
 Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas : monetary politics in the European Union, 1998, 
Ithaca, NY, Conell Univ. Press. 
149 
 
1990 Merger Regulation (MCR) was the first European step towards a neo-liberal 
efficiency-oriented competition policy. Even though the Ordoliberal cause of common 
market protection was still to be found in the MCR, Hubert Buch-Hanse and Angela 
Wigger maintain that with the approbation of this regulation the interests of the Member 
States began to be conspicuously excluded from the competition policy-making process 
in favour of a sort of efficiency-oriented discourse.409 Japan, too, followed the neo-liberal 
trend. Even though the government tried to reject any Western influence in their 
response to the crisis, competitive pressures led to the adoption of a stronger 
antimonopoly policy in 1990. The measure adopted was the product of a close 
cooperation between American antitrust officials and their counterparts in the Japan Fair 
Trade Commission (JFTC) and a perfect example of a mimetic and competitive 
mechanism, which allowed Japan to integrate into a transnational antitrust institutional 
culture.410 
In conclusion, those trends can be explained through different isomorphic 
mechanisms that can hardly be singled out or separated from one another. There is 
indeed a common ground shared by all those different combinations of isomorphic 
mechanisms. On the one hand, those countries aspired to be as economic efficient as the 
US and, at the same time, the latter was free to exert a form of coercive pressure on 
them. On the other hand, by adopting similar ideological frameworks and institutions, 
those countries started to share a common language. This process facilitated the mimetic 
and especially the normative isomorphic trends that, through a path-dependence cycle, 
influenced the overall antitrust policy-making process. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Ideas, cultures, beliefs and their conversion into theoretical conceptualisations are crucial 
to understand the evolution of the meaning of competition. Indeed, while the rationale 
of antitrust lies in the maximisation of efficiency and the protection of welfare, the 
interpretation of how to reach these objectives can produce different outcomes. Goals 
and objectives are assessed by taking into consideration the contingent necessities and 
the interests of each historical period as well as the frame of theoretical conceptions and 
cultural variables that influence the social realm. For this reason, competition policies 
have a different meaning according to the country where they are applied and the cultural 
environment of reference.  
 Douglas North defines the state as the organisational centre where institutions 
are constructed by specific actors or member of governments. In time of change, 
political actors alter their behaving by shaping institutions according to the new interests 
that have to be reached. In the case of the US, the actors involved in the process are the 
experts, who, by virtue of their expertise, are called on to play an effective and active role 
in the antitrust decision-making process by the politicians, whose decisions, in turn, are 
embedded within the specific theoretical frameworks sustained by their community of 
experts. This issue network has favoured the creation of particular antitrust models that 
normally reflect the characteristics of the general model of capitalism. In this sense, the 
institutionalisation of antitrust is enforced in the respect of the cultures and ideas that 
shape the specific model of capitalism.  
Nevertheless, this approach does not explain why countries have in time 
switched from a liberal to a neo-liberal interpretation of antitrust policy. VoC schools 
interpret this as a competitive phenomenon in which countries adopt common practices 
in the interest of efficiency. However, as outlined above, efficiency discourses vary from 
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country to country; for instance, in Germany, efficiency has also welfare components, 
while in the US it does not. Again, the Japanese interpretation of the meaning of welfare 
differs from the European one. In this sense, while the competitive system can partially 
explain the development of specific institutions, it does not answer completely the 
question of why states have adopted similar antitrust institutions or at least institutions 
that followed similar ideological paths. 
According to scholars from a sociological background, this process has also been 
caused by mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphism. In fact, it is possible to 
maintain that the four processes of isomorphism have set off a form of antitrust 
convergence – even though a complete harmonisation is not forthcoming and the 
differences among capitalistic structures are still conspicuous. 
 In conclusion, this chapter has illustrated the institutionalisation of common 
antitrust approaches in the US, Europe and Japan, despite the embedded structures of 
different models of capitalism. It explained how the processes of isomorphism have 
contributed to the alteration of the general capitalistic models and to the trend of partial 
convergence of antitrust policy. Having defined the general theoretical hypothesis, the 
next chapter will introduce an analysis of the antitrust institutionalisation process during 
the Great Depression, the Oil Crises and the Credit Crunch in order to provide an 
empirical demonstration of these assumptions. 
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PART II 
CHAPTER 4 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST POLICIES 
 
This chapter aims to offer a historical illustration of  the theory of  pan-institutional 
development hitherto presented, with specific reference to the foundations and evolution 
of  American antitrust policy.   
Since the beginning of  the 20th century, American administrations have been 
enforcing various antitrust approaches through the appointment of  ad hoc experts at the 
head of  the Federal Trade Commission and/or the Antitrust Division. By acting as a sort 
of  issue network, this group favoured the translation of  particular antitrust ideas into 
institutionalised policies, regulations, and practices in order to overcome economic 
downturns and address business needs.  
The main arguments in support of  this thesis are structured as follows: the first 
part of  each section will frame the historical context of  analysis, by explaining the 
relevant events causing the US institutional change process. The chapter starts with an 
investigation into the role of  ideas in the institutionalisation of  the first antitrust 
regulations in the US and goes on to follow the evolution of  the discipline throughout 
the administrations that dealt with the three crises, namely, Roosevelt for the Great 
Depression; Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan for the Oil crises; and Bush and Obama for 
the current downturn. As previously stated, these three historical periods are relevant 
here not for their role in the collapse of  the institutional framework of  the time, but 
because they created the conditions for the emergence of  new interests and, along with 
them, of  new antitrust practices. 
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In conclusion, this chapter traces the process of  antitrust institutional 
development in chronological sequence. This approach will help to verify the consistency 
of  path dependency and to clarify the position of  the state and governments at the 
intersection between interests and ideas. 
 
1900S: THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE CLAYTON ACT 
 
The earliest form of  institutionalisation of  antitrust in the US dates back to the 
nineteenth century, when the US Congress approved its first antitrust law, the Sherman 
Act, in order to discipline unfair economic activities, such as monopolies or cartels. 
Specifically, the extended public negotiations for the approval of  the Act took place in 
1888 and lasted until 1890.411 At that time, no other country, apart from Canada, had 
adopted a similar juridical body to regulate monopolies and restrictive business practices; 
views on the necessity of  such antitrust provisions were initially polarized and this 
instigated two years of  contentious debates.412 On the one hand, it was deemed necessary 
to foster competitiveness but, on the other, confidence in classical economic laissez faire 
and the neoclassical perfect-competition model remained high, as trusts were generally 
believed to lead to large-scale economies and productive efficiency gains.413  
Even though these were not times of  real crisis, such disputes took place in a 
period of  political and economic uncertainty. In the wake of  the Civil War, the burden 
of  the northern industrial model over the country produced an increase in the number 
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of  trusts and cartels. This phenomenon brought about a rapid change in the production 
system at a time when industrial activities benefited from such technological innovations 
as the development of  national transportation and communication systems. According to 
Peritz, ‘while these revolutionary developments presaged much greater economic 
efficiency than had been known in the past, at the same time, entire industries were 
increasingly controlled by monopolies or cartels’, slipping out of  the grip of  the state.414 
Railroads were the first instances of  these huge consolidations, followed by processing 
and distribution firms, and then by massive integrated manufacturing enterprises.415 
 By 1890, while great trusts like John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil dominated the 
markets, the American response to anticompetitive practices was twofold. States such as 
Kansas and Missouri pushed an anti-monopoly agenda by prosecuting corporations for 
restraining trade, while in the same year New Jersey, Delaware and New York approved 
new regulations allowing trusts and holding companies.416 This phenomenon was due to 
a different conception of  competition. While American economic laissez faire essentially 
forbade any attempt to regulate trade practices, the growing economic power of  
corporations and the mounting social inequality were constantly challenging the belief  
that markets were self-policing.417 Thus, the ideas that inspired the creation of  an 
appropriate antitrust law were bound to come from outside the economic orthodox 
perspective. Indeed, as long as competition was considered perfect and naturally inherent 
in the market, no need was felt for a discipline studying it.  
Absent a coherent theoretical background to the study of  competition and 
market behaviour, the Sherman Act, even as it was approved, was influenced by 
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economists of  all stripes. For instance, while orthodox economists regarded any attempt 
to rule competition as futile, in 1887 Clark informally maintained the necessity for an 
appropriate antitrust regulation. He held that all firms, if  subjected to high fixed costs 
and economies of  scale, would naturally end up merging to avoid ruinous 
bankruptcies.418 Other scholars, such as Commons, Stockings and Fetter, maintained the 
necessity to appropriately institutionalise antitrust regulations. According to Commons, 
antitrust law was a ‘viable means of  collective actions to control corporate power’.419 
For this reason, when the Sherman Act was approved in 1890, it contained two 
substantive sections: section one disposed that ‘every contract, combination […] or 
conspiracy, in restraint of  trade […]’ was illegal, while section two declared illegitimate all 
activities associated with monopolisations or any ‘attempt to monopolise’. 
Even though Peritz maintained that marginalism only began to influence antitrust 
doctrine with the Clayton Act, it is clear that the Sherman Act counts as the first attempt 
to institutionalise general marginalist principles.420 Indeed, although the first marginalist 
models could not clearly explain how a competitive enterprise could ever recover its fixed 
costs without colluding, it is not accidental that the Sherman Act was approved the same 
year in which Alfred Marshall declared his ‘marginalist revolution’ in economics.421  
This early marginalist influence is particularly apparent in the ideas that drove 
Congress to enforce the law. These were underpinned by the realisation that, since 
competition is not perfect, economic egalitarianism cannot subsist. In this sense, some 
form of  regulation was deemed necessary to protect not just competition and efficiency, 
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but also economic opportunity and, along with it, the distribution of  wealth.422 The 
primary aim of  Congress was to keep firms from acquiring enough market power to 
raise prices artificially and to restrict output, making it impossible for consumers to 
purchase products at competitive prices. In fact, artificially high prices were condemned 
not for causing allocative inefficiency, but for ‘unfairly’ transforming consumer wealth 
into monopoly profits.423 This approach was maintained by Judge Robert Bork's 1966 
Legislative Intent and the Policy of  the Sherman Act. In his view, the American government 
approved antitrust regulations in an attempt to promote, above all, social welfare.424 
Indeed, the majority of  trusts operating in 1890 were highly productive and even Senator 
Sherman himself  considered large corporations to be already quite efficient.425 
Experience has shown that they are the most useful agencies of  modern 
civilization. They have enabled individuals to unite to undertake enterprises 
only attempted in former times by powerful governments. The good results 
of  corporate power are shown in the vast development of  our railroads and 
the enormous increase of  business and production of  all kinds.426 
 
Hence, despite their efficiency, trusts were condemned for generating an unequal 
distribution of  wealth. However, a number of  researchers have argued, from a public-
choice perspective, that the Sherman Act dispositions had strong private interest 
components and that the decision of  Congress was more producer- than consumer-
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oriented.427 In other words, the Congress aimed to support competition in order to 
stimulate production efficiency. 
In addition to promoting social welfare, many economists have hypothesised that 
the Sherman Act was also aimed at restraining the economic power of  large corporations 
and at fostering greater competition among small firms.428 As Judge Hand stated in the 
ALCOA429 case, the Sherman Act was promulgated with a view to favour ‘a system of  
small producers, each depending for his success on his own skill and character, to one in 
which the great mass of  those engaged must accept the direction of  the few’430.  
We can conclude that the approval of  the Sherman Act was primarily due to  
Congress’ desire to promote economic efficiency and welfare. Its implementation is to be 
considered a unique juridical projection of  the economic interests of  the time, which 
were stimulated and sustained by the emergence of  new marginalist economic ideas of  
imperfect competition.   
 
Institutional Evolution: The Clayton Act and the Twenties 
The second most significant change in the political and ideological perspectives on 
American competition policy occurred during the early twentieth century, when it 
became evident that the new industrial and financial empires were destroying the 
American dreams of  freedom and equal possibilities. The interests that pushed for the 
enforcement of  new antitrust rules were motivated by the need to control mergers more 
strictly, by creating specific agencies in charge of  supervising and enforcing antitrust. 
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This is because a large number of  firms were starting to consolidate their trusts and 
cartels and, absent an institutionalised antitrust bureau, they could easily elude the 
restrictions imposed by the Sherman Act and de facto render void many of  its 
dispositions. 
Since Clark’s ideas on workable competition reflected a general sense of  urgency 
for some kind of  national control over unfair competition practices, they soon began to 
gain enough influence and credibility to inspire policymakers on the ground. For 
instance, Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom Plan, clearly inspired by Clark, supported the 
enforcement of  a new legislation that could restore safe competition and erase all the 
special privileges and unfair practices associated with the trusts. The plan emphasised the 
need to guarantee economic freedom by implementing ‘a body of  laws which will look 
after the men who are on the make rather than the men who are already made’.431 
According to the supporters of  New Freedom ideas, prosperity was a direct result of  
competitive behaviour in the market. They believed that, in order to overcome the 
recession, it was necessary to decentralise business structures and to allow competitive 
forces so as to maintain economic balance through the investigation and prosecution of  
antitrust and anticompetitive practices; capitalists, here, were seen as the main cause of  
the on-going recession.  
 Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism Plan regarded the 
concentration of  economic power as a consequence of  mass production and advancing 
technologies. According to Roosevelt, competition wasted resources and produced social 
inequality, thus the state had a right to intervene in order to ensure a more equal 
distribution of  the benefits of  modern industrialisation. The New Nationalists supported 
a planned-economy scheme; they claimed that some form of  concentration of  economic 
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power was essential to achieve market efficiency. Business concentrations may have been 
one of  the main causes of  the Great Depression, but they had also accelerated mass 
production and technical progress in the years leading up to it. At the same time, 
however, the New Nationalists believed that central administrations had a duty to 
organise and control business activities in order to restore the economic balance and to 
prevent future breakdowns. Furthermore, Arthur Jerome Eddy’s New Competition 
theory highlighted the need for government supervision of  business agreements.432 The 
government would thus become responsible for the proper functioning of  fair 
competition. In a nutshell, New Competition supporters argued that some form of  
business–government cooperation – short of  full government intervention – could be 
highly effective. 
These different approaches, while presenting contrasting takes on the economic 
recovery, all subscribed to Clark’s call for greater state control on trade practices. As soon 
as Wilson became president, these ideas were quickly put to the test with the 
enforcement of  the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.433 The 
implementation of  the Clayton Act in 1914 reflected the need to add further substance 
to the US antitrust regime by seeking to prevent anticompetitive practices in their 
incipiency.434 The law contained provisions against price discriminations, restrictive deals, 
as well as mergers and acquisitions. In addition, it provided a right to injunctive relief  
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‘against threatened loss or damage by a violation of  the antitrust laws’ by sanctioning 
private remedies.435 Secondly, the Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal 
Trade Commission, a body in charge of  suing large corporations involved in 
anticompetitive trade practices, carrying out investigations, and issuing cease-and-desist 
orders.436 
Despite such substantial reforms to the body of  antitrust law, the Great 
Depression, together with the level of  mass unemployment and declining incomes that 
came with it, divided public opinion once again and marked the emergence of  new 
economic interests and of  the consequent need for an institutional response. Thus, at the 
beginning of  his mandate, Roosevelt was faced with the need to push forward new 
economic reforms and to formulate a consistent set of  business policies in order to 
increase economic welfare while preserving democratic values, restoring competition, 
and regulating the market.437 
 
1930-1960S: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND HARVARD COMPETITION POLICY 
 
The Great Depression and the subsequent economic and political upheavals offer 
another interesting example of antitrust institutionalisation in times of change. At that 
time, the need to foster the American economy and to overcome the recession pushed 
President Roosevelt to radically intervene in the market with a new set of fiscal and 
economic policy reforms collectively known as the New Deal. 
Although historians have paid considerable attention to Roosevelt's policies and 
his attempts to reduce the negative consequences of the recession, comparatively little 
has been said about the American approach to antitrust changed during the crisis. 
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Inspired by interventionist ideas, the New Deal introduced various provisions embodied 
in the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), which aimed to establish governmental 
control over private economic powers in order to promote free competition, social 
equity, and economic development.438 Approved by the Congress on June 16, 1933, 
with a small majority of the Senate, the NIRA was considered, especially on account of 
its social policy aspirations, the symbol of national mobilisation against the common 
enemy of the Great Depression.439  However, the Act was not in force for long as it was 
considered an attempt to establish central control on private investments and was 
therefore declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court with the ALA Schechter 
Poultry Decision of 1935.440  
However, during the NIRA era, antitrust faced ‘its darkest moment’, as the plan 
had essentially replaced fair competition with a system in which government and 
business ‘cooperated’ against the recession.441 The core of  the NIRA, touted by 
President Roosevelt as ‘the most important and far-reaching [policy] ever enacted by the 
American Congress’, was to promote a national industrial recovery plan with a 
combination of  two strategies: the implementation of  public works, incorporated in the 
Public Work Act (PWA), and the promotion of  fair competition among economic actors, 
embodied in the National Recovery Act (NRA).442 The NRA had to promote economic 
recovery by eliminating the destructively cut-throat competition practices that allowed 
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companies to create cartels and had thus worsened the recession and stimulated negative 
externalities, such as drastic wage reductions, low quality products, and predatory price-
cutting. 
 The Act, in its attempt to promote a fair competition model, allowed the 
suspension of  the application of  antitrust laws in favour of  more central control of  
private investments and closer cooperation between the manufacturing and labour 
sectors.443 According to Havley, the major objective of  the Act seemed to be the 
promotion of  a cartelised risk-free economic order, a system whereby the government 
could help business groups to fix prices, restrict production, and protect capital 
investments. However, those who supported the New Deal regarded the NRA as an 
attempt to organise the previous anarchical competitive system in order to promote 
social reforms through the development of  a centrally planned collectivist democracy.444  
Indeed, Edward Chamberlin, Harvard economists, and members of  the Consumers' 
Advisory Board for the NRA administration condemned the neoclassical price theory as 
inadequate and not applicable to most markets, so they challenged the notion of  price 
competition and introduced an alternative interpretation of  concentrated markets.445  
Under the influence of  these ideas, the NRA authorised the reorganisation of  
American business and labour markets through ‘codes of  fair competition’. By fixing 
minimum prices, minimum wages, and maximum workweek hours, the codes kept a right 
rein on many anticompetitive practices. Indeed, it was believed that higher prices would 
generate larger business profits and thereby increase labour wages.446 The codes were to 
be drafted by groups of  firms and associations in collaboration with governmental 
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agencies led by General Hugh Johnson, and they had to abide by generic dispositions of  
the law that did not specify time limitations. This allowed, for example, to prevent the 
imposition of  inequitable restrictions over other companies and to limit the membership 
of  the group in charge of  drafting the codes. Moreover, it would also prevent any form 
of  monopoly or any practice that would be damaging to small enterprises.447 
Many economists, including Clark, welcomed the NRA and its codes as an 
effective plan to overcome the recession caused by the big corporations. At the time, this 
kind of  strict state intervention was considered the only solution to the recession. 
Writing in March 1934, Clark expressed general sympathy for the NRA and maintained 
that while the Act would not promote an immediate recovery, it would certainly allow the 
creation of  a more enduring basis for economic prosperity that would encourage the 
development of  an alternative system to the previous liberal one. In his view, the NRA 
was ‘probably one of  the things necessary to reasonable economic stability in the 
decades ahead’.448 
Indeed, the NRA gave the President unprecedented powers to reorganise and 
regulate competition. Roosevelt could intervene directly and impose his own conditions 
in the redaction of  the codes as well as make additions or deletions prior to their 
approval. Although he could not force industrialists to sign the codes, he used  
propaganda to cajole businesses into adopting them. Exhortations to join the President 
in his war against depression were broadcast through radio and the press. According to 
Hawley, popular symbolisms started to portray competition in terms of  ‘economic 
cannibalism’ and both conservative industrialists and classical economists became known 
as ‘Old Dealers’ or ‘corporal disasters’. The practice of  reducing prices to gain a larger 
share of  the market became ‘cut-throat and monopolistic price slashing’. At the same 
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time, monopolistic collusions, price and cartelisation agreements started to be 
cooperative or associational activities.449   
Despite the bona fide intentions, the codes started, over time, to resemble a 
strategy designed to eliminate competition through cartels rather than a plan for more 
efficient and fair workable competition.450 Edward Chamberlin joined a rapidly rising 
chorus of  discontent when, in 1934, he pointed out that the ‘NRA has little to do with 
economic recovery’ and that ‘it has become increasingly apparent that the means chosen 
were not adapted to the ends. Restrictive measures such as price fixing, the prohibition 
of  sales below cost, and the limitations of  output are being abandoned, although a year 
ago these were represented as the only means of  curing a demoralised state of  
industry.’451 
 
Workable Competition and the NRA Codes 
Propelled by the propaganda machine, the first NRA codes were drafted for the textile 
and shipbuilding industries. Electrical manufacturing and the coat and suit trades were 
codified in July 1933. By the end of  August, the President had signed the codes for steel, 
petroleum, lumber, and automobile industries. On September 18, the promulgation of  
the Bituminous Coal Code completed the codification of  most of  the major industries. 
Without precise guidelines, the code-drafting process often resulted in a 
bargaining exercise between businessmen and government officials.452 Moreover, the 
NRA program director, General Hugh Johnson, seemed to have a sympathetic attitude 
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towards businesses. He allowed almost every attempt on the part of  firms to establish 
cartels or to fix prices as he considered anticompetitive behaviour a means of  pursuing 
public utility and overcoming the crisis.453 
However, in 1933, as economic indices started to fall again and the cost of  living 
increased more than wages, it began clear that the recovery plan had failed and that firms 
were in fact using codes to suit their own priorities, limit production, and maintain high 
prices.454 Critiques were mounted from every political and social faction: business leaders 
were convinced that the NRA codes represented an attempt to establish a bureaucratic 
socialist control on business, while the supporters of  antitrust policy believed that the 
program was fostering monopolies and cartels. Finally, economic planners, who initially 
were not opposed to economic regulation, refused the idea of  such controls being 
exerted on business cartels. Intellectuals and economists, such as Henry Simons, Jacob 
Viner, and Frank Knight from Chicago University, started to call for stronger antitrust 
enforcement measures.455 
For these reasons, the NRA went through several reorganisations during the 
course of  1934. Even though in 1935 the GNP climbed from about fifty six billion 
dollars to approximately seventy-two billion, and unemployment had dropped by about 
two million, the Act had already lost its support. 
In 1935, the US Supreme Court, in the A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States case, declared the NRA unconstitutional. The Schechter Corporations have been 
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accused of  failing to observe code provisions by fixing minimum wages and maximum 
hours for employees and by signing some dealings with slaughterers and dealers not 
licensed under the code. 
The Supreme Court judged that the provisions of  the Act were not a valid 
exercise of  federal authority, because they lacked the system of  checks and balances that 
characterises every American institution. Indeed, both the Congress, by regulating wages 
and working hours, and the President, by heavily influencing the approbation of  these 
codes, affected interstate commerce and invaded the administrative jurisdiction of  federal 
states.456 
By the time the NRA was overturned, more than 700 industries had been 
codified and nearly 23 million workers were under codes; however, 20% of  the 
workforce was still unemployed. The National Recovery Act was considered a failure 
because it did not stimulate economic recovery or an economic reorganisation; instead, it 
caused the rise of  prices and monopolies. However, Roosevelt's administration, after the 
Court declared the NRA unconstitutional, approved a series of  new Little NRA bills 
targeted at specific industries, such as coal mining and oil refining. The approbation of  
the Robinson-Patman Act of  1936 and the Miller-Tydings Act of  1937, both of  which 
prohibited ‘unfair’ price competition in the retail trades, promoted the idea that more 
state interventionism was needed in market and private business conducts.457 Indeed, 
through the NRA provisions, Roosevelt’s administration tried to organise the market by 
introducing in the US a cartelised system similar to the one prevailing in Europe and 
Japan, where the state not only had no special provisions against those practices, but 
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even encouraged them.458 For instance, while Tokyo supported the Zebaitsu, a family 
industrial group that owned the main national firms, the UK and Germany allowed the 
creation of  the Federation of  British Industries (FBI) and of  the German equivalent, the 
Reichsgruppe Industrie.459   
However, neither the protectionist provisions approved by Hoover nor 
Roosevelt’s NRA stimulated much economic recovery. While the problem of  over-
production was not solved, the US government could not sustain a high level of  prices. 
It would take new antitrust institutions and a world war to overcome the crisis. 
 
Thurman Arnold Revolutionary Antitrust Approach:  The Incipient Institutionalisation of  Harvard 
Ideas 
True to its isolationistic tendencies, Roosevelt’s first mandate was committed more to the 
domestic recovery than to the development and expansion of  US international cartels 
and international anticompetitive practices.460 This resulted in the absence of  a real 
opposition to international cartels that involved American corporations, such as IBM, 
GM, Ford, Alcoa, Du Pont and Standard Oil.461 In fact, according to Stocking and 
Watkins, the term cartel, during the inter-war period, was commonly referred to as 
‘international marketing arrangements’ and often seen as a way to alleviate the effects of  
the global recession.462  
In this environment, Roosevelt could hardly have launched an international 
antitrust campaign.463 However, the deepening of  the recession in 1937 and the critical 
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and unstable international dynamics at the dawn of  World War II pushed the President, 
in April 1938, to advocate to Congress the need to enforce antitrust policy at a national 
and transnational level. His concern was to preserve American free competition and to 
avoid the rise of  a fascist collective system of  the kind promoted by some European 
countries.464 To do so, it was necessary to abandon the scheme of  planned cartelisation 
embedded in the NRA and to adopt a new market-competition perspective that 
promoted vigorous antitrust measures. Many economists of  the time fell under just such 
a rubric; Means, for instance, in his ‘Administrative Price’ thesis, underlined the 
undesirable externalities caused by the market power of  big businesses, which were 
affecting the monetary and fiscal policies formulated in response to the depression.465 In 
view of  the failure of  the NRA, Roosevelt was increasingly receptive to such economic 
ideas and eventually resolved to make an about-turn over the centralised system of  
planning that had sparked the system of  business cartelisation. In line with this renewed 
attention to market competition, he appointed Thurman Arnold as a successor to 
Jackson with a view to implementing a new antitrust programme.466 
Arnold’s antitrust policy was inspired by the economic theories of  Berle and 
Means and by the idea that the rise of  unrestricted corporate power could distort 
democracy; broadly speaking, he held a more Harvard-oriented vision of  antitrust 
policy.467 Rejecting the classical and neoclassical models, he was also influenced by the 
works of  Thorstein Veblen and Walton Hamilton and was convinced of  the need to 
introduce new elements to economic analysis, such as law, technology, psychology, and 
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property studies.468  
Arnold’s idea of  pro-competition action was to combine policing consumer 
prices and social welfare goals with the prosecution of  national and international cartels, 
which considered the cause of  the 1937 recession. Indeed, even if  American antitrust 
law declared per se illegal every cartel affecting the internal market, the antitrust doctrine 
on international cartel arrangements was less clear. Indeed, on the one hand, the 
American Banana Co. case established that US antitrust policy could not exert any 
extraterritorial authority.469 On the other hand, in 1924, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), in its reinterpretation of  the 1918 Webb Pomerane Act, declared that ‘there was 
no reason why export associations could not enter into agreements with foreign cartels 
providing there were no unlawful effects on the American domestic market’.470 The Act 
was originally enforced in order to provide exemption for some cooperative agreements 
from antitrust restrictions in order to increase US exports by allowing exporters to deal 
more effectively with foreign cartels.471 However, according to Fournier and Suslow, the 
interpretation provided by the FTC, allowed many ‘Webb-Pomerane associations’ during 
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the inter-war period to act as cartels by fixing prices and allocating sales.472 
Nonetheless, during the late 1920s and early 1930s the Antitrust Division won 
several cases that partly challenged this interpretation. One of  the first applications of  
extraterritoriality was in the Aluminium Company of  America's (Alcoa) case,473 one of  
the most important cartels of  the time. According to Freyer, in 1937, ‘studies concerning 
the international cartel movement, in conjunction with NRA and other data, revealed the 
extent of  Alcoa’s monopoly’ of  aluminium.474 During the Wilson administration, Alcoa 
had not been persecuted because, according to the rule of  reason, the Court declared that 
its activities did not constitute a restriction of  competition. However, by the onset of  the 
Great Depression, Alcoa's adjustments to international price instability had resulted in 
companies gaining a monopoly in the domestic market. Moreover, the production of  
aluminium, being indispensable in the economic and industrial life of  the Nation and in 
its military and naval defence, was correlated to national security issues. Consequently, it 
was deemed necessary to persecute Alcoa also because, in the international political 
turmoil of  1937, it had negotiated a deal with the Nazis to supply Germany with war 
machines.475 
Arnold's campaign against cartels represented a major change in American 
antitrust policy. Despite the international expansion of  American corporate capitalism in 
the years following the end of  World War I, the Department of  Justice had prosecuted 
only seventeen cases of  international anticompetitive conduct by 1930 and, from 1932 to 
1937, Alcoa was the only case under international antitrust investigation.476 Arnold, by 
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promoting the idea of  free markets, established a more rigid control over competition 
and international cartels and secured a considerable number of  legal victories against the 
monopolisation and price-fixing practices of  American firms. The appropriation of  the 
Antitrust Division, which stood at about $473,000 in 1938, rose to $1,800,000 in 1943, 
while personnel grew from 111 to 496.477 
Arnold promoted rigid antitrust measures to foster free markets in the interest of  
US competitiveness. Indeed, despite the failure of  the NRA provisions, the crisis and the 
beginning of  World War II had strengthened the idea that competition had to be 
controlled and regulated. The Great Depression was in fact aggravated by the kind of  
anticompetitive behaviour exerted by American corporations in the national and 
international markets. Moreover, the increasingly international reach of  American firms 
had guaranteed many countries an easy access to strategic goods and materials. 
According to Hofstadter, thanks to Thurman Arnold antitrust became an 
accepted institution, and its institutionalisation process was ‘an excellent illustration of  
how a public idea […] can become embodied in institutions with elaborate, self-
preserving rules and procedures, a defensible function and an equally stubborn capacity 
for survival’.478 In short, starting from the 1930s, imperfect and monopolistic 
competition models first, and Harvard-oriented ideas later, led to the beginning of an era 
of major state control over anticompetitive practices. In particular, Edward Mason’s 
structure-conduct performance (SCP) model, by interpreting anticompetitive behaviours 
as an unavoidable consequence of non-perfectly competitive markets, influenced the US 
government to adopt a stricter approach to competition. This was formally 
institutionalised in the congressional amendment of  section 7 of  the Clayton Act merger 
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provision in 1950. This provision extended the application of  merger controls to cases 
of  market dominance. Additionally, in 1968, Harvard economist Donald F. Turner, on 
becoming the head of  the Antitrust Division at the Department of  Justice, 
institutionalised its Harvard principles through the Merger Guidelines.479  The Merger 
Guidelines included very few efficiency-boosting provisions and stated that ‘unless there 
are exceptional circumstances, the Department will not accept as a justification for an 
acquisition normally subject to challenge under its horizontal merger standards the claim 
that the merger will produce economies’.480 In particular, the 1968 Merger Guidelines 
provided three reasons for only accepting efficiency claims in exceptional circumstances:  
(i) The Department’s adherence to the standards will usually result in no 
challenge being made to mergers of the kind most likely to involve 
companies operating significantly below the size necessary to achieve 
significant economies of scale; (ii) where substantial economies are 
potentially available to a firm, they can normally be realized through 
internal expansion; and (iii) there usually are severe difficulties in 
accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of economies claims 
for a merger.481  
The validity of efficiency claims is of fundamental importance for understanding the role 
played by Harvard ideas. It was under the influence of Harvard ideas that regulators 
promoted the institutionalisation of antitrust policies that benefited social welfare as 
much as individual market players.  
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In conclusion, while the Harvard antitrust era only reached its zenith under 
Turner and his successors, its institutionalisation began with the implementation of  anti-
cartel policies by Arnold, who first enforced state interventionism over competition and 
anticompetitive practices. By placing social welfare above efficiency, Arnold’s translation 
of  marginalist and Harvard ideas into antitrust policies paved the way for the Golden 
Age of  capitalism.  
 
1970S-1990: THE CHICAGO INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
Nixon and the Harvard Approach 
In the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II, the US had built an internal 
economic order congenial to its interests, Keynesianism was applied in macroeconomic 
policies and Fordism in production, and Harvard ideas began to be the source of 
inspiration of the main antitrust institutions. Despite the positive connotations of a 
‘Golden Age’ of capitalism, the beginning of the 1970s witnessed a deterioration of the 
economic performance of all the major capitalist countries.482 
When Nixon won the 1968 presidential elections against his democratic rival 
Hubert Humprey by 500,000 votes, he was confronted with the cost of the detrimental 
war in Vietnam, in addition to the trials of the Cold War itself. Moreover, rising 
unemployment and lower growth rates pointed to a general American loss of economic 
power and influence on the international arena.483 
While Nixon, together with Henry Kissinger, his Security Adviser, tried to face 
the political crisis through the strategy of  Détente, on the economic front, he focused on 
boosting American performance and international competitiveness. 484  The US share of  
world gross domestic product (GDP) had decreased from half  in 1946 to just about one-
                                                        
482
 Gerard Dumenil, Dominique Levy, ‘The Nature and Contradictions of Neoliberalism’, 2002, 32 
Social Register, 43-70. 
483 Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, 1986, Verso Editions NLB, 204-5. 
484 Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, 1986, Verso Editions NLB, 206. 
174 
 
third in 1970. Between 1947 and 1965 American productivity had grown at an annual 
rate of  3.3%, but in the 1966-70 and 1971-80 periods the average rates dropped to 1.5% 
and 0.2% respectively. As Japan, Germany and other EU member states started to 
outperform US productivity in both quantity and quality, American companies suffered 
stiff  trade competition and their economic supremacy progressively declined. 
Consequently, on August 15, 1971, without consulting the leaders of  the rest of  
the world, Richard Nixon unveiled a ‘New Economic Policy’ and abandoning the Bretton 
Wood system.485 The value of  the dollar was depreciated in order to provide banks and 
corporations with all the liquidity necessary to improve American competitiveness and 
trade balance.486 Letting the dollar fluctuate in the international markets meant that most 
nations had to raise the value of  their currencies against the dollar. Thus, their firms 
could not benefit from low exchange rates in their exports to the US market. Rather, 
foreign products sold in the US would become more expensive, thereby creating a 
competitive advantage for local firms.487 
Additionally, pressure from American companies and the Congress led Nixon to 
enforce a temporary 10% ‘additional tax’ on imports to ensure ‘that American products 
will not be at a disadvantage because of  unfair exchange rates’.488 
Although Nixon’s shock strategy gave new impetus to the US economy, the 
American internal market was negatively affected by an unprecedented rise of  business 
conglomerations and mergers. From 1963 to 1969, there had been 13,880 acquisitions 
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announcements globally.489  In 1972, the 200 biggest US corporations controlled 60% of  
national manufacturing assets, as opposed to 48% in 1949. The concentration of  profit 
shares was very high; among more than 200,000 manufacturing corporations, only the 
422 largest registered 71% of  the profits.490 The formation of  mergers was partially 
encouraged by the state after World War II, in order to allow US companies to take 
advantage of  favourable market conditions and enlarge their business.491 However, under 
the influence of  the Harvard School workable competition ideas, the Antitrust Division 
started, during the Nixon presidency, an unprecedented crackdown on what was 
considered at the time an incredible mergers boom. According to Nixon, the US was 
becoming a country of  ‘a few hundred business suzerainties under whose influence a 
multitude of  small, weak, quasi-independent corporations will be permitted a subsidiary 
and supplemental role’.492  
By appointing John Mitchell as attorney general at the DOJ and Richard McLaren 
as head of  the FTC, Nixon intended to make clear that his antitrust approach would be 
based on government initiatives ‘to stop this merger trend that was leading more and 
more toward economic concentration’.493 McLaren, in particular, was an antitrust lawyer 
who had been engaged in defending big corporations from antitrust charges. He knew 
the tricks of  the trade and planned to use them to ‘attack the conglomerate mergers with 
great vigour’.494 In his view, conglomerates were economically inefficient because they 
stifled innovation and promoted large concentrations of  power.495   
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This strict antitrust approach was not supported by everyone. For instance, 
Robert Bork and Richard Baxter, from the Chicago School, criticised the Antitrust 
Division’s corporate de-concentration policy.496 According to Bork, the Supreme Court, 
antitrust agencies, and Congress were saving less efficient small firms at the expense of  
both competition and efficiency.497 Similarly, Chicago School economist George Stigler 
expressed much the same idea and called on the government to change the orientation 
of  its antitrust policy. 
Although Goorlick argues that this anti-conglomerate policy was applied against 
Nixon’s will, Fligsetin maintains that many White House documents demonstrate the 
contrary. Nixon was aware of  the anti-merger policy pursued by Mitchell-McLaren – and 
he supported it. For instance, on May 11, 1969, during a meeting at the White House, 
Nixon maintained that ‘antitrust law should protect the small firms from the large firms’, 
and that he ‘would rather deal with an entrepreneur than a pipsqueak manager of  a big 
store’.498 
Nevertheless, as McLaren’s strict antitrust policy started to create malcontent 
among the business community, Nixon began to prefer a more liberal approach and by 
September 1969 he was directly supporting Chicago scholar Robert Bork and the idea 
that anti-merger legal actions were ‘one of  the most disappointing developments of  
antitrust history’.499  This change of  tendency is made clear also in the speech that Peter 
Flanigan, one of  Nixon’s advisors on economic affairs, did in 1971: 
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On April 12, the President met with the Secretary Stans and 
Undersecretary Lynn to receive from them a report on areas of  
government harassment of  business. The President directed the action be 
taken to reduce any such harassment, apparent or real. As a result, I have 
met with Attorney General Mitchell and told him that a less antagonistic 
attitude towards business must be taken by the antitrust division. Mitchell 
has agreed in this area. More specifically, I have discussed with him several 
pending mergers and received his assurances that he will personally 
monitor any antitrust activity in their regard500. 
 
President Nixon’s, and his White House administration’s, about-turn in support 
of  conglomerate mergers was a product not only of  the neo-liberal ideas developed at 
the time, but also of  specific interests. This is easily understandable by taking into 
account the controversial ITT settlement. In 1971, the Department of  Justice settled an 
antitrust case against International Telephone and Telegraph Corp (ITT). This 
corporation, having acquired three other companies, had created a merger that, according 
to McLaren, was going ‘to have an adverse effect on competition’.501 Nixon’s adoption of  
Chicago School ideas in his condemnation of  merger lawsuits coincided with the ITT 
contribution of  400,000 dollars to the Republican National Convention of  1972 in San 
Diego. Sure enough, President Nixon and his White House administration made pressure 
to the Department of  Justice to drop the antitrust action, so ITT was judged on 
relatively favourable terms.502 Once Nixon and his administration had come under 
investigation on corruption charges in relation to ITT, the earlier interventionist antitrust 
policy was permanently abandoned and McLaren was replaced with the less militant 
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Thomas E. Kauper.   
According to the Time magazine, this was ‘a prelude to a relaxation of  antitrust 
policy’; in fact, throughout his four-year tenure, Thomas Kauper initiated only three 
merger cases. Although the Justice department declared that it would apply ‘the same 
vigorous enforcement’ of  antitrust law as under McLaren, by the 1974 the anti-merger 
fervour was over and in 1979 the number of  mergers rose once again.503 
Nonetheless, the Watergate scandal soon replaced the echoes of  the ITT case.504 
In 1972, after a political campaign that presented the Republican Party as the party of  
order against corruption, Nixon was re-elected. However, a few months before his 
election the police had arrested five men for trespassing an office of  the Watergate 
building that belonged to an organisation affiliated with the Democratic Party. Later, 
Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein uncovered the scandal: 
Nixon and his collaborators had systematically spied on democrat officials with the help 
of  the FBI in order to set up campaigns of  disinformation against their adversaries. 
Nixon had to resign and leave the presidency to his vice-president, Gerald Ford.505 
Ford and Carter: a Transition towards Chicago Ideas 
When President Ford took office, the conglomerate merger wave was effectively over, 
but economic recession, rising unemployment and high inflation were still taking their 
toll on the American economy. In addition, between 1973 and 1974 the Yom Kippur war 
precipitated the first oil crisis of  the 1970s. Meanwhile, the cost of  the Vietnam War, 
combined with the high government expenditure needed to support the social policies of  
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post-war Keynesianism, caused an unprecedented inflation wave.506 Being influenced by a 
Harvard antitrust framework, Ford aimed at facing the economic downturn by adopting 
a strict control over the market to counter monopolistic and merger behaviours and their 
inflationary effects.507 In this respect, he promoted a specific plan to reduce inflation, 
namely the Whip Inflation Now (WIN). The WIN was an attempt to promote grassroots 
voluntary programmes designed to encourage people to change their spending habits in 
order to make anti-inflation measures more effective. However, in 1974, since 
congressional elections gave the Democrats a majority in both houses and the economic 
situation was still deteriorating, Ford was forced to change his economic policy. In 1975, 
the Democratic majority rejected Ford’s proposal to reduce the domestic budget and 
pushed him to apply a massive tax cut and increase federal spending. Between the 1975 
and 1976 many other bills were passed, including a compromise energy bill, a four-
billion-dollar Public Works Act and a tax revision bill. By mid-1975, the American 
economy gave the first signs of  recovery: the rate of  unemployment dropped and the 
cost of  living fell from 11% in 1974 to 5.8% in 1976. 
In an attempt to rein in rising prices, Ford tried to apply the same conservative 
antitrust policy pursued by Nixon during his first mandate. Therefore, even though the 
Chicago School was already gaining a foothold in the antitrust policy scene, within a few 
months of  taking office, President Ford promised a harsh crackdown of  illegal antitrust 
conspiracies in order to fight business practices that ‘diminish competition and force 
price up for consumer’.508 Indeed, Ford maintained that the government had an 
important role in promoting ‘an environment where free enterprises [could] operate 
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without a monopolistic development’.509 Harvard ideas were again institutionalised in the 
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, which was designed to ‘strengthen significantly 
antitrust laws and the ability to enforce them’. Furthermore, in September 1976, 
President Ford signed into law a set of  amendments to the Clayton Act, also known as 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act).510  
The Act was important because it reinforced antitrust controls by requiring ‘firms 
to notify the FTC and the Justice Department before carrying out mergers that exceeded 
certain size thresholds’.511 For instance, title II of  the Act maintained that any company 
attempting specified acquisitions had to communicate its decision a priori to the Federal 
Trade Commission and to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of  the Antitrust 
Division of  the Department of  Justice at least thirty days before starting the operation.512 
The law also established a mandatory waiting period for firms that wanted to acquire or 
merge with another company.513 Title III stated that federal states could sue companies in 
the Federal Court for monetary compensation on behalf  of  their citizens. For this 
purpose, the Parens Patriae provision allowed federal funds to be allocated to the state 
attorney general for antitrust purposes. This provision was very innovative as previously 
only persons directly affected by anticompetitive activity could sue for damages. 
These laws were the result of  a common anti-merger tendency supported by part 
of  the Congress and by the Harvard school of  antitrust. They all served a specific 
objective: to enforce antitrust law in order to facilitate a process of  de-concentration. 
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Indeed, as it maintained in 1975 by Oregon Republican Senator Robert Packwood: 
The present antitrust laws […] even if  rigorously enforced, will not 
achieve what is necessary in this country: A breakup of  the concentrations 
of  power in the major industries in this country, oil and otherwise, so that 
we might return to the numerous, small- and medium-size competitive 
industries that made this country grow, and continue to be needed to make 
this country great.514 
 
Following this view, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly under the Chairmanship of  Senator Philip Hart became very active in 
proposing de-concentration regulations, such as the Industrial Reorganisation Act, which 
aimed at promoting industrial de-concentration in order to strictly limit collusion, and 
the Monopolisation Reform Act of  1976, which would have allowed the state to 
intervene against irresponsible conducts.515  Many other legislative drafts, such as the 
Interfuel Competition Act of  1975 (S. 489), were proposed in order to re-launch state 
interventionism in different economic sectors. However, those bills have never been 
approved as the necessity to improve economic performances of  American companies 
resulted in a growing influence of  the ‘efficiency’ antitrust theory maintained by the 
Chicago scholarship.516 
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As Gerald Ford left his office in 1977, without completely solving many of  the 
problems affecting the American economy, newly elected President Carter proclaimed ‘a 
new beginning’ in his inaugural speech.517 At that time, the US economy was still 
characterised by stagflation, high unemployment, adverse trade balance and increasing 
dependence on foreign sources of  energy. However, to face the economic downturn, 
Carter adopted policies similar to those of  his predecessor. On the one hand, he tried to 
increase federal spending to finance public works and, on the other, he reduced taxes in 
order to stimulate employment. While these initiatives had a positive effect on the level 
of  unemployment (which dropped from 7.9% in December 1976 to 6.4% in 1977 and to 
less than 6% by mid-1978), inflation and federal deficits were on the rise. 
Carter failed also to apply a coherent antitrust policy. Indeed, although in 1979 
anti-merger positions were still persisting in the National Commission for the Review of  
Antitrust Laws and Procedures (NCRALP), the first extensive, and official, adoption of  
Chicago School ideas by antitrust policymakers occurred under his administration.518 
Freyer, in fact, argues that the wave of  antitrust prosecutions during Carter’s 
administration was based on an informal acceptance of  the idea that most mergers were 
economically efficient.519 Indeed, in 1979 the Congress defeated the proposed Small and 
Independent Business Protection Act (also known as Anti-Conglomerate Merger Bill, or 
S. 600), which would have forbidden mergers or acquisition among companies disposing 
of  assets or sales above a certain limit (either two billion dollars or 350 million dollars, 
according to the purpose).520  
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The defeat of  the act was a clear sign of  the popularity of  Chicago School ideas 
in Congress. Indeed, although the apparent purpose of  the bills was to substantially 
enhance market competition and efficiency, the main interest of  most legislative 
representatives was to promote new statutory limitations of  merger activities and to 
justify those on political and social grounds.521 Indeed, when Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy introduced the legislation, he stated that the aim of  S. 600 was ‘to help preserve 
the integrity of  a political and economic system committed to diversity’. In his view, the 
bill was ‘far more than a narrow technical concern within a given market structure’, 
indeed it had ‘a far broader perspective’ that dealt with ‘a social concern’ of  ‘the impact 
of  corporate power not only upon the character and responsiveness of  individual 
economic market, but upon the very social and political fabric of  a nation committed to 
diversity and individual freedom of  choice’.522 
However, the defeat of  this act confirmed the growing acceptance of  the 
Chicago efficiency doctrine within the Carter administration. There are many factors that 
can be used to explain why Congress abandoned its social role in controlling the market 
and checking the power of  corporations. First of  all, the economic downturn of  1974, 
and the consequent economic instability fostered the Chicago School’s ideas stating that 
the exclusive promotion of  allocative efficiency was more than necessary to boost the 
market. Secondly, as the number of  private antitrust cases increased under the aegis of  
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Improvements Act, the Department of  Justice had to concentrate 
its resources on criminal (particularly price-fixing) rather than civil (merger) cases. These 
elements form the basis of  the radical change of  approach to antitrust occurred under 
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the Reagan administration.523 
 
Reagan and the Chicago Institutional Revolution 
After the second oil shock in 1979, the seizure of  the Teheran embassy, and Ronald 
Reagan’s election in November 1980, free market ideas and Chicago School pro-market 
theories were suddenly in the ascendant and soon came to dominate the deregulation 
movement of  the 1980s. Chicago School ideas started to gain political support by the 
mid-1970s, when many US firms were losing competitiveness in the international 
markets in the midst of  the on-going American recession.524 However, the direct 
institutionalisation of  the Chicago antitrust approach only began in 1981-82, when the 
former Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan was elected president and the economic 
recession rekindled popular demand for greater market efficiency.525 
The central asset of  the Reagan presidency was to ‘make America great again’ 
both by implementing a liberal economic programme and by supporting a patriotic arms 
race in reaction to the Vietnam defeat.526 For instance, Reagan raised military expenditure 
by 51% in order to modernise the US strategic forces and implement general defence 
programmes.527 
While Reagan invested in the US military forces to restore the American 
international projection of  power, he applied strong deregulation measures in the 
economic field in order to promote a neo-liberal system that would globally re-launch the 
American economy.528 More than ten years after Nixon took office, government 
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spending and taxes were still high. In 1981 the GDP diminished by 5% and in 1982 the 
unemployment rate reached 10% – the highest level since the 1940s.  
In order to face the economic downturn, Reagan suggested a new approach 
inspired by Friedman’s monetarist doctrine and supply-side economics.529 This approach 
was condensed in his inaugural address in this statement: ‘Government is not the 
solution to our problem; government is the problem’ [emphasis added].530 The plan 
consisted in a drastic cut of  the federal budget and a massive reduction of  taxes. These 
provisions would at first favour the leisure class and corporations, as they provided them 
with the means to implement new investments and production. Subsequently, profits 
would gradually trickle down to the poorest. ‘Reagonomics’ promoted a tax cut of  750 
billion dollars in five years while simultaneously reducing welfare state spending.531 
In matters of  antitrust policy, Reagan applied a ‘revolution’ by maintaining an 
open fight against excessive regulation.532 He was seemingly not concerned about 
excessive concentrations of  economic size and power: 
There is nothing written in the sky that says that the world would not be 
perfectly satisfactory place if  there were only 100 companies(…) I 
certainly do not see a war against aggregate concentration as part of  this 
department mission. 533 
 
Under his presidency, the structural antitrust approach experienced a definite 
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turnaround. Reagan and his administration informally abandoned any strict antitrust 
controls over big corporations, as ‘bigness doesn’t necessarily mean badness’.534 While the 
number of  mergers rose from 1,565 to 4,323 between 1980 and 1986, their value grew 
even faster, from 33 billion dollars in 1980 to more than 204 billion in 1986. There was 
no American firm that had not been involved in merger agreements; the period between 
1981 and 1984 witnessed the creation of  75 of  the 100 largest corporate mergers in 
American history.535 In fact, Reagan maintained that ‘vertical and conglomerate mergers 
have ceased to be a major enforcement focus of  the [Antitrust] division’.536 
Thanks to William Baxter, Reagan’s new appointee at the head of  the Antitrust 
Division, the room for action of  the Department of  Justice Antitrust Division was 
reduced. On the one hand, Baxter blocked many antitrust suits; on the other, he 
guaranteed the revision of  twelve hundred old verdicts. Moreover, in order to limit and 
control the FTC power, Reagan appointed James Miller III, a free-market conservative 
lawyer, to lead the Commission. Under Baxter and Miller’s direction, both the FTC and 
the Antitrust Division significantly reduced their activities. Between 1981 and 1987, 
10,723 mergers came to the attention of  the Justice Department, but only 26 were suited 
in court by the Antitrust Division. In the same period, the FTC’s filing of  only seventeen 
administrative complaints amply demonstrated its unwillingness to be more proactive. 
In addition, in 1982 Baxter published a set of  guidelines on President Ford’s 1976 
HSR Act. Here, he explained how to analyse the prior-notification and waiting-period 
provisions to predict whether or not a merger would result in prosecution. Under these 
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merger guidelines, the possibility for a merger to be judged legal increased from 14% to 
18%. In the case of  low barriers, where access to competitors was easy, a merger could 
consolidate up to 48% of  market share. At bottom, the new guidelines underlined that 
the size of  vertical and conglomerate mergers would rarely be challenged.537 In addition, 
Baxter replaced Turner’s measure of  concentration with the Herfindahl Index. Through 
mathematically determined thresholds, the index indicated that most vertical and 
conglomerate mergers – unlike horizontal mergers – would in fact be free from 
prosecution.538 According to the Department of  Justice, 
The 1982 Guidelines did not simply clarify the Department’s merger 
policy […] The 1982 Guidelines recognised that most mergers do not 
threaten competition and that many are in fact precompetitive and 
benefit consumers […] One of  the most important advances of  the 
1982 Guidelines was the increased freedom they gave to American 
industries to enhance efficiency through mergers.539 
 
Moreover, after Reagan was re-elected with 68% of  the vote in 1985, his Administration 
launched the Merger Modernisation Act of  1986 in order to amend section 7 of  the 
Clayton Act. As mergers were likely to ‘increase the ability to exercise market power’, it 
was believed that merger policy should ‘not interfere with the ability of  American firms 
to freely reorganise through mergers and acquisition’.540 The proposed bill was the most 
serious attempt made by the Reagan administration to revise the Clayton Act, the 
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foundation of  US mergers policy, and institutionalise an efficiency-oriented system.541 
According to the ABA Task Force Report, whose contributors included former 
Antitrust Division chiefs from the Nixon and Carter eras, the Reagan antitrust 
administration adopted an uncritical attitude towards mergers, which were again on the 
rise.542 This new wave of  mergers was also encouraged by the corporate tax cuts 
promoted by President Reagan in his first term. This provision helped corporations to 
overcome the shortage of  capital that prevented them from investing in innovations and 
from competing in the international markets. 
However, since the Chicago antitrust approach was oriented towards market 
efficiency and consumer welfare, the government, while formally adopting a neo-liberal 
approach against market concentrations, employed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to 
monitor mergers considered less efficient or anticompetitive while increasing its control 
over price-fixing agreements.543 In federal district courts, Baxter and his successors 
initiated 94 cases annually, 80 criminal and 14 civil, while the Carter’s Department of  
Justice brought 67.5 cases annually, 30 civil and 37.5 criminal. Hence, Reagan’s DOJ not 
only increased the average number of  cases considered, but also pushed for more legal 
actions against criminal cases.544   
 The effects of  Reaganomics are still objects of  debate, but it must be said that by 
1982 the recession was overcome, the level of  employment started to rise, and inflation 
rate fell to 7% – which amounted to a very positive economic outlook. Moreover, the 
institutionalisation of  the Chicago School antitrust theory and its conversion into free-
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market institutions allowed the US to increase its economic transactions and to establish 
the basis for a durable economic model by according an unprecedented number of  
consolidations to big businesses and multinational corporations, which ultimately helped 
to overcome the crises of  the 1970s.545 The institutionalisation of  Chicago ideas into 
antitrust policies proved to be durable and, more broadly, put antitrust policy on a more 
permanent footing. The success of  those ideas was so great that they persisted up until 
the end of  the Bush Presidency – and they arguably still do. 
  
1990 -2010: THE CHICAGO AND POST-CHICAGO COMPETITION TRADITION 
Bush and the durable path of  Chicago Ideas 
Since the Reagan Administration, Chicago ideas have been shaping – with varying 
degrees of success – US antitrust policies for almost 30 years. Despite Bill Clinton's 
moderately interventionist rhetoric during his 1992 presidential campaign, the neoliberal 
agenda of free market was set on a durable institutional path.546  With the policy of fiscal 
austerity of the late 1980s, the US began to loosen national control on corporate 
behaviour in both the domestic and international spheres and allowed a wave of business 
privatisations.547  The implementation of neo-liberal antitrust policy was related to a 
number of reasons, both pragmatic and ideological. From a pragmatic point of view, 
rising global competition required a more aggressive strategy. From an ideological 
perspective, the triumph of Chicago ideas over Keynesianism engendered blind faith in 
the free market. Any kind of state interventionism policy began to be perceived as a 
constraint on market activity that would generate imbalances and restrict growth.  
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The triumph of Chicago ideas was also fed by the positive economic outcomes 
experienced in the 1990s, when the US experienced its longest period of continuous 
economic expansion and extraordinary rates of growth.548 In 1995, the US real GDP was 
growing at a rate of more than 4% a year. While this trend continued through the 2000s, 
the level of unemployment fell by 4% and inflation remained low. At the same time, 
stock prices increased at an incredible rate, which seemed to vindicate the faith in a 
newfound wealth among the middle class. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
resulted in a drastic reduction of defence spending and encouraged Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan to cut interest rates. At a global level, the world GDP 
increased by one-third and many of the world leading economies reached 
macroeconomic stability and high levels of employment. Neo-liberal and Chicago ideas, 
by pushing for a global system of deregulation and privatisation, deepened the 
integration of international markets and fostered an unprecedented expansion of big 
American businesses. According to the 2002 Global Powers of Retailing report, in 2000 
39% of the 250 largest retail companies in the world were based in the United States and, 
globally, 48.9% of the 200 most active companies in consumer markets were 
American.549 
 The US economic performance of the 1990s seemed to demonstrate that 
neoliberalism, and the ideas of the Chicago School, was the only way to build an effective 
capitalist economy, but in the last quarters of the year 2000 the US rate of economic 
growth began to noticeably slow down. At the beginning of March 2000, the stock 
market began to contract and the Federal Trade Reserve responded to the slowing 
economy by slashing interests’ rates. By the start of 2001, ‘rates were at their lowest level 
in four decades. A recession, however, could not be avoided. The economy’s ten year 
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expansion was officially declared to have ended in March 2001.’550 Therefore, since the 
beginning of his presidential mandate in 2001, George W. Bush was already confronted 
with very difficult challenges.  
Not only did Bush inherit an economic expansion that was on its last legs, but he 
also won the elections by a tiny margin.551 This meant that the Republican Party did not 
gain the majority of seats in both the houses of Congress. While this should have 
suggested a cautious and moderate policy approach, the Bush administration defied 
expectations with the promotion of bold neo-liberal turns in the economy and daring 
political strategies in foreign policy.  
On the one hand, Bush resumed Reagan’s policies by supporting huge tax relief 
programmes embodied in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
the June 7, 2001. The purpose of the Act was to allow middle and upper-middle classes, 
considered the backbone of American wealth, to dispose of more money to invest in the 
economy.552 In his Remarks on Signing the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, 
Bush affirmed that, ‘we cut taxes for every income-tax payer. We target nobody in; we 
target nobody out’.553 
The plan not only should have provided strong economic growth but it should have 
also created jobs. Both of  those promises did not materialise. On the contrary, under 
Bush’s tax agenda, America suffered its weakest economic expansion since World War II. 
George W. Bush's economic policies resulted in a net loss of  private-sector jobs and in 
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the increase of  public debt. The cost of  tax-cutting amounted to neglected 
infrastructures and growing social inequality.554 The creation of  public deficits, in turn, 
culminated in the reduction of  government social programmes and the consequent 
removal of  those Democrat ‘policy tools’ that helped to win the elections.555 On top of  
tax cuts, Bush also increased security costs because of  the wars fought in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.556 While the war on terrorism caused one of  the highest public deficits ever 
registered in the US, it allowed corporation incomes to grow. For instance, 80% of  
Pentagon spending was allocated to six major corporations operating in the military and 
security sectors.557 
The general triumph of  the laissez-faire ideas embodied in the enthusiastic adoption of  
the Chicago School and in the vilification of  state interventionism allowed big 
corporations to drive the development of  American economy, and its job market, 
according to private, rather than collective, interests. In other words, laissez-faire policies 
allowed corporations to abandon any commitment to the national interest; this created 
negative externalities and systemic economic risks.558 For example, in order to maintain 
profits, corporations started to reduce prices by lowering wages or exploiting cheaper 
labour force. This phenomenon diminished consumers’ purchasing power, either because 
real salaries were too low or because they had to face unemployment and unstable 
working conditions; hence, high consumption started to be sustained through debts. At 
the same time, only a small portion of  the American society, i.e. those with an annual 
income of  more than 200,000 dollars, enjoyed the benefits of  the kind of  capital 
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investments encouraged by Bush’s neo-liberal reforms. 559 
Following this trend, a Ponzi economy based on 'a giant pyramid selling scheme' 
began to grow in a cycle; trade deficits helped to finance the US budget deficit and to 
make up for its low savings rates.560 During the Bush era, the US needed roughly 2 billion 
dollars every day to fund the current account deficit, sustain its overconsumption, and 
avoid the fall of  the dollar. As Gill notes, the American debt was mostly covered by 
Asian central banks. In 2008, Japan held 12% of  the total US debt, China 11%, while 
Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan more than 6%.561 
Table 2. Foreign holdings of US securities, by country and 
type of security, for the major investing countries into the 
US, as of June 30, 2008 (billions of dollars)  
Country Total % Equities 
Japan 1,250 12 199 
China (Mainland)  1,205 11.67 100 
Singapore 210 2 52 
Korea, South 150 1.4 11 
Hong Kong 147 1.4 29 
Taiwan 137 1.3 81 
Total 10,324   2,969 
Source: U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs 
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This was a paradoxical situation in which poorer nations were sustaining the most 
powerful country in the world. Central banks did not easily reveal ‘the proportion of  
their reserves held in US dollar assets, but the Bank for International Settlements […] 
estimated that just over two-thirds of  total central bank foreign exchange reserves were 
held in dollars at the end of  2003’. Additionally, according to the US Bond Market 
Association, in 2004 foreigners possessed ‘46.8% of  US treasuries, versus the 20% they 
controlled in 1990’.562 At the same time, while the level of  state and corporate debts was 
already high, the manufacturing capacity started to erode. Corporations, which enjoyed a 
very liberal antitrust policy, found more profitable to invest their gains not in new 
productions, but in merger operations that reduced the level of  competition in the 
market. Indeed, following in Reagan’s footsteps and true to its Chicago School roots, 
Bush adopted a laissez-faire approach also in antitrust policy. 
 
Bush’s Antitrust Policy 
The credit crunch has been linked to the international spreading of  a mortgage crisis 
caused by the US housing construction sector. Even though the causes of  the credit 
crunch are more related to the general deregulation of  the banking and investment 
industries, it has to be said that the wide-ranging permissive policies towards mergers 
allowed big companies to acquire enough shares to control the financial sector and 
overturn governmental policies.563 As a matter of  fact, since his election in 2001, 
President George W. Bush manifestly enforced a non-interventionist approach towards 
antitrust along Chicago neoliberal lines. The FTC Chairman Timothy Muris and the 
Former Assistant Attorney General of  DOJ Charles A. James institutionalised the 
Chicago antitrust vision advocated by Bush. After their appointment, they started to 
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enforce a variety of  federal antitrust and consumer protection laws and to eliminate anti-
competitive practices in order to ensure that the nation's markets functioned 
competitively.  
For instance, in 2001 the administration, through the Premerger Notification 
Rules, enforced an amendment of  the Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting convention that 
allowed the rise of  a new wave of  mergers.564 From a value of  1.2 trillion dollars in 2002, 
the rate of  merger activity increased rapidly and, by the end of  2006, it reached 3.4 
trillion dollars.565 Those are also the years of  the ten largest mergers in history, such as 
American Online and Time Warner (2000) and the AT&T and BellSouth Corporation 
(2006).566 
The number of  mergers challenged by DOJ became equal to the merger 
enforcement level experienced during the second term of  the Reagan presidency, which 
was the lowest registered in the US. This trend was intensified during Bush’s second 
mandate, when, while the DOJ enforcement rate remained constant, the FTC 
enforcement rate dropped. This resulted in a general decline of  the total federal merger 
enforcement rate, which beat the lowest level previously recorded.567 
Bush’s antitrust policy in his second mandate considered the strengthening of  
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antitrust control more harmful than good.568 Yet, after President Bush appointed Tom 
Barnett as Assistant Attorney General and Deborah Platt Majoras as Chairman at the 
Federal Trade Commission, the federal merger enforcement rate reached the lows 
recorded during the Reagan presidency.569 As Majoras underlined in one of  her speeches, 
since the scope of  antitrust was to protect the interests of  consumers, competition 
agency had to carefully limit enforcement to the rare cases when those interests were 
actually damaged.570 
Professors Jonathan Baker and Carl Saphiro argued that the DOJ and FTC had 
never been as permissive of  seemingly anticompetitive mergers and transactions as they 
were during the Bush administration.571 As reported by the Wall Street Journal in January 
2007, ‘the federal government has nearly stepped out of  the antitrust enforcement 
business, leaving companies to mate as they wish’.572 This lenient antitrust attitude was 
also picked up by the New York Times in March 2007. According to the newspaper, the 
‘Bush administration has been more permissive on antitrust issues than any 
administration in modern times’.573 
Notwithstanding the devastating consequences of  the crisis, Bush did not change 
his Chicago approach towards antitrust; on the contrary, excessive laissez faire and 
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extreme faith in market efficiency resulted in big acquisitions in the financial sector.574 In 
fact, immediately after the crisis, companies took advantage of  this and started to merge 
in order to increase their profits far from the eye of  state. For instance, Bank of  America 
bought Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan bought Bear Stearns, and Wells 
Fargo acquired Wachovia.575 According to Kovacic, Bush’s competition programme ‘had 
swung too far in the direction of  non-intervention.’576   
At the end of  2008, the US was facing the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. 
While references to Keynesian theory and policy became the order of  the day, Chicago 
economists remained committed to free markets.577 The difficult relationship between 
those contrasting ideas and the pressing economic needs of  the time did not result in the 
promotion of  coherent institutions to regulate the market. On the contrary, while 
antitrust policy remained essentially neo-liberal, the US started to adopt a schizophrenic 
trade policy to protect the market from what was considered unfair competition. 
According to Simon Everett, head of  the Global Trade Alert research group of  
the Centre of  Economic Policy Research (CEPR), ‘the overwhelming picture is one of  
planned and implemented state initiatives that reduce foreign commercial opportunities 
and reverse the 25-year trend towards open borders’.578 According to Everett, the 
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decision to raise new ‘tariffs on Chinese tires, cancel a program allowing Mexican trucks 
to carry cargo on American roads, and enact a stimulus package that included explicit 
“buy-America” requirements’ could be defined as protectionist policies.579 However, such 
protectionist strategies were short-lived as the Bush presidency was coming to an end 
and it was now Obama’s turn to face the recession and try to rebalance the American 
economy.  
In the aftermath of  the crisis, the most pressing question was concerned with the 
sort of  criteria that competition agencies would need to adopt if  they were to enforce 
the institutional framework of  a new model of  competition policy that would carry the 
US out of  the crisis.580 
 
Obama and the Crisis: A new Institutional Response? 
The credit crunch and the merger wave were tackled head-on by President Obama who, 
elected in 2008, decided to adopt a different antitrust approach. President Obama 
represented a homo novus in the American political panorama; he was portrayed as the 
embodiment of  the change the US desperately needed.581 
It is too early to analyse the effects of  Obama’s antitrust policies and the 
implementation of  appropriate institutions responsible for the control of  competition. It 
is safe to note, however, that the newly elected U.S. President has clearly exhibited a 
strong interest in antitrust regulations and antitrust efforts seemed to have ‘becom[e] a 
corner-stone’ of  his policy agenda.582 
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During the first months of  his administration, Obama appointed Christine 
Varney as the new head of  the DOJ Antitrust Division and Jon Leibowitz as the Chair 
of  the FTC; both of  them were well known for their strong stance against mergers and 
anticompetitive practices.583 In a speech given to the Centre for American Progress, 
Varney publicly rejected the laissez-faire policies of  the Bush administration and affirmed 
that the DOJ was ‘committed to aggressively pursuing the enforcement of  Section 2 of  
the Sherman Act’.584 Varney stressed that strong antitrust policies were necessary to fight 
market concentrations and mergers (especially in high-tech, health, pharmaceutical, 
telecommunications, food, and agriculture firms), as they would lead to higher prices, 
low-quality products, and other negative externalities for consumers.585 Moreover, the 
DOJ made now explicit reference to its debt to Thurman Arnold, the Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of  antitrust under Roosevelt, who was the first to enforce a 
substantious antitrust program on a nationwide scale’.586  
However, while President Obama was not planning to suspend antitrust 
enforcement (as Roosevelt did with the NIRA during his first administration), a strong 
Harvard-oriented approach seemed to be difficult to put into action. In this sense, the 
Merger Guidelines adopted in 2010 perfectly represented this dilemma: on the one hand, 
they did not reform the material, but on the other hand they aimed to introduce a more 
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flexible interpretation of  mergers.587 Indeed, while heavily relying on the 1982 version, 
the new guidelines reflected the ever-increasing tide of  change that invested the US 
antitrust enforcement practices.588 For instance, they revised the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of  market concentration; this Index, originally introduced during the 
Reagan presidency, established a scale of  the level of  market concentration reaching up 
to 10,000, with 10,000 representing a perfect case of  market monopoly. Obama’s Merger 
Guidelines modified the reading of  the Index so that any merger agreement that registers 
an increase of  200 HHI points, or otherwise recording an overall HHI score greater than 
or equal to 2,500, will be de facto considered anticompetitive.  
Generally speaking, the approach introduced by the new Merger Guidelines to 
the legality of  mergers is based on the evaluation of  ‘direct’ evidence of  the real impact 
of  mergers on competition. Indeed, one of  the tools suggested for better assessing the 
anticompetitive effects of  an agreement is based on the ‘upward pricing pressure’ model. 
This model allows the comparison of  the premerger profit margins of  the firms with the 
diversion ratio of  customer demand. According to Crane, ‘because profit margins are 
often high in differentiated goods markets, this upward pricing pressure model could be 
used to predict that many more mergers than previously expected will result in the 
unilateral exercise of  market power.’589 
The result of  these policies is plain to see. According to Baker and Shapiro’s 
benchmarking scale of  merger actions, the Obama administration increased the control 
of  mergers. Indeed, in a scale where the value of  0.75% corresponds to the lowest level 
of  merger control applied during the second term of  the Reagan Administration and the 
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first term of  Bush Administration, Obama reached – only in 2010 – a merger control 
level of  1.5%.590 
Looking at Obama policies, it can be argued that the President is trying to 
enforce Post-Chicago antitrust institutions based on efficiency analysis, but not on pure 
laissez faire ideas;591 this is in line with what sustained by Von Apeldoorn and the idea that 
this crisis does not constitute the end of  neo-liberalism but only a reinterpretation of  its 
principles.592 However, in the aftermath of  the crisis, it is still too early to properly 
interpret the criteria that US antitrust agencies are currently adopting in order to 
promote a new model of  competition policy.593 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
North and historical institutionalists were right to point out the existence of a path-
dependent process, in which specific market conceptions are passed down from one 
generation to another. Although the evolution of antitrust institutions has been 
characterised by vibrant trends and its different roots have followed different ideas and 
material interests, its core meaning has always remained anchored to the need to foster 
effectiveness and social profits.  
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In this interpretation, the three above-mentioned schools of thought and the 
ideas encapsulated in their theories have been modifying the perception of antitrust while 
reflecting, at the same time, specific interests. At the same time, concepts such  as welfare 
and efficiency have always been relevant in the institutionalisation of new policies.   
The Great Depression, by challenging the economic and political dynamics of the 
time, spelled the end of the classical conceptualisations of antitrust. Those were 
embodied in the theories of Adam Smith and Ricardo and maintained by many other 
illustrious scholars such as Schumpeter. At the beginning of the 1930s, there was not a 
strong antitrust tradition, as the previous theories stressed the non-necessity of any 
analysis of competition per se, since the market would adjust its rivalry dynamics by itself. 
However, the emergence of the Marginalist School bucked this theoretical trend 
and paved the way for a different understanding of market competition. Its ideas 
influenced the development of the first antitrust rules, such as the Sherman Act, the 
Clayton Act, and also the NRA. The US found marginalism a valuable framework of 
reference, because, by criticising the vision of perfect competition, it formally legitimised 
the intervention of the state in the market. Their alternative understanding of 
competition was more compatible with the new US economic needs. Those were 
concerned more with containing the power of the robber barons than with limiting the 
negative externalities produced by cartels.  
Although marginalist scholars were the first to focus on the mechanisms of 
imperfect competition, they did not define any precise course of actions for the state. 
This may explain why the NRA resembled more a protectionist plan than a pro-
competition set of regulations.  
Nonetheless, proceeding from those assumptions, the Harvard School began to 
influence the development of antitrust policy more directly. The first actor involved in 
the ‘Harvardisation’ of antitrust institutions was Thurman Arnold. At the head of the 
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DOJ, Arnold contributed to revolutionise the understanding of antitrust and to 
prosecute unprecedented numbers of national and international cartels. This was the first 
implementation of informal Harvard-oriented antitrust institutions, which were later 
formalised through the enforcement of the amendments of section 7 of the Clayton 
Act's merger provision in 1950 and of the Merger guidelines of 1968.594  
The influence of ideas in the modernisation process of US antitrust policy was 
crucial. Mergers previously interpreted as normal outcomes of perfectly competitive 
market agreements started to be questioned not in term of efficiency but in term of 
general welfare, whereby the latter began to be considered as an efficiency generator. 
Similarly, as soon as the causes of Great Depression began to be clearly perceived as the 
negative externalities created by cartels and mergers, and World War II started to wreak 
economic havoc, the range of interests pursued by the US started to change and so did 
its institutions. 
Harvard ideas began to be perceived as the only lenses through which reality 
could be understood. These ideas were part of a general trend, reflected also in 
Keynesianism and Fordism, in which the revitalisation of general economic welfare 
became economically efficient. In fact, the Great Depression and the War World I 
outlined the necessity to create free markets where to sell products. Therefore, American 
regulators used Harvard ideas to enforce institutions that would limit and control the rise 
of mergers and cartels and create more favourable conditions for the emergence of new 
competitors. This would allow a major diffusion of positive economic outcomes and 
would create the possibility for a higher number of people to gain access to market 
products, thereby reinvigorating the economy.  
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Harvard institutions were held in place until the Carter Presidency, when another 
school of thought took over antitrust policymaking. The interaction of the ideas 
advocated by the Chicago School and the necessity to overcome not only the Oil Crises 
but also the de-legitimisation of the US as an international political actor pushed 
President Reagan to resettle antitrust regulations according to what he defined as a 
Reagonomic revolution. The neo-liberal principles inspired by the Chicago School, and 
which formed the basis of his policies, radically modified the way of fair and unfair 
competition were understood, and created room for a new interpretation of how 
economic growth should be promoted. The power of those ideas was so strong that it 
changed the perception of reality. From a welfare-oriented perspective, antitrust 
institutions were to shift towards a completely efficiency-oriented logic in order to better 
serve the interests of corporations. 
Once again, ideas and interests determined the institutionalisation of a specific 
antitrust approach. The members of the FTC and DOJ formed the network involved in 
the process, although a number of lobbies and interest groups also contributed to the 
push for change. Chicago ideas were de facto institutionalised by Baxter and Miller 
through the enforcement of the 1982 guidelines. These guidelines substantially modified 
the interpretation of the 1976 Hard-Scott Rodino Act, the historical act that had 
formalised the control over merger practices. 
As pointed out above, the institutionalisation of Chicago School ideas and, 
generally speaking, of a neo-liberal approach, has been long-lasting – and it is probably 
going to survive the current crisis. However, it is also possible that the downturn will 
allow the emergence of new ideas. President Obama’s nomination of Varney and 
Leibowitz at the head of the FTC and the DOJ could be considered an attempt to 
restore a Harvard-oriented approach. From an historical institutional point of view, this 
would correspond to what Polanyi defined as the ‘cyclical change’ or what Kovacic called 
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the ‘antitrust pendulum’.595 In other words, the choice of non-regulation and non-
intervention will consistently be followed by the opposite regulatory trend. However, by 
analysing the current situation, it is rather difficult to imagine a re-institutionalisation of 
the same antitrust approach enforced by Thurman Arnold in the 1940s. Interests are still 
dictated by economic efficiency and it is evident that states are still in the on-going 
process of economic liberalisation.  
Although the possible institutionalisation of a Post-Chicago approach would 
represent another shift in the antitrust pendulum, this would still be very much in line 
with the previous antitrust mechanism. On the one hand, it would probably allow the 
development of more flexible market conditions, but on the other hand it would also 
allow the implementation of regulations halfway between rigid state control – hardly 
practicable at present – and a complete laissez-faire approach.  In other words, the Post-
Chicago School could represent a compromise between a pure efficiency-seeking 
approach and a radical welfare-oriented policy.  
In conclusion, this chapter aimed at describing the role of state actors in shaping 
the institutional changing process. By mediating the diktat of ideas with practical 
economic interests, the US government played a fundamental role in the evolution of 
antitrust.  As previously pointed out, most changes in American antitrust policy resulted 
from the emergence of economic thoughts that were able to offer different ways of 
interpreting reality in each historical period and to allow individuals to pursue their 
specific economic interests.  Apart from the role exerted by US presidents, antitrust 
experts, and economic actors, this evolution trajectory has also been determined by the 
outbreak of economic crises. Indeed, crises had the merit of highlighting new market 
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exigencies, thereby making it easier for governmental bodies to set up institutions 
specifically designed to respond to the new economic needs. This process favoured the 
enforcement of various regulations, according to the way interests and economic 
opportunities were perceived in each historical period. Nevertheless, a path-dependent 
process allowed antitrust to evolve along time-tested routes. This is particularly apparent 
in the primacy that has been constantly ascribed to the principles of efficiency and 
welfare by every US antitrust policy. In conclusion, the evolution of US antitrust policy 
can be interpreted as the outcome of specific interests as well as of theoretical 
interpretations of reality and market needs. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 INTERNALISING ANTITRUST: THE EVOLUTION OF 
COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE AND JAPAN 
THE FATE OF THE HARVARD SCHOOL 
 
The purpose of  this chapter is to illustrate and explain the process through which 
American antitrust ideas have been influencing the development of  competition policies 
in Europe and in Japan in the aftermath of  the Great Depression and World War II.  In 
order to do this, this chapter is organised in two parts. The first part offers a brief  
historical overview to help to contextualise the general outlines of  the period. The 
second part describes the emulation processes that took place in each of  the three 
countries under analysis. 
 In addition, because the political and economic structure of  the European 
Union has been subject to several changes over the past 80 years, the first part will also 
take into consideration the development of  competition policy in Germany. This country 
has been specifically chosen because it represents the most interesting example of  
traditional European competition theoretical frameworks and juridical administrations.  
The German case is also of  particular interest because the country was historically forced 
to accept the introduction of  policy reforms and to adjust its traditional economic 
system to the new practices. In this sense, the history of  German antitrust policy is a 
clear illustration of  how American antitrust ideas came to be incorporated into Europe.  
The evolution of  competition regulation in Japan is a fascinating case study all on 
its own. Formally, antitrust was introduced in the country by direct American 
intervention after the end of  World War II. Still, the way Japanese Confucian ideological 
frameworks adapted to liberal and neo-liberal economic ideas is uniquely remarkable.  
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In conclusion, this chapter will outline the different types of  isomorphic 
mechanisms that have enabled the institutionalisation of  a Harvard antitrust approach in 
those countries. In doing so, it will see to explain how US ideas could have such a 
dramatic – and concrete – impact on local perceptions of  market competition.   
 
The Great Depression, Competitiveness and  Trade Performance in Europe and Japan 
If  the Great Depression had already damaged free trade and competition in the 
international markets, the outbreak of  World War II effectively killed them.  
Already in 1931, the US Congress’ approval of  Hoover’s Smoot-Hawley Tariff  
Act compelled most nations to raise protective barriers. For instance, European countries 
and Japan started to reinforce protectionist provisions by imposing stringent nationalistic 
tariffs and currency controls. At the same time, every country strengthened their 
protection of  so-called strategic industries, particularly after 1930, when the belligerent 
intentions of  Germany and Japan came to light.  
Those market restrictions reinforced cartelisation practices among leading US, 
German, and Japanese big firms; exporters from different countries began to join 
together in order to overcome the contraction of  the market. At the time, world 
governments refused to negotiate a common program to re-establish competition and 
revive the international economy because of  a lack of  resources and leadership. This, 
coupled with the absence of  systematic antitrust legislations, allowed firms to enter into 
explicit contractual agreements.596 
The United Kingdom, which had historically directed the efforts to keep the 
international trade system stable, was weakened by the war while the US was reluctant to 
take its place.597 Ironically, despite declaring cartels per se illegal within the domestic 
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market, the US waited a long time to intervene against the anticompetitive practices of  
American giant corporations operating in the international market. Consequently, 
economists from both Europe and Japan rejected the idea of  US antitrust leadership. 
Protectionism and state interventionism became the only tools for Europe and Japan to 
preserve their internal market from foreign competitors and to overcome the crisis. 
The vacuum left by the general reluctance to agree on a compromise was filled by 
international cartels, which were still considered by many as a ‘higher form of  economic 
organisation that replaced the brutal ethos of  competition with a system of  cooperation’ 
supported by governments.598  By the beginning of the 1940s, cartels controlled 40% of 
the global markets. Indeed, many countries considered them vital for their domestic 
economic security.599  
For instance, in Germany, the Weimar government approved an ordinance in 
1923 that imposed more direct control over cartels in order to avoid abuses of  market 
power. However, the ordinance only served to judge the legality or illegality of  cartels.600 
At the time, many pressure groups and political action committees started to lobby the 
central administration to adopt several different antitrust reforms. On one side of  the 
spectrum, the liberals were in favour of  policies restricting cartels, although they 
disapproved of  direct government intervention. On the other side, the socialist and 
communist parties advocated heavy-handed state control and interventionism against all 
forms of  cartels. By contrast, the Federation of  German Industries supported the self-
regulation of  cartels by business operators.601 The dire consequences of  the Great 
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Depression, in terms of  high unemployment and low market transactions, seemed to 
vindicate the interventionist ideas recommended by most German economists, with the 
notable exception of  the Freiburg School. Consequently, in order to overcome the 
depression and maintain social stability, the government established a new series of  
provisions to empower the Ministry of  National Economy to apply stronger controls 
over price reductions and cartel agreements. 
However, the ascent to power of  the Nazis caused a new reorganisation of  the 
system. With the approval of  the Compulsory Cartels Law, the Economy Minister was 
authorised to set up and dissolve cartels as well as to force firms to enter into existing 
cooperative agreements. In Edward Mason’s words, ‘The cartels made Hitler and Hitler 
made war”.602 
In the name of  national and racial superiority, the National Socialists restricted 
the operation of  foreign corporations. Indeed, a provision of  a 1933 law allowed cartel 
members to boycott other businesses, if  the persons in charge of  them were not deemed 
reliable enough. The meaning of  ‘reliability’ was strictly related to nationality and the 
whole reform was meant to favour Germans over foreigners and to delineate market 
relations in racial terms. Moreover, the cartelised economy made it possible for the Nazi 
government to easily supervise society, control prices, and limit the introduction of  
technology in order to maintain high employment. It was through cartels that Hitler 
planned to establish a new economic order in Europe. By imposing an extensive 
rationalisation of  industries on an international scale and by negotiating trade agreements 
with other continents, he also planned to put an end to the balkanisation of  the global 
trade system.603 Since several European countries, such as Belgium, France, Spain, Italy 
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and the Netherlands had no special provisions against cartels, cartel policies became the 
preferred way to negotiate agreements with Germany and to adjust the level of  exchange 
rate and exports.604 For instance, according to Freyer, ‘in 1939, representatives from each 
nation's coal industries agreed on quotas regulating coal exports throughout Europe.605 
In 1930, Britain passed a resolution requiring compulsory notification, registration, and 
publication of  cartels agreements.606 Additionally, in March 1939, in Dusseldorf, the UK 
Federation of  British Industries (FBI) and its German equivalent, the Reichsgruppe 
Industrie, signed an agreement to put an end to ‘destructive competition’ and to achieve 
a ‘more ordered system of  world trade’ by negotiating fixed prices.607 As a result, at the 
beginning of  the war, the UK and Germany had signed more than 130 agreements and 
controlled a large share of  global trade through international cartels. 
In the same period, in the other side of  the world, Japan was experiencing a 
similar trend. Since 1853, when the U.S. started to force the country to open to foreign 
trade, the strong relationship between the Tokyo government and Japanese business 
firms had safeguarded the internal market more than protectionism itself. Indeed, 
according to the Japanese Confucian tradition, the exertion of  power had to be 
centralised and free competition was not considered the best strategy for economic 
development.608   
For these reasons, the Japanese strategy consisted of  a partial adoption of  
European and American technology, education, and institutions, which were to coexist 
with its own traditions. Accordingly, Japan developed a unique capitalistic system, 
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characterised by the coexistence of  property rights and extensive government 
interventions in the economy. Although private business welcomed state interventionism 
and the government encouraged some forms of cartelising practices in order to limit 
excessive competition, until 1920s Japan had only a very small number of cartels. The 
first two cartels appeared in 1880 and in 1882 with the foundation of the Japan Paper 
Manufacturers Federation and the Japanese Cotton Spinning Federation.609   
Yet, Japan developed other forms of cooperation. In fact, the Japanese internal 
market was mostly controlled by the Zaibatsu, a group of  holding companies structured 
in an oligopolistic organisational system that was owned by members of  a small number 
of  single families, such as the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Furukawa, and 
Okura. In fact, the term ‘Zaibatsu’ literally meant financial combine. From the beginning 
of  the nineteenth century, these families started to leading banking, insurance, mining, 
manufacture and construction industries and their influence over the Japanese market 
was so strong that in 1937 they controlled 10% of Japan's paid-in capital.610  
During the 1930s, the economic depression pushed the government to 
substantially promote the Zaibaitsu, along with cartels and other anticompetitive business 
practices.611  For instance, in 1931, Tokyo approved the Significant Industries Control 
Law. This law authorised the Ministry not only to enforce price-fixing agreements, output 
restrictions, joint-sale practices, and other market restraints, but also to act as a promoter 
of  cartel agreements.612 In so doing, the Japanese bureaucracy began to closely control, 
but not impede, cartels. On the contrary, cartel participation and market access were sold 
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to other countries for technological know-how or for the protection for domestic 
industries.613 Additionally, in 1941 Japan enforced the Major Industries Association 
Ordinance, which was designed to suppress competition by fostering the on-going 
cartelisation process. This was designed to create a new economic structure that, 
according to the Japan Economic Federation and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, was essential to allow the country to sustain the economic pressure of the 
war.614 
 Therefore, by the end of  the 1930s, both the German and Japanese governments, 
following global trends, pursued a strictly controlled economic policy and favoured the 
creation and the protection of  cartels. Cartels shaped economic and business structures 
and became generally accepted practices to develop and protect the domestic market. 
Although this general trend had detrimental effects on the development of  competitive 
trade practices, substantial political economic reforms were not introduced until the end 
of  the war.  
 
The US Interests in Promoting New Antitrust Systems:  The Causes of  a Coercive Internalisation 
Process 
As described in detail above, the US overcame the Great Depression by institutionalising 
a new antitrust approach that abolished both political isolationism and economic 
protectionism. At the same time, the US also realised that in order to boost its 
production, it was necessary to create a free market in Europe and Japan where its 
surplus products could be sold. Thus, at the end of  the war, the need to increase trade 
drove the US to look at the rest of  the world in its promotion of  free markets. 
American efforts were motivated by the need to influence antitrust regulations 
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and to introduce strict provisions against cartels, especially in occupied Germany and 
Japan.615 Indeed, it was evident that the Great Depression caused widespread 
cartelisation of  large international corporations especially in those two countries. 
By influencing competition laws, the US would not only ensure the promotion of   
free market, but also the complete abolition of  national protectionisms and cartels, 
which were held to be largely responsible for the long duration of  the war. Indeed, 
during the conflict, international cartels provided strategic resources to the totalitarian 
regimes. For instance, the cartel agreement between the Aluminium Industrie AG (Swiss-
German) and Alcoa (US) provided Germany with enough strategic material to support 
the war against Europe.616  Similarly, in Japan, it was only thanks to the nepotistic 
business system of  the Zaibatsu that the government could sustain the war effort. 
Furthermore, the fight against cartels became a way to pursue more radical 
policies both in Western countries and Japan. Indeed, the fear of  economic recession and 
the allure of  market freedom became a way to keep countries out of  the Soviet sphere of  
influence and into the American one. Indeed, the US needed stability in order to provide 
American firms with free access to European and Asian market. For this reason, it 
promoted democratisation programmes to also encourage the adoption of  antitrust 
policies in both Europe and Japan. Antitrust policies were thus coercively implemented 
and internalised because of  the economic, financial and military clout the US exerted on 
them at the time. This power came from different sources. Firstly, after World War II, the 
US was the only country able to counterbalance the Soviet Union and the expansion of  
the planned-economic system. By providing security to Western countries through the 
Atlantic Pact and through its monopoly of  atomic weapons, it could easily create a safe 
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space where institutionalise antitrust policies and promote trade growth.617  
Secondly, the US wielded maximum financial power, as the dollar dominated 
both Western and Japanese economies. At the time, most currencies were not convertible 
and the US, through the gold standard, made the dollar the only currency that could be 
used in the international transactions. Under this system, many countries pegged their 
exchange rates to the US dollar and were compelled to buy or sell their products to the 
US in order to supply cash.618 Thirdly, since European and Japanese enterprises had to be 
rebuilt or reconverted, American corporations had a de facto, if  not de jure, monopoly in 
the supply of  merchandise. 
In conclusion, the mechanism of antitrust emulation after World War II can 
easily be explained as a form of coercive isomorphism. Indeed, both Europe and Japan 
were militarily, financially and economically unable to confront or challenge the US 
involvement in their national market regulations and general economic policies. 
 
Coercive Isomorphism:  The Case of Europe 
The first example of  coercive isomorphism was found in Europe. Indeed, through the 
Marshal plan, the US acquired not only the right to lead the recovery process, but also to 
exert its influence over both the development and the direction of  the European 
integration process. Economic aid began to be used by the US to push European 
countries to adopt the American prescriptions on monetary and fiscal policies and to 
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foster the liberalisation and opening of  national markets. In other words, by providing 
economic aid to Europe, the Marshall Plan allowed the US to spread specific ideas on 
how capitalism should be regulated. In fact, once its European partners recovered their 
economies and became effective competitors, the US claimed the right to demand the 
adoption of  specific domestic reforms in order to ‘level’ the ‘playing fields’ and promote 
international competition.619 Sure enough, those reforms would turn out to be a strong 
challenge to the maintenance of  certain national interventionist practices or some of  the 
state aid provisions that were used during the war to avoid competition. 
Apart from the Marshall Plan, the US also influenced the drafting process of  the 
competition law of  the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Indeed, the US 
Secretary of  State of  the time, Dean Acheson, was convinced that the Schuman Plan for 
the creation of  the European Coal and Steel Community was an excuse to conceal a 
huge European cartel.620 Consequently, the antitrust principles introduced in the ECSC 
Treaty resulted to be an accommodation of  US Harvard antitrust ideas to the European 
market, made by Professor Robert Bowie and supported by Jean Monnet.  
Indeed, according to Jean Monnet, the antitrust provisions of  the ECSC Treaty 
‘were fundamental innovations’ for Europe and they were based on the ‘few lines in the 
Schuman Treaty’ written by Robert Bowie on the basis of  the Sherman Act and 
reworked into ‘European idiom’ by Maurice Lagrange.621 Professor Bowie, an antitrust 
specialist from the Harvard Law School, was a member of  the German High Committee 
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and he was involved in the drafting process of  the German Anti-Cartel Act of  1947. In 
June 1950, he also drafted the preliminary version of  the ECSC antitrust provisions that 
would become articles 60 and 61 of  the final ECSC Treaty, which complied with ‘the 
substantive imprint of  the Sherman Act derived from their American ancestry’. Article 
60 prohibited cartels and loose agreements that could be authorised by the High 
Authority only in case of  crisis. Article 61 dealt with concentrations and the abuse of  
market power, prohibiting, as per the American tradition, only unreasonable 
concentrations thereof. Finally, with the creation of  European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1957, these articles were changed to become article 85 and 86 of  the Treaty of  
Rome.622 
Those antitrust provisions can be considered as the foundation of  competition 
regulation in Western Europe.623 Where the European Economic Community provisions 
were applicable, they took precedence over national rules. 624 Consequently, by 
influencing EEC law, the US could partially control the application of  competition laws 
in all the member countries of  the European Community (EC). However, according to 
Giandomenico Majone, ‘the commitment to competition policy has never been as strong 
in Europe as it is in the United States. Indeed, cartels and restrictive practices were 
traditionally accepted either as an expression of  freedom of  contract, as in Britain, or as 
instruments of  rationalisation and industrial policy as in Germany’.625 
Nonetheless, the American will to support the European economy and to 
influence its antitrust policy was translated into a process of  coercive isomorphism 
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whereby Europe could not confront the US spread of  Harvard anti-cartels and mergers 
principles. However, although it is hard to deny that the US acted out of  its economic 
and military supremacy, the acceptance of  the US involvement in European antitrust 
policy was probably also determined by mimetic reasons. In other words, the EC 
acknowledged the effectiveness of  American antitrust practices because its member 
States were actively looking for new economic models and the US was the only 
alternative to the Soviet planned-economic system. Hence, Europe’s response to the 
nationalistic ideologies that caused World War II resulted in their yielding to American 
pressures ‘to ensure primacy of  economics over politics, and thus to de-ideologise issues 
of  political economy into questions of  output and efficiency’.626  
Finally, this process also paved the way for future normative isomorphism. 
Indeed, by creating the general framework of  antitrust laws, the US shaped not only the 
basis of  European competition policies, but also its future perception of  antitrust and 
competitiveness. Similarly to the Coal and Steel Community, the process of  post-war 
reconstruction and institutional building in Germany was widely influenced by the US 
through coercive procedures. As in the case of  the ECSC, the isomorphism process was 
largely coercive because the US was the main economic power of  the time and its 
intervention in the war had been of  fundamental importance for the Allies’ victory. In 
this context, Germany was forced to adopt antitrust regulations because the demolition 
of  those business concentrations that were believed to undermine economic growth 
became the US principle objective during the occupation.  
A law against unfair competition, known as the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb or UWB, had already been approved in 1909. However, the Nazi regime had 
subsequently promoted the development of  large cartels to assure total economic 
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control. Consequently, in 1947 the Allies, aware that the economic power of  the Nazi 
regime was based on the structure of  German industries, pushed the West Germany 
government to adopt antitrust provisions specifically targeted against cartel 
agreements.627 The introduction of  such competition policies, modelled after the 
American tradition, was hoped to prevent the rise of  any future totalitarian power and to 
turn Germany into a viable economy.628  For this reason, the adoption of  an antitrust 
system became one of  the preconditions for the withdrawal of  the allied military forces.  
The industrial sector that most suffered from the provisional antitrust regulations 
was that of  the coal and steel monopolies in the Ruhr. During the war, all the German 
steel production was controlled by 6 main cartels, and between them, the Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke produced more steel than France alone.629 From 1947 to 1948, the Allied High 
Commission (AHC), composed of  the US, UK and France, imposed a decartelisation 
and a de-concentration law drafted by Professor Bowie. The law aimed at dismantling the 
6 steel cartels and at creating 25 private enterprises. Its rationale was to introduce 
Harvard principles into the country in order to re-establish competition by converting 
Germany to an American-oriented antitrust model where cartels and restrictive practices 
had to be prosecuted and blocked. The fact that the abolition of  cartels decimated the 
productivity levels of  some of  the most strategic and efficient German industries was 
seemingly irrelevant. 
The 1947 law was later replaced by a new one, which had to be approved by both 
German and Allied authorities. This was finally passed in 1957, when the West German 
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government enforced the Restraint of  Competition Act (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), a final draft of  antitrust law in full compliance with the 
American antitrust tradition. According to the Act, cartels and loose agreements had to 
be declared illicit and combinations that restrained trade had to be considered illegal per 
se.  
Although Berlin included a number exceptions, and even if  the Act after various 
amendments, was only finally consolidated in 1980, this episode counts as the first 
coercive attempt by the US to convert Germany to the American Harvard antitrust 
tradition and to consolidate a free market subservient to US interests. 
 
Coercive Isomorphism: The Case of Japan 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Japanese government had to provide jobs for 
seven million soldiers, four million military-factory workers, and one-and-a-half million 
individuals returning from abroad.  Moreover, the poor results of the 1945 rice harvest 
and the general war costs put Japan in a very fragile economic condition. In this general 
framework, another big challenge for Japan was the need to adopt antitrust policies. 
Indeed, just as in Germany, the US forced Japan towards a liberalisation process through 
one of the most ambitious antitrust campaigns in history.630 
On January 6, 1946, Corwin Edwards’ Mission on Japanese Combines, otherwise 
known as the ‘Zaibatsu Mission’, arrived in Tokyo. Quoting Eleanor Fox, First Harry 
claimed that ‘the Edwards Mission's mandate was to consider the ways and means that 
would effectively destroy the power of the Zaibatsu’.631 Making Tokyo adopt competition 
regulations was part of a wider market-opening plan to promote a general Japanese 
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economic restructuring, in accordance to Harvard and Keynesian principles.632 Hence, in 
the aftermath of the Allied military occupation, the Japanese authorities had to enforce 
market regulations that would satisfy the Allies’ requests. Indeed, the withdrawal of the 
occupying forces was conditional upon the full democratisation of Japan.  
Japan bureaucrats had very little knowledge of US antitrust and, at the time, very 
few Japanese scholars had studied the discipline of competition and antitrust. 
Nonetheless, among those influenced by the Anglo-American competition models, 
academics like Wakimura and Takayanagi tried to persuade the government to abolish 
the Zaibatsu holding company, to provide new market opportunities for other firms, and 
to increase investment possibilities.633 Unfortunately, those ideas had very little influence 
on Japanese policymakers’ traditional Confucian understanding of the social-economic 
order. Hence, in January 1946, in response to the Allies’ request to liberalise the market, 
the Japanese authorities presented the Industrial Order Bill. This was to regulate the level 
of government intervention in the market in a similar way to the political economic 
strategies adopted by Japan with the 1931 Important Industries Control Act and it did 
not offer any provision for stimulating market competitiveness in an American liberal 
way. Since ‘the measure clearly did not represent a realistic grasp of American antitrust’, 
in 1947 the Allies forced Tokyo to enforce an Antimonopoly Law, namely the Act on 
Prohibition of  Private Monopolization and Maintenance of  Fair Trade. The major aim 
of the law was to lay the economic foundation for democracy by prohibiting private 
monopolization (Article 3), cartels (Article 3), and unfair trade practices or any other act 
that impeded competition (Article 19). On the one hand, the Act would pass judgement 
on all those practices that were considered harmful for the development of  national 
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economy and social welfare. On the other hand, it would allow the opening of  a new rich 
market for US corporations.634  
In other words, the Allied Occupation Force’s economic democratisation policies 
were nothing short of  a pure attempt to break up the Zaibatsu system of  combinations 
and to avoid the rise of  new monopolies and concentrations that would adversely affect 
their investments in Japan. Moreover, similarly to the Ruhr industries, the Zaibatsu was 
considered an undemocratic concentration of  economic power and a possible danger to 
international security, being as it was easily exploitable by a militarist regime. For these 
reasons, the Zaibatsu was completely dissolved under the intervention of  the General 
Headquarters of  the Allied powers in Japan (the GHQ), and, as in Germany, the 
previous system was replaced with a more dispersed industrial structure through the 
redistribution of  ownership.635  
In conclusion, it can be argued that the US used its military and economic power 
to influence Japan antitrust policy. The process can be understood as coercive 
isomorphism and it was aimed at guarantying the maintenance of  free markets and at 
preventing the rise of  protectionism. This was part of  a wider plan aimed at 
reconstructing and developing the major economies at the time in the interest of  
international peace and stability. On the one hand, stability would allow American firms 
to invest freely in those economies, and on the other hand, economic reforms would 
assure the capacity of  local markets to absorb American goods.  
Despite its best efforts to shape Japanese competition law, shortly after the US 
military left the country, Tokyo started to adopt a broader interpretation of  antitrust 
policy compared to the Harvard-oriented one inherited from the US. The Ministry of  
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International Trade and Industry (MITI) began to strictly control the activities of  the 
Fair Trade Commission (FTC) in order to prevent any form of  ‘ruinous competition’ 
that would reduce Japan’s industrial profits. The rise of  the Japanese economy would risk 
threatening the competitiveness of  American companies and, sure enough, this 
eventually became one of  the main problems for the US during the oil crisis of  the 
1970s. 
 
Coercive, Mimetic, Normative and Competitive Isomorphism: General Trends 
The US intervened in the economic reconstruction of  Europe and Japan in order to 
spread its liberal market approach and Harvard antitrust ideas with a view to ultimately 
promote world peace and so prosperity. US involvement took place in the form of  a 
coercive isomorphism process, whereby Europe, Germany and Japan were directly 
coerced to adopt antitrust regulations in order to abolish national forms of  
protectionism and government-backed cartels. This is an example of  what I understand 
as institutionalisation process whereby ideas were internalised by countries to allow the 
achievement of  specific interests. 
In this context, Harvard antitrust ideas were strongly supported by the US 
because they were believed to promote free markets. Access to international free markets 
was vital for American firms to freely invest in Europe and Asia and thereby solve their 
over-production problem. Furthermore, Europe and Japan had no other choice other 
than buying American merchandise because, before restoring their own production 
capacities, they first needed to dismantle their military industries.  
Hence, the imposition of  competition regulations modelled after those of  the US 
resulted in a liberal environment heavily influenced by a Harvard perspective of  the 
world economy. This aspect is perfectly explained by coercive isomorphism. However, 
while the US coercively enforced antitrust regulations in Europe and Japan, those 
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countries started to integrate these practices with their traditional models. This set in 
motion other types of  isomorphic mechanisms, namely a mimetic, a normative and a 
competitive one. Indeed, after World War II, the need for economic reconstruction 
pushed Europe and Japan to find and apply the best model that would allow them to 
regain international competitiveness. This facilitated the construction of  a world where 
similar economic ideas could be easily shared; these ideas, in turn, favoured a constant 
normative isomorphic process that preserved international stability and, along with it, the 
US economic supremacy.636 By the end of  the 1950s, the US promoted an international 
political and economic post-war order based on a coalition of  states tied together 
through markets, international agreements, and security partnerships. On the one hand, 
the US provided its European and Asian partners with economic and financial aid; on 
the other, however, it encouraged an open world economy by forcing the adoption on 
the part of  Europe and Japan of  antitrust regulations that allowed American 
corporations to establish and expand their investments.637 
The form of  embedded liberalism inherent in the Keynesian and Harvard ideas 
that were international promoted by the US allowed states to increase social welfare 
without obstructing free trade. This combination resulted in what came to be known as 
the Golden Age of  capitalism. For this reason, the adoption of  specific antitrust 
institutions, in the form of  laws and regulations, while at first coercive, became in time 
an international normative trend, particularly strong in Europe. 
Moreover, the exigencies of  international competition and the need for 
international leadership pushed European countries, and later Japan, to integrate their 
traditional models with a more Harvard-oriented perception of  antitrust or, at least, to 
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maintain the previsions previously established by the US. 
Europe was more accommodating to a Harvard-oriented antitrust approach, not 
only because it was forced to do so, but also because it looked at the US as a successful 
economic model. West Germany, for instance, was obliged to adopt an antimonopoly law 
that was reframed as soon as the occupation ended. However, the need to respect 
European competition criteria, to preserve international competitiveness, and to avoid 
the rise of  another fascist regime pushed the country to reconsider the merits of  the 
Harvard School and to integrate it with its own Ordoliberal tradition. In this sense, the 
influence of  American antitrust ideas in Europe was caused not only by coercive 
isomorphism but also by mimetic, normative and competitive ones. Japan, by contrast, 
adopted its Anti-Monopoly Law only because it was coerced to do so. However, as soon 
as the occupation ended, the MITI amended the AML exempt cartels. This trend 
demonstrates that coercive isomorphism per se is not enough to promote full institutional 
change, as ideas are normally deeply rooted in the local culture. Indeed, even though 
Japan started to adopt a more liberal approach towards cartels, those liberal ideas were 
always integrated with local business customs.  
In conclusion, the international adoption of  Harvard-oriented antitrust policies 
was first set in motion by a mechanism of  coercive isomorphism and later sustained by 
mimetic, competitive and normative motivations. American ideas became so influential as 
to permanently change the way Europe and Japan understood competition. The liberal 
trend turned out to be extremely favourable to the Europeans and the Japanese, so much 
so that, at the beginning of  the 1970s, the US started to confront stiff  economic 
competition from the same countries it had helped recover twenty years before. 
Nonetheless, prior to the oil crises, Harvard antitrust ideas together with the Keynesian 
policies and Fordism production system were responsible for creating an international 
Golden Age of  capitalism. 
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THE FATE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
 
After the Great Depression and World War II, the US engaged in the construction of  a 
post-war international order congenial to its interests. The United States were able to 
influence antitrust regulations in Europe and Japan because of  its military, economic and 
financial dominance. In other words, through coercive isomorphic processes, the US 
could drive Europe and Japan to institutionalise Harvard oriented antitrust ideas into 
their models of  capitalism and influence their way of  perceiving competition. The 
general result of  the US international involvement was the construction of  a stable 
international arena, which favoured the development of  independent centres of  
economic power. Indeed, as soon as European countries and Japan started to recover 
from the crisis and the war, they became very strong competitors.638   
By the 1960s, while production in Europe and Japan reached or exceeded pre-war 
levels, the US share of  world manufacturer exports began to decline. On the contrary, 
Western Europe’s share rose from 48.6% in 1953 to 52.3% in 1959 and 55.1% in 1971, 
whereas Japan’s share increased, in the same years, from 3.9% to 6.8% and 10.7%. 
However, the economic trauma generated by the two oil crises of  the 1970s 
stimulated government interventionism in much of  the ‘free world’, as it was known at 
the time. Europe and Japan followed their traditional way of  tackling economic 
downturns and, by radicalising Keynesian and Harvard formulas of  central antitrust 
controls, ended up favouring the adoption of  subsidies. Forms of  protectionism and 
other interventionist measures began to be perceived as the only recipe for stimulating 
the recovery and for protecting the national economies from outside competition.639  
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These measures are not comparable to those implemented during the Great Depression. 
Indeed, the institutionalisation of  international competition practices, through the anti-
trade barriers campaign promoted by the GATT, deterred governments from adopting 
economic policies that would directly exclude foreign investors. However, the use of  
national subsidies – or the creation of  companies groups in the case of  Japan – 
encouraged governments to indirectly apply anticompetitive policies in order to 
overcome the crises. At the same time, the US lacked the same economic strength to 
coerce other countries to implement different policies.640  
At the beginning of  the 1980s, trade and non-trade barriers adopted by European 
and Japanese governments were still damaging the US economy. In response to this, the 
Reagan administration resorted to a more aggressive bilateral strategy based on the threat 
that the US would restrict access to its market unless other countries adopted fair trade 
policies and opened their borders to US corporations. At the same time, economic 
exigencies pushed Europe and Japan closer to the US in their attempt to meet the new 
needs that had just arisen from the downturn. 
 
European State Aid and the Re-launch of  the European Union 
Even though the competition policies adopted by the ECSC, and based on American 
ideologies, were in contrast to the Western European tradition of  economic dirigisme, they 
came to be adopted by the EC much more readily than by Japan.641 In fact, they became 
part of  the set of  common rules necessary to integrate the European market.642  
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However, European competition policy was also strongly influenced by the 
German Ordoliberal School. According to Gerber, the ordoliberals maintained that ‘the 
inability of  the legal system to prevent the creation and misuse of  private economic 
power’ had ‘led to economic and political disintegration of  Germany and elsewhere’.643 
Hence, it was necessary to develop a social market economy where the role of  the state 
was not undermined by economic power.644 According to Walter Hallstein, the German 
law professor of  ordoliberal principles that led the first presidency of  the European 
Commission, what the Community was all about integrating ‘the role of  the state in 
establishing the framework within which economic activities takes place’. 645 
The ratification of  the Treaty of  Rome, along with its liberal economic 
provisions required by the US and mediated by the German Ordoliberal School, was the 
point of  departure for one of  the longest economic booms in Europe, a ‘European 
Golden Age.’ Between 1950 and 1970, the European GDP grew by about 5.5% a year, 
while the world average stood at 5.0%. The level of  unemployment was very low and 
industrial production rates rose by 7.1% a year against a world average of  5.9%.646 
However, if  the economic expansion that followed World War II allowed Europe 
to recover and reconvert its industries, the first oil crisis of  1974 precipitated an 
economic downturn that sent both the European and the world economy into 
depression. Between 1973 and 1985, the EC experienced negative rates of  growth and its 
share of  world trade in manufactured goods fell from 45% to 36%. The crisis had also a 
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negative impact on the European integration process.647 
The economic downturn developed disparities among EC economies and the 
influence of  the American economic model in Europe waned considerably. Since tariffs 
could not be raised within the EC free zone and the GATT prohibited the adoption of  
aggressive protectionist policies, European governments used public subsidies in order to 
promote national firms and to raise the level of  employment.648 This policy direction, 
which was driven by a misinterpretation of  Keynesian and Harvard principles, had 
already been taken up by many EC countries even before the economic boom; however, 
the economic downturn reinforced the trend.   
Although the Treaty of  Rome gave the EC Commission the competence to 
discipline national subsidies, at the time Directorate General of  Competition, (DG IV) 
lacked the legitimacy necessary to effectively coordinate states’ aid to industries.649 Unable 
to agree on any common policy, the European governments tried to find valid responses 
to the economic downturn through a vigorous, if  not coordinated, promotion of  
national economies. In Germany and Britain, the biggest European economies, large 
firms operating in industrial sectors such as shipbuilding, steel production, cars, and 
electronics, received national industrial subsidies. Moreover, in the textile sector, while 
British governments paid employers to keep on any redundant workforce, West 
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Germany covered 80% of  part-time workers’ wages.650 According to Margaret Sharp, in 
the telecommunication sector, British government awarded large public sector contracts 
to companies like ICL or the GEC-Marconi, while British Telecom procured materials 
only from the three British suppliers of  telecom equipment and eschewed all foreign 
suppliers. Similarly, the German Deutsches Bundespost shared contracts only with the 
German Siemens and Nixdorf.651 
These policies affected economic integration and threatened competition, and 
thus the efficiency of  the European internal market.652 Moreover, the economic 
downturn was exacerbated by the second oil-price shocks in 1979/80. At that point, 
stagflation pushed political leaders in Europe and the US to abandon the Keynesian 
scheme and to reconsider the policies of  the post-war boom.653 Indeed, compared to the 
1960s, the level of  growth had dropped to at least one-half, while intra-EC trade 
expansions had effectively stopped and international trade transactions had slowed 
down.654 
This trend lasted until the mid-1980s, when the European Union, inspired by the 
Reagonomics, started to change tack and member states started to agree on a common 
policy at a European level with a view to developing a Single European Market.655 The 
increasing willingness of  the US to regulate the European market is also apparent in the 
Cooperation Agreement signed in 1979 with West Germany. Here, the Ordoliberal 
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School had proposed models that slightly differed from those supported by the Chicago 
School; by maintaining both trade unions and high social protections, the German 
economy had thus managed to stay competitive.656 Even though neo-liberal reforms were 
hardly applicable in West Germany, in 1979 the US promoted an Antitrust Cooperation 
Agreement in an attempt to regulate cooperation between the two countries and avoid 
the rise of  ‘restrictive business practices’ that could be ‘prejudicial to the economic and 
commercial interests’ of  both countries.657  
At the same time, German Ordoliberal scholars, influenced by Chicago theories, 
developed the ‘neo-liberal Euro-sclerosis idea’ and linked the causes of  the European 
economic stagflation to states' interventionism.658 In contrast, the Ordoliberal 
economists’ recipe for a successful industrial policy comprised privatisations and the 
reduction of  state aid. This was likely the result of  first a mimetic, and then a 
competitive, isomorphic process. At the time, the US did not wield enough influence to 
force Germany to adopt a different antitrust policy. It was rather Germany itself  that, 
looking at the US neo-liberal model as a possible way out of  the crisis, turned to a more 
Chicago-oriented competition approach. 
Similarly, the UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, inspired by Reagan, 
inaugurated a neo-liberal policy with a drastic containment of  public expenditure. The 
reduced role of  the state was translated into market self-regulation and a major 
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privatisation wave.659 
 
Mimetic, Normative and Competitive Isomorphism: the case of  Europe 
Although Germany and the UK inaugurated a largely neo-liberal economic policy, in the 
early 1980s other European countries were still promoting national champions and 
strategic trade policies. For instance, in Italy and France there was a form of  ‘symbiosis’ 
between public and private sectors.660 However, impressed by the initially positive 
outcomes of  deregulation in the United States, and fearing greater competition, the EU 
leadership finally decided to overhaul its antitrust policy. On the one hand, Europe 
agreed to promote gradual deregulation; on the other hand, it granted the promotion of  
the common market through the enforcement of  the Single European Act (SEA) in 
1986. These policies helped to overcome national economic egoisms and to achieve an 
‘improved competitive advantage of  private companies and industries within the 
Member States and the Community as a whole’. 661  
The aim of  the SEA was in fact to give new impetus to the creation of  a single 
market, by promoting, for instance, a deeper integration in competition regulations under 
the aegis of  the European Commission. Indeed, the development of  a strong European 
common market was linked to the stricter regulation of  mergers and state aid and to the 
prohibition of  cartels and monopoly conducts.662 
Although the general trend in the 1980s was for governments to favour greater 
liberalisation in the market, ‘the European Commission’s policies protected smaller 
enterprise and labour while imposing accountability upon US multinational 
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corporations’.663 In this sense, European competition policy, by following both a 
European welfare oriented policy and an ‘Americanized efficiency-seeking political 
economy’, developed a sort of  alternative to the US system in the region.664 Furthermore, 
following the fall of  the Berlin Wall, Europe started to be very dynamic in exporting and 
influencing ‘competition regulation’ in Eastern and Central European countries and 
competition policy became also one of  the EU membership criteria. European 
Association Agreements were signed with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic in December 1991, and with Romania and Bulgaria in February and 
March 1993.665 
Yet, because the EC Treaty did not provide any specific juridical tool to control 
mergers, the Commission prosecuted concentrations that involved many American 
multinational corporations under the anti-dominant position provisions of  Article 82.666 
Hence, after the controversial result of  the 1973 Continental Can and the 1989 British 
American Tobacco, an appropriate EC merger regulation became effective in September 
1990.667 
The new regulation attempted to neo-liberalise European competition policy by 
preventing forms of  state interventionism. It introduced a package of  reforms that 
modified the division of  jurisdiction in the case of  large mergers and empowered the 
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Commission.668 The MCR made mandatory the notification to the Commission of  any 
kind of  concentration and it clarified that, in the case of  mergers or acquisitions with a 
community dimension, only the Commission had the power to verify the compatibility 
of  those activities within the ‘common market’.669 Apart from the British Clause under 
article 21(3), which allowed member states to use their existing powers to protect certain 
‘legitimate interests’ not taken into account by the MCR competition test, the MCR 
blocked any national attempts to introduce, in merger evaluations, any consideration 
related to employment or industrial policy.670 According to Commissioner Brittan this 
merger regulation ‘beat back’ the supporters of  an industrial policy’ and gave ‘clear 
primacy to the competition criterion, with only the smallest nod in the direction of  
anything else’671. 
Even though the ordoliberal clause of  common market protection remained in 
the MCR, Hubert Buch-Hanse and Angela Wigger maintained that this was the first step 
made by the European Competition General Directorate towards neoliberalism. This was 
fostered by a mimetic isomorphic process, through which the European competition 
policy was directly inspired by the same Chicago ideas that shaped antitrust in the US. 
Indeed, for the first time, the interests of  Member States were heavily excluded in the 
competition evaluation and a sort of  efficiency-oriented discourse that reflected business 
interests started to emerge.672 This process resulted from competition mechanisms too. 
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Indeed, Europe began to move its policy towards a more efficiency-oriented approach 
because of  a rising tendency among the EU Member States to consider the neo-liberal 
system applied in the US as the best model for the development of  efficiency and 
welfare.  
However, traditional European interpretations of  competition were usually not as 
much oriented toward economic efficiency as the American one. On the contrary, the 
Commission and the Court, in interpreting any violation of  competition regulations, 
normally focused on the extent to which a particular economic behaviour in contrast 
with European laws was affecting the common market, rather than how profitable it was 
in terms of  economic performance. Hence, the 1990 MCR did not alleviate American 
fears of  an uncontrolled development of  the European welfare oriented competition 
system; on the contrary, this regulation fostered the idea of  a Communitarian policy that 
would have a deep effect on mergers involving not only European but also American 
corporations by not completely following an ‘Americanised efficiency-seeking political 
economy’.673 
Consequently, in 1991 the US began to adopt a normative isomorphic strategy by 
launching discussions with the European Commission. Those discussions were designed 
to promote a formal competition agreement, which could in turn foster cooperation 
among competition authorities and allocate jurisdiction in transnational merger cases.674 
In other words, the agreement was a normative instrument to reduce conflicting 
decisions and facilitate collaboration in a field where the Europeans had increasingly 
enforced their decisions over cases that involved US companies’ interests. Hence, the 
final ratification of  the Cooperation Agreement was the means through which Europe 
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started to institutionalise American-oriented antitrust ideas.  
Through the cooperation agreement, the US found the right institutional tool to 
indirectly promote the consensual adoption of  its neo-liberal model of  capitalism and its 
Chicago-oriented antitrust approach over business conducts. In fact, in the days after the 
agreement, the Commission began to move the intellectual foundations of  European 
Competition toward a different approach: a Chicago one. 
 
The Japanese Post–World-War Economic Success and the Oil Crises 
Prior to 1945, the Japanese juridical system did not provide any antitrust supervision and 
the national market was entirely controlled by the Zaibatsu, a family group that owned the 
main national firms. However, after World War II, the US, by pushing Japan to adopt the 
Antimonopoly Law of  1947, rebalanced the Japanese economic system in order to 
integrate it with the new international order embodied in the Bretton Woods and the 
GATT agreements.675 From 1950 to 1973, the country experienced extraordinarily fast 
economic growth: manufacturing production grew by 13% a year and GDP growth 
reached 10% a year. Moreover, the ‘asymmetric cooperation’ with the United States 
allowed Japan to raise its exports by 10%.676 
However, as soon as Japan regained full sovereignty in 1952, the Ministry of  
International Trade and Industry (MITI) allowed the development of  a strong 
cooperation between public and private sectors. On the one hand, under the 
administration of  the Ministry of  Finance, restrictions on market entry and international 
competition were applied. On the other hand, the Bank of  Japan supplied money to the 
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national banks in order to allow them to provide credit to the main local industries. In 
addition, MITI considered weaker antitrust enforcement measures to be more beneficial 
to economic development and accordingly sponsored a wide range of  cartels and an 
economic model based on high market concentrations. Indeed, the general belief  was 
that firms had to be protected, especially in their infant stage.677 
Consequently, through the 1953 Antimonopoly Law Amendment, the formation 
of  the keiretsu (kigyo shudan) was legalised.678 Essentially, the keiretsu was an unusual inter-
corporate shareholding system that reintegrated and reassembled the corporations of  the 
dismantled Zaibatsu.679 This new type of  business agglomeration was based on a 
reciprocal cross-ownership system that guaranteed corporations market power by 
allowing them to share the use of  common resources, such as technology and 
information.680 With the increasing importance of  the keiretsu, by the beginning of  1970 
cartels were playing a central part in government industrial policy and Japan was 
becoming a ‘cartel archipelago’.681 
The aim of  the industrial policy implemented by the MITI was to foster 
competition between oligopolistic firms by granting different kind of  rewards, such as 
access to credit or protection from international competition. Those rewards were 
assigned according to the economic performances registered in export markets, 
technological development, or new products. This combined system of  cooperation and 
competition was the key to the Japanese economic success; indeed, it enhanced rivalry 
between firms and promoted a dynamic and efficient system where industries were 
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extremely competitive.682 For instance, at the beginning of  the 1950s, the MITI allowed 
companies in the textile, paper and pulp, chemical fertilizer, and steel sectors to develop 
cartels to stimulate their growth and development. Moreover, after World War II, Tokyo 
began to limit imports and foreign direct investments (FDI) to protect domestic 
companies. Indeed, FDI were partially liberalised in 1967 and they were eventually freed 
in 1973.683 
However, the economic miracle that characterised the Japanese ‘high-speed’ 
growth of  the 1960s was followed by a severe economic downturn, and eventually a 
recession, over the 1970s. Indeed, as the Bretton Woods declined in 1971 and the world 
economy was beaten by the oil shock of  1974, demands for more protectionist measures 
multiplied. Moreover, the end of  the dollar convertibility negatively affected the trade 
balance surpluses, which had buoyed the Japanese economy in the period from the late 
1960s to 1972, while the excess of  liquidity created by the shock caused the rise of  
inflation.684 
At first, in order to foster the recovery of  some e of  the most rapidly declining 
sectors, such as those of  textiles and shipbuilding, the Japanese government, under the 
aegis of  Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, promoted a series of  ‘rationalisation’ cartels.685 
In addition, following the radicalisation of  the effect of  the oil crisis, the MITI and the 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA) recommended two bills. The first one allowed the 
government to fix quotas for petroleum product shipments directed to industries or 
consumers. The second bill, the Law on Emergency Measures to Stabilise the National 
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Lifestyle, allowed the central government to set ‘criterion prices’ for basic products. 
However, both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members and industry leaders 
declared to be against this bill; indeed they did not want Japan to return to the situation 
of  price controls that characterised the wartime market. Moreover, while the FTC did 
not completely oppose the bill, on the understanding that price competition would only 
be suppressed for the time necessary to promote the economic recovery, the head of  the 
Fair Trade Commission, Takahashi Toshihide, was opposed to the government proposal 
to include manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers in a system of  price stabilisation 
cartels. 
Since by May 1973 the level of  prices had doubled and by February 1974 
inflation had reached 26%, the issue of  price controls became increasingly important. 
Inflation had a destabilising effect over the political arena, too. Local media spoke of  a 
‘Liberal Democratic Party in crisis’ and during Tanaka’s first year of  administration (July 
1972-July 1973) cabinet support rate dropped from 62 to 25%. 686  When the political 
scenario started to be affected also by a number of  major corporate scandals, the 
government began to direct its effort to strengthening an antimonopoly policy, and 
cartels became a primary FTC target. 
Consequently, from the beginning of  1973, the FTC, under the direction of  
Takahashi Toshihide, rolled in stricter controls over cartels of  all kinds.687 During the 
mid-1970s, the FTC sued sixty-seven cartel actors, accused 12 oil wholesalers and five of  
their directors of  price-fixing, and sued the Japanese Petroleum Federation and its four 
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representatives for restricting production.688 Even if  the FTC activism pushed three 
consumer groups to lodge a private action, its authority was not a reason of  concern for 
corporations. The majority of  them, having received recommendations from the FTC 
during the past years, received no sanctions at all. Therefore, although the Fair Trade 
Commission became more active, recording 69 formal actions against big corporations 
only in 1973, the level of  prices did not decrease, as corporations were not really affected 
by any of  the FTC actions. 
As the Japanese economy was still deteriorating in 1973 and in 1974/5 registered 
the first negative growth rate from the 1950s, Takahashi proposed to review the 
Antimonopoly Law in order to enforce the power of  FTC against cartels and price 
controls. The process of  revision of  the law was very long and had to face one rejection 
in 1975 and another in 1976. Indeed, while Takahashi’s proposals were generally 
supported by small business and consumer groups, who were mainly concerned about 
losing the protection of  the state, big businesses were obviously against any reforms that 
would undermine their privileges.689 Moreover, the MITI was against any kind of  FTC 
reinforcement that would affect the promotion of  its industrial policy. However, since 
the reform was supported by the political opposition as well as by Prime Minister Miki, 
the LDP was forced into compromise and the reform was finally passed in 1977. 
In the period between 1977 and 1983 the Japanese economy remained in crisis. 
Indeed energy costs were high and the country had to face a much stronger competition 
in the international market because the yen had been overvalued. In this context, the 
MITI decided to promote the formation of  cartels to reduce production in some of  the 
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sectors badly affected by the economic downturn. In 1977, the Diet passed the 
Depressed Industries Stabilisation Law, which allowed, for a period of  five years, the 
formation of  cartels among eight of  the fourteen production areas belonging to the 
eight industry sectors most affected by the economic crisis. However, the fact that not all 
industries were covered by the Stabilisation Law pushed industrialists to ask the MITI to 
revise the law so as to include new sectors. The MITI formulated their requests in the 
‘six Yamanaka principles’ where it was maintained that even if  the MITI agreed on the 
system of  cartel established by law and on the power accorded to the FTC, their 
cooperation was dependent on the Fair Trade Commission being more flexible in 
evaluating the condition of  each industry. The FTC agreed on keeping a controlled cartel 
system; however, it denied any alteration in the cartel agreement criteria settled. Hence, 
MITI could not ‘issue a warning against designated cartel outsiders over new investment’, 
control the production by issuing guidelines, or approve exemptions for mergers and 
business tie-up agreements.690 
 
The Case of  Japan: Competition under Constraints 
Even though Nixon tried several times to open Tokyo’s markets, it was under the Reagan 
administration that effective political actions started to be taken. Indeed, since the mid-
1980s, the US began to push Japan to strengthen its antitrust regime and to avoid on the 
one hand, any limitation of  market access and, on the other, excessive exports to the 
US.691 For the first time, in October 1982, a US Trade Representative report to Congress 
identified Japan’s industrial policies and the keiretsu system as trade barriers. Later, in 
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December 1982, Lionel Olmer, the Undersecretary of  Commerce for Industrial Trade, 
made a formal statement to President Reagan and the Cabinet, stating that the US had to 
change its policy towards Japan in order to restrain the country’s growing position in the 
technological, manufacturing and financial sectors. 
Following the displacement of  American domestic production by Japanese 
exports in areas such as steel, textiles, and consumer electronics, the US started to 
consider Japanese antimonopoly policy as inefficient and to maintain that the Japanese 
rapid expansion was due to lax antitrust policies that favoured local companies.692 During 
the 1980s, as US global competitiveness was declining, business groups began to push 
the government to limit trade policies on a selective basis. Mounting US criticism of  
Japanese unfair treatment of  cartels and similar anticompetitive policies, made it more 
difficult for the MITI to justify policies that compromised antimonopoly policy 
principles. The US wanted Japan to reduce the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) exemption 
cartels that damaged American business and consumers; moreover, it asked the FTC to 
fight against exclusionary practices in the distribution system. In the end, the FTC and 
the MITI arrived at a compromise embodied in the 1983 Industry Structure Law. This 
act established that, since economic depression had negatively affected 26 production 
areas in 10 industry sectors, designated cartels would be allowed in seven production 
areas. However, in 1987, US pressure on Japanese anticompetitive policies pushed the 
MITI to draft the Law of  Temporary Measures to Facilitate Industrial Structural 
Adjustment. The bill replaced the previous act by denying any form of  cartels or AML 
exemptions. However, it allowed a financial assistance scheme based on the concept of  
voluntary reductions in production facilities. 
In 1984, US and Japanese delegations and Tokyo started the Market Oriented 
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Specific (MOSS) negotiations in order to diminish or prevent trade barriers in the 
industries dealing with the telecommunication, electronic, forest production, medical, and 
pharmaceutical sectors.693 After the expiration of  the Industry Structure Law in 1988, 
while MITI tried to informally control production, the Office of  the United States Trade 
Representative began to complain that the Japanese cartelised system represented a 
substantial barrier to US exports to Japan and it was causing a massive bilateral trade 
imbalance. 
Hence, in 1989, the US launched a bilateral negotiation process, called the 
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) in order to pressure Japan to adopt a more 
coherent antimonopoly antitrust policy in accordance with US interests and to foster a 
different trend in the bilateral trade and investment imbalance. The US was not only 
concerned about Japan’s tariff  and quantitative restrictions on imports, but also the 
oligopolistic industrial sector that, by linking all the main local corporations, excluded any 
outsider firm from transactions.694 
The SII represented the US intention to harmonise the Japanese system to the 
international standards of  an open market; it was a bilateral negotiations directed to 
rectify the structural impediments between the Japan and US trade relationship. Its 
recommendations were mainly concerned with Japanese domestic policy regulations, 
such as public expenditure, land use policy, restrictive business behaviour, close inter-
corporate relationship and the system by which goods were distributed. 
The SII was the result of  coercive isomorphism; indeed, the recommendations 
directed to the US were general and abstract. By contrast, the advice to the Japanese 
government was very concrete and aimed at pushing the government to make structural 
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changes in the antimonopoly practices.695 Yet, while the reasons at the basis of  the 
adoption of  the SII by Tokyo were coercive, they soon became competitive. As the 
implementation of  SII took place, a profound crisis invested Japan.  
The collapse of  a speculative boom caused Japan’s worst recession in fifty years. 
Moreover, the fragmentation of  the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had ruled the 
country since 1955, caused severe political instability.696  The final agreement reached in 
June 1990 was also the result of  the Japanese need to overcome the political and 
economic downturn. By enacting a stronger antimonopoly policy, Tokyo managed to 
avert any stronger repercussions from the US and allowed the Japanese economy to 
grow. The measure reflected a close cooperation between American antitrust officials 
and their counterparts in the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), and permitted Japan 
to integrate its economy into a transnational antitrust culture. Although they were 
integrated with local Confucians traditions, neo-liberal ideas began to be institutionalised 
into common practices. According to Mitsuo Matsushita and Douglas Rosenthal, for the 
second time since the approbation of  the Japan Antimonopoly Law (AML), Japan 
antitrust law was ‘increasingly […] enforced in ways comparable to Western antitrust 
law’. 697    
 
The Oil Crises and Antitrust Isomorphism Procedures 
Compared to the history of  Harvard ideas, the institutionalisation process of  Chicago 
ideas followed a different course. At the end of  1980s, it was clear that the US had lost 
its privileged position at the international level to become just another actor among the 
many other important political and economic national entities. The US had to face not 
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only an economic downturn, but also a crisis of  international stature; indeed, it could not 
directly enforce antitrust regulation as it had done in Japan and Germany after World 
War II.   
However, in Japan, the adoption of  a cooperation agreement was forced by the 
US. This process was forcedly accepted by Japan under the threat of  being excluded 
from the US market. Europe, which had been influenced by the US ideas after the Great 
Depression, integrated Chicago principles mainly through a normative process. Indeed 
the American antitrust culture was more readily accepted by European countries and this 
had created a sort of  common understanding of  business practices. Hence, it was easier 
for Europe to accept US antitrust ideas, as they were already partially shared by the 
European governmental bodies. Nonetheless, the institutionalisation of  neo-liberal ideas 
was also led by competitive dynamics. Both Europe and Japan soon realised that in order 
to rescue their market and increase competitiveness, it was more convenient to follow the 
U.S. neo-liberal route because it easily proved to be the most successful one. Yet, on the 
one hand, the US and Japanese bilateral negotiation process, the Structural Impediments 
Initiative, adapted the Japanese system to the necessities of  an open market.698  On the 
other hand, the process of  coordination enforced by the competition agreement of  1991 
saw Europe orienting even more towards neo-liberalism.  
 By the end of  the 1990s, the whole international economic order was sharing the 
same neo-liberal ideas and institutions that reflected, or at least did not challenge, US 
economic principles.699 While the US seemed to have lost its dominant position, by 
becoming just one actor among the many important political actors in the international 
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arena, its economic ideas were once again leading the world. At the same time, the 
international spread of  neo-liberalism and Chicago antitrust theories helped the US to 
re-establish a new role in the global markets by leading a multilateral system that had 
internalised the same antitrust principles.  
 
NEO-LIBERAL ERA AND POST-CHICAGO IDEAS 
 
Since the 1990s, the US has started to collaborate more closely with European and 
Japanese bureaucracies in order to foster cooperation in antitrust matters. Bilateral 
negotiations have allowed the institutional sharing of  antitrust enforcement measures.700 
However, a common institutional culture and greater cooperation have not 
resulted in a complete transformation of  the European and Japanese competition 
systems towards an American-centric approach. On the contrary, there are many 
examples of  these countries arriving at different juridical decisions of  the same dispute. 
For instance, in the case of  Microsoft or Boeing/McDonnell Douglas mergers, the US 
Federal Trade Commission and the EU DG IV arrived at different deliberations 
regarding the presence – or the absence of  anticompetitive practices. As outlined by 
many antitrust experts, there are various peculiarities in each national antitrust 
procedures and their complete elimination is not feasible.701  
Nevertheless, the substantial enforcement of  bilateral agreements, and the 
increasing antitrust cooperation, allowed for an international diffusion of  neo-liberal or 
Chicago-oriented antitrust values, which transformed both the European and Japanese 
competition systems.702 To stress to point further, the practices and the juridical 
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procedures of  those countries, on comparison, are completely different because of  the 
divergences in the legal system and in the traditional perceptions of  the meaning of  
antitrust. While the rationale of  European competition policy lies in the need to foster 
the common market and to avoid any beggar-your-neighbour practices, in Japan 
competition policy has always been understood as a practice used by the state to defend 
national enterprises, rather than to condemn local cartels. 
However, since the US began to directly (after World War II) or indirectly (after 
the oil crises) influence European and Japanese competition policy, the way the discipline 
developed in those countries has been inspired by American ideas. This is evidenced by 
the fact that, since the 1990s, both competition regimes have started to become more 
efficiency-oriented. 
It is too early to see how the 2008 crises and the 2009 environmental catastrophe in 
Japan have affected the evolution of  antitrust development. However, it can safely be 
argued that the neo-liberal model of  the Chicago School has largely failed, and that both 
Europe and Japan are trying to establish a sort of  interventionist policy with stricter 
business controls. At present, Europe and Japan are experimenting with alternative 
strategies to overcome the recession. It is still not clear if  this crisis will push for a radical 
change of  institutions or it will just re-adjust the neo-liberal framework to the new social-
economic necessities. Although some scholars, such as Stigliz, have enthusiastically 
welcomed the crisis as the end of  the neo-liberal hegemony, three years after the credit 
crunch the neo-liberal system is still largely intact. Indeed, as Van Apeldoorn and 
Overbeek claim, this crisis appears to be not a crisis of neo-liberalism, but a crisis in neo-
liberalism. In other words, while the downturn questioned the validity of  the neo-liberal 
system, it did not cause its end; on the contrary, there is still place for a new dominant 
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neo-liberal era.703 
 
Europe 
The European competition policy does not only possess a slightly differentiated structure 
compared to the US antitrust regulatory body, but also very different goals. According to 
Gerber and others, the meaning of  European competition policy lies in the necessity to 
primarily foster the political and economic integration of  Member States into the 
common market.704 Above all, European competition law had to defend the economic 
freedom of  market players, even though their actions were not economically efficient, in 
order to avoid the aggregation of  big business that would affect the economic 
performances of  smaller competitors and thus reduce market integration.705 
However, in the twenty years after the enforcement of  the 1990 Merger 
Regulation, European competition policy grew in prestige and effectiveness to become a 
sort of  ‘economic constitution’.706 In other words, from being a symbolic endorsement 
of  the market economy, it developed into a cornerstone of  European competitiveness in 
the global markets.707 
The increasing importance of  competition policy has been in line with the rise of  
a neo-liberal wave. Since the end of  the oil crises, the European Commission has started 
to judge competition matters by adopting an approach increasingly more similar to the 
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US one.708 Normative and competitive isomorphism have in fact favoured the diffusion 
in Europe of  the idea that free competition with minimal government intervention, 
short-term economic efficiency, and faith in the market was the most effective way to 
develop the economy. 709 This does not mean that Europe has started to judge antitrust 
matters in the same way as the US. However, since the end of  the 1990s, the 
Commission has begun to enforce a more efficiency-oriented approach, which differed 
from the previous one because of  the introduction of  the first supranational system of  
merger controls that was embodied in the MCR.710 From the end of  the crises to 2001, 
the European Commission blocked 18 mergers, out of  1,700 cases judged. In only two 
cases did the EU blocked mergers that involved US firms: the WorldComMCI/Sprint, 
which was also challenged by the DOJ, and the GE/Honeywell.711 Additionally, in 
October 2002, the EU and the US jointly published their ‘Best Practices’ for 
coordinating the review of  mergers.712 
The legal framework regulating competition was again deeply reformed through 
the Modernisation Regulation in 2003. This generated a shift from an ordoliberal to a 
Chicago approach both in the modus operandi and in the substance of  regulations. The 
above-mentioned modernisation process has, in fact, consolidated a more efficiency-
oriented analysis of  business activities by attributing more importance to short-term 
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consumer welfare considerations.713 Such a market-based approach was strongly 
sustained by many DG Competition Commissioners, especially Mario Monti, who 
regarded it as ‘a silent process of  convergence towards US competition law and 
practices’.714 Moreover the Modernisation Regulation applied also a decentralisation of  
the implementation of  the Competition rules, which gave more space of  action to the 
Member States National Competition Authorities (NCAs). Indeed, the enlargement 
towards Eastern European Countries experienced by the EU in 2004 and in 2007, 
together with the previous established centralised corporate notification system had 
rapidly increased the Commission workload.  Hence, the EU Council Regulation 1/2003 
allowed National Competition Authorities and Member State national courts to directly 
enforce of  Articles 101 and 102. At the same time, the Commission had to lead the 
development of  the European Competition Network. Indeed, the European 
Competition Network (ECN), a central element of  the modernisation process of  2003, 
had to promote cooperation as well as a ‘common competition culture’ in antitrust 
matters among national authorities and the DG IV.715 Hence, the modernisation 
regulation caused strong changes in the European competition policy. On the one hand, 
the central authority of  the DG Competition was increased since the regulation 
established the precedence of  European law over national regulations. On the other 
hand, national competition authorities obtained more competences in enforcing Articles 
101 and 102.716 Overall, the ECN favoured a normative or institutional isomorphism that 
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has allowed national authorities to adopt a similar vision on antitrust matters to the one 
of  the DG Competition.717  Through the ECN, the Commission has been seeking to 
expand the commitment to a neoliberal European economy by privileging competition 
per se instead of  employment or social welfare.718 Indeed, differently from Vallindos – 
who argues that the European Union has been maintaining a sort of  Harvard approach, 
with a strong state control over mergers –  Wigger argues that the European competition 
policy has adopted a more permissive, efficiency-oriented, and ‘Americanised’ neo-
liberalism. 719 
This trend is apparent not only in the above mentioned modernisation of  merger 
regulation approved in 2003 by European Ministers, but also in the many guidelines 
introduced by the modernisation process of  2004.720 For instance, the Horizontal 
Mergers Guideline stressed the need to divert attention from the simple revelation of  an 
existent dominant position in the market to a more liberal understanding of  whether the 
merger can negatively affect competition.721 
In order to measure concentration levels, the Horizontal Mergers Guidelines 
formalised the use of  the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the same index 
introduced by Baxter during Reagan’s presidency. 722 The adoption of  this index reshaped 
the European measure of  concentrations, the so-called ‘Dominance Test’, towards a 
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more Chicago-oriented approach that authorised the most efficient mergers even when 
they were likely to generate economic concentration.723 
From 2004 to June 2008, only two notified mergers, out of  a total of  1466, were 
prohibited by the Commission.724 The enforcement of  the reform, whose effects were 
similar to the ones generated by the American 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, not 
only emphasised a European will to achieve the same economic benefits of  the US, but 
also exhibited a growing consensual European acceptance of  the Chicago-oriented 
antitrust approach implemented by the United States two decades before.725 According to 
the US Deputy Attorney General for Antitrust, James Rill, European merger evaluation 
became ‘as close at it could get to the US-style without copying the whole caboodle’.726 
This modernisation process can be understood as a result of  mimetic normative 
and competitive isomorphism. On the one hand, Europe wished to confront the 
competition generated by Japan and the US but, on the other, since the US was the most 
powerful economy of  the time, it was easier to copy its approach and reconvert it into a 
European framework. Moreover, the creation of  a cooperative agreement favoured a 
normative isomorphism and provided room for a constant exchange of  opinion and 
information between US and EU antitrust practitioners. 
Over the past years, the financial crisis has strongly tested the EU economic and 
financial stability. With the financial collapse of  Ireland and Greece, and the fragile 
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economic conditions of  Italy, Spain and Portugal, the European Union is struggling to 
find a way to recover stability.   
Clearly, it will be necessary to enforce a radical change in economic and financial 
regulations and to redefine competition regimes at the national and European levels.727 
Indeed, while the recession has started in the financial sector, it has also quickly spread 
over the real economy. The negative growth caused by this downturn has created the 
worst recession since the post-war era. However, it is still too early to predict whether the 
crisis is going to cause any policy changes.728 The term ‘crisis’, as employed by the 
Commission, can be thought to refer to a ‘deterioration in competitive conditions and an 
attendant shift in political priorities which has impacted on competition policy. Some of  
the impacts are already obvious or easy to predict, others are more speculative and 
potentially profound.’729 
The effect of  the recession on Europe has driven the Commission to regulate 
once again the use of  state aid and mergers, since many financially vulnerable companies 
necessitated a major relaxation of  competition regulations.730 To avoid a rising 
anticompetitive trend and a ‘beggar your neighbour policy’ European institutions have 
promoted a Temporary Framework in 2008 in order to regulate the use of  state aid and 
non-horizontal merger guidelines, which also covers vertical and conglomerate 
mergers.731 
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This framework, being part of  the measures launched by the Commission in its 
26th November European Economic Recovery Plan authorises Member States to provide 
up to 200,000 dollars of  capital to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) without 
previous notification. Moreover, Member States are thus able to finance companies in 
exceptionally difficult circumstances to the tune of  500,000 dollars upon notification to, 
and approval from, the Commission. The framework has also reduced the level of  
interest rates and has facilitated industrial loans by reducing the amount of  annual 
premium to be paid for a settled guarantee by 25% for SMEs and 15% for other 
companies. The Commission has also established that companies investing in new ‘green’ 
products have the right to ask for national aid; indeed, despite the economic crisis, the 
EU is still far from fulfilling its environmental commitments. Moreover, the framework 
also raised the safe-harbour threshold for risk-capital investments in order to reduce the 
increasing number of  investments in safe assets and to promote risk-capital investment 
in SMEs. 
It looks like the EU is trying to find a third way in the regulation of  competition 
by taking inspiration from the old Ordoliberal literature. Wigger has indeed strongly 
criticised the ideological perspective previously followed by Europe that has minimised 
antitrust enforcement by using US-style analysis based on efficiency evaluation, 
neoclassical principles, and econometrics.732 Although many European academics, 
especially from Germany, are starting to stress the need to resettle the system towards a 
more social welfare approach, their orthodoxy risks being challenged by the rise of  a the 
Post-Chicago competition approach, which, according to Budzinski, provides ‘an 
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unambiguous manual to the “right” competition policy’. 733 
In conclusion, it is still difficult to understand if  the Anglo-Saxon competition 
model is going to be replaced and, if  so, what model is going to replace it. Indeed, while 
the EU is opting for a stricter regulation of  the common market, the US seems still 
unable to define a new antitrust approach. On the one hand, the Obama administration 
has to keep the promise of  stronger antitrust measures, while confronting the challenge 
of  the financial crisis; on the other hand, however, the neo-liberal tradition is still very 
hard to challenge. 
 
Japan 
From the mid-1980s, since the Japan’s economic performance and its increasingly closed 
markets were having a negative impact on the American economy, the US promoted a set 
of  institutional arrangements, in the form of  bilateral negotiations, that aimed to foster 
Japanese antitrust provisions against cartels and to open up its market to American 
economic interests.734 At the beginning of  1985, the US and Japan started the negotiation 
of  the Structural Impediment Initiative (SII), a bilateral treaty that had to promote both 
cooperation in antitrust enforcement and open markets. The agreement had strategic 
importance in fostering both normative and coercive isomorphic processes; indeed, the 
term cooperation itself  covered a wide range of  conducts and potential obligations. 
The aims of  the SII were twofold: on the one hand, it intended to promote a fair 
antitrust regulation against the anticompetitive and cartelised business practices of  the 
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keiretsu. Indeed, the scope of  the SII was not to completely challenge the structure of  
keiretsu system per se, but to simply expose and detect the anticompetitive behaviour of  
those Japanese business organisations that affected American business activities.735 In this 
sense, this new regulatory process did not have to abolish the traditional Japanese 
bureaucratic system; on the contrary, it simply had to orient it towards competition and 
away from protectionism. According to a US Congressional Research Report quoted by 
Freyer, the Japanese FTC had to ‘monitor the transactions among keiretsu firms to 
determine whether or not they are being conducted in a manner that impedes fair 
competition’. 736 
On the other hand, the SII envisioned the promotion of  a deregulation process 
that would allow the demolition of  all bureaucratic and normative impediments and the 
complete openness of  the Japanese market to American corporations. 
The cooperation agreement, therefore, allowed the establishment of  a normative 
and mimetic isomorphism. Japan reformed its own system and accepted a more neo-
liberal antitrust institutional culture; at the same time, the neo-liberal culture gradually 
became a common language between the two countries. This isomorphic process was 
also a coercive and competitive one, considering that the US had repeatedly threatened to 
close its borders to Japanese products and that Tokyo needed to rebuild its market 
structure in order to remain globally competitive. 
Hence, the enforcement of  the SII resulted in a neo-liberal antitrust 
enforcement, which gave the JFTC a new legitimacy in subjecting the keiretsu to greater 
transparency. Indeed, according to the SII, the Japanese Federal Trade Commission had 
to enforce the Antimonopoly Act in order ‘to address anti-competitive and exclusionary 
practices uncovered’.737 It also had to provide guidelines and recommendations against 
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any business actions that could violate the Antimonopoly Law to ensure that keiretsu 
transactions would not restrict the market opportunities of  foreign firms. The effect of  
the SII on Japanese competition policy was so strong that the gap between the US and 
the Japanese levels of  antitrust enforcement narrowed by a wide margin. Moreover, 
despite the number of  antitrust criminal cases was greater in the US than in Japan, the 
FTC imposed a larger number of  fines against cartels.738 
Additionally, the neo-liberal effects of  the SII can be seen in the fact that while 
competition regulations were indeed implemented, the JFTC simultaneously enforced a 
deregulation process over many industries. Deregulation plans were proposed for the 
transportation industry, including airlines, trucking, and taxi services, the non-life 
insurance industry, the telecommunications industry, and the electric power industry. 
Strong importance was attached to the need to ensure that the new companies would 
have access to essential market facilities.739 According to Osamu Moriya, a member of  
MITI, ‘Now, deregulation is under way in every sector and discretionary powers of  the 
bureaucracy are phased out where possible.’740 
Since the enforcement of  the SII, the US has kept monitoring the evolution of  
Japan’s competition policy and, following a more general international trend, a 
cooperation process has developed between the two countries. The isomorphism process 
introduced by the SII continued through the negotiation, on October 7, 1999, of  an 
‘Agreement between the Government of  the United States of  America and the 
Government of  Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anti-Competitive Activities’. The aim 
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of  the agreement was ‘to contribute to the effective enforcement of  the competition 
laws of  each country through the development of  cooperative relationships between the 
competition authorities of  each Party. The Competition authorities of  the parties shall 
cooperate with and provide assistance to each other in their enforcement activities 
(Article 1)’.741 
According to the agreement, since the two economies were becoming more and 
more connected, it became increasingly necessary to strengthen antitrust cooperation. 
Hence, since the 1990s, Japan began to gradually open up to competition. For instance, 
‘entry restrictions were reduced in telecommunications, financial services, taxis, electricity 
generation and petroleum. Price controls were abolished in industries such as trucking, 
airlines and brokerage’.742 
Following this trend, in 2001, Prime Minister Jonichiru Koizumi emphasised the 
need to enhance and revitalise competition. In his inaugural speech, he underlined that 
enforcing a stronger and effective competition policy played a fundamental part in the 
general government programme to restructure the economy of  the country. This 
economic ‘revitalisation’ process was set off  in 2005 with the amendments of  the 
Antimonopoly Law (JAML) and again in 2009 with further modifications to the Act. 
Despite the opposition of  the powerful business groups, the 2005 amendments, 
in an attempt to make competitiveness more effective, increased the administrative 
surcharge for the turnover of  a company participating in a cartel from 2% to 10%. Apart 
from the surcharge system, which was designed as a deterrent system against the 
development of  cartels and anti-competitive activities, the reform established also a 
leniency program in order to incentivise cartel participants to step forward and inform 
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the JTFC of  the unlawful activity they were involved in.743  
The 2005 reform was most strongly criticised by the Keindanren group. According 
to this business organisation, the procedure introduced by the amendment was biased 
because the JFTC was in charge not only of  investigating and issuing the administrative 
order, but also of  reviewing it in the hearing procedure. They argued that it was very 
unlikely that the examiners would dispute an order issued by themselves. Academics, in 
contrast, welcomed the reform, arguing that the JFTC was the most appropriate organ to 
judge competition matters.744 The Japan Federation of  Bar Association, for its part, called 
for a dual system in which a ‘party subjected to a JTFC order would have a choice of  
petitioning in court or requesting that the JFTC initiate a formal administrative 
hearing’.745  
For this reason, the Diet decided that the amendment would be reviewed two 
years later. However, the 2009 amendment, which took effect in 2010, did not change the 
hearing procedure and it raised the administrative surcharge to 15%. 
Despite the government attempt to promote a fair competition system, the 
strategy applied by the majority of  Japanese enterprises was to turn into mergers or 
cartels in order to face market difficulties. According to Freyer, this can be explained in 
terms of  cultural influence. Indeed, in a seminal article, he argued that, when asked about 
antitrust enforcement, the Japanese Ministry of  Finance answered him that ‘cartels were 
surely bad’, but the phenomenon involving ‘Japanese business people meeting over 
dinner to talk about prices’ was quite simply part of  their culture.746 
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   Before the crises, this trend was highly criticised. It was claimed that Japan 
needed ‘a more flexible economy in which competition is truly open will increase 
productivity and create new business opportunities’.747 However, since the beginning of  
the current financial turmoil, Japan has realised that the laissez-faire approach adopted 
globally has allowed enterprises to abuse their market power. Therefore, ‘a level playing 
field’ is required ‘since abuse of  market power, has become more pronounced with 
economic globalisation’.748  In this context, Japan has decided to introduce reforms 
against unilateral conducts in order to monitor and eventually sanction any attempt of  
private monopolisation and unfair trade practices. However, the natural disaster caused 
by Fukushima has added pressure to the already serious economic fallout caused by the 
crisis. Nowadays, it is accepted that, in the case of  Japan, the reconstruction of  the 
economy and the re-establishment of  equilibrium in the system is still a long way off.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As demonstrated above, the institutionalisation of specific antitrust approaches in 
Europe and Japan can be explained by the phenomenon of isomorphism. 
At first, the institutionalisation of the liberal antitrust approach – identified with 
the Harvard school of thought – in Europe, West Germany, and Japan, was achieved 
through the combination of different isomorphic processes. Despite the fact that 
Germany had originally its own school of antitrust thought, namely the Ordoliberal 
School or Freiburg School, the enforcement of the first antitrust law was coercive. 
Germany had in fact lost the war and the 1959 Anti-monopoly Law was approved 
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because of the pressure exerted by the Allies to start the decartelisation of its industries. 
The same happened in Japan, where the antimonopoly law introduced by the US, 
destroyed the Zaibatsu, the industrial groups at the basis of the Japanese economic model. 
In Europe, the process of antitrust institutionalisation was different. Indeed, the 
antitrust regulations introduced in the European Cool and Steal Community Treaty in 
the 1950, were inspired by Professors Bowie and maintained American roots as well as 
Ordoliberal ones. In practice, the prescriptions introduced by the law reflected 
international liberal trends. In this context, the institutionalisation of Harvard-oriented 
ideas was first of all mimetic; European countries had to reconstruct their economies and 
needed a model of reference. Secondly, the antitrust institutionalisation trend was, 
however, also coercive. As the US was providing financial help to the majority of 
European countries, Europe had to abide by any suggestions coming from American 
government in terms of market liberalisation and competition regulations. 
Yet, the process of antitrust institutionalisation tends to be a path-dependent 
trend. Building on the liberal principles institutionalised by the first competition 
regulations, the European member states subsequently developed their own systems by 
integrating Harvard liberal values in their model of capitalism. This explains why most 
scholars strongly denied any process of antitrust harmonisation or convergence. In so 
doing, the liberal roots of the original US antitrust positions were adapted to the local 
necessities as well as to the local, and already established, model of capitalism.  
The onset of the oil crises created the need for Europe and Japan to change their 
system once again. As both started to apply protectionist reforms, the US decided that 
something had to be changed. For instance, in Japan, the US coercively introduced the 
SSII agreement through which Japan agreed to modify its antitrust institutions according 
to a more efficiency-oriented path. This isomorphism process, however, was also 
implemented because of competitive motivations. Indeed, Japan wanted to overcome the 
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crisis and believed that neo-liberal ideas could provide a new roadmap for reaching a 
sufficient level of development. In Europe, too, the process of isomorphism happened 
through a cooperative treaty that fostered mimetic and competitive processes. This made 
Europe more neo-liberal. The EU needed a model of reference to reframe the 
inefficiencies of its competition system and to stimulate economic growth; moreover, the 
normative processes established years before encouraged European governments to keep 
following the US way as Member States were already sharing US-based antitrust 
discourses.  
At present, the neo-liberal model appears moribund. However, there is as yet no 
process of isomorphism in sight, since neither the US nor Europe nor Japan has 
rebalanced its economy and a clear plan of reconstruction is still out of reach. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS IN THE GLOBAL(ISING) 
ECONOMY 
 
Having defined the antitrust internalisation process occurred in Europe and Japan, in 
what follows this thesis analyses how the US spread antitrust ideas or theories at a global 
level through the creation of international regimes. Here, differently from Keohane and 
Nye, regimes are not interpreted as ‘networks of rules, norms and procedures that 
regularise behaviour and control its effects’.749 Rather, they are explained in terms of 
shared and accepted ways of understanding specific conducts as right or wrong.  
Following Meyer and Rowan, it is possible to posit that international 
organisations have been used by the US to institutionalise specific patterns of market 
behaviour and thus acquire legitimacy at a global level.750 To be sure, based on its role in 
the creation of international institutions in the form of agreements or treaties, it can be 
argued that the United States have attempted to spread and promote specific views of 
antitrust at the global level – and to have done so in furtherance of its own economic 
interests. In this view, the US used international organisations as the ‘physical entities’ 
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through which rules and conventions functional to American economic needs could be 
diffused.751  
This process allowed the development of an international regime, based on 
‘principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of behaviour’ or 
shared worldwide models able to construct and propagate institutions in order to 
influence national policies.752 Indeed, as Goldstein and Keohane pointed out, those 
worldviews, or common principles, which were acknowledged and accepted by 
recognised world elites, were able to exert the greatest impact on the social realm.753  
The promotion of  a common international understanding of  antitrust has taken 
different forms over time. This is because the United States have employed a number of  
different instruments to internationalise its competition ideas. For instance, after World 
War II, the US leveraged its economic and military supremacy to create the first 
functioning group of  international organisations. While the material power exerted by 
the US allowed the construction of  an international framework to serve specific ideas 
and particular interests, the maintenance of  the system was not as dependent on sheer 
power. On the contrary, it was linked to a sort of  normative institutionalisation of  the 
American antitrust approach, which, at the same time, provided the US both with 
international legitimacy in its governance of  competition and with the possibility to 
enforce daring antitrust policies with international reach. 
Against this background, this chapter will provide an historical overview of  US 
attempts to internationalise its antitrust ideas by means of  international organisations. It 
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is worth noting that organisations are here interpreted, in Hodgson’s words, as ‘special’ 
kinds of  institutions, whose physical framework allows the implementation of  
institutionalised practices754 In this sense, they can be considered the supporting 
structures of  international regimes and globalisation. Indeed, globalisation is here 
conceived as the result of  institutional isomorphic processes, which has allowed the 
spread and the internalisation of  ideas and the institutionalisation of  the same theoretical 
framework into different countries. This has allowed the creation of  a global arena where 
countries maintained the peculiarities of  their model of  capitalism but at the same time, 
they began to conceive market issues according to similar path.  
With that in mind, the chapter will provide a conclusive analysis of  the evolution 
of  antitrust paradigms in the globalising economy. Indeed, as evidenced in my historical 
analysis, these schools of  thought had a profound impact on the way antitrust was 
perceived, understood, and institutionalised during the Great Depression, the oil shocks, 
and the current financial crisis at both the national and international level. The central 
aim of  this chapter, therefore, is to explain the process of  antitrust institutionalisation 
that took place during these crises as the outcome of  the influence exerted by antitrust 
ideas on the way the US, Europe, Japan and the international arena came to understand 
competition and to identify their interests. 
 
ANTITRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL  CONTEXT 
The Three Pillars of the Golden Age of Capitalism and the Internationalisation of Antitrust Ideas 
The first attempt by the US to internationalise a specific antitrust approach dates back to 
the final years of  the Great Depression. As soon as the New Deal and the 
institutionalisation of  the corresponding antitrust method managed to kick-start the US 
economy, Roosevelt realised that only by re-establishing positive trends in international 
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trade could the crisis be truly overcome. 755 Since the expansion of  global trade was vital 
for US prosperity, President Roosevelt decided to intervene in support of  the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement Act (RTAA). In June 1934, the President’s secretary of  state, Cordell 
Hull, advocated to the Congress the adoption of  the RTAA, which, as an amendment to 
the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff  Act, marked the end of  the historical era of  American 
protectionism. 
The aim of  the Act was to stimulate the US economic recovery by introducing the 
principles of  non-discrimination and reciprocity in trade policy. Indeed, as much as the 
US government sought to increase exports, it could not afford to reduce imports because 
other countries would simply respond in kind. Moreover, a policy of  reciprocal trade 
liberalisation would effectively balance the economic benefits of  increasing exports with 
the negative externalities of  imports in the domestic competing sector.756  
The principle of  non-discrimination contributed to the liberalisation programme 
that, together with Keynes’ October 1940 proposal for the implementation of  an 
international monetary system, constituted the basis for the institutionalisation of  an 
international liberal economic order. Moreover the 1941 Atlantic Chart and the 
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consequent 1942 framework agreement signed by Roosevelt and Churchill gave the US 
the authority to influence the normative development in the after-war period. Indeed, 
article 7 defined the compensation for the US military and economic engagement in 
terms of  US normative intervention over the Allies post-war economic and trade 
policies.757  
Indeed, no sooner did commercial negotiations begin that countries started in 
earnest to replace their previously protectionist systems with new liberal ones. However, 
the stability of  this new liberal order at a global level needed to be preserved and 
guaranteed by a system of  ad hoc international organisations. To this end, the creation of  
an international organisation with the scope of  promoting antitrust provisions became 
of  vital importance by governments all over the world. This laid the foundations of  the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO).758 
Starting from the early 1943, the US government promoted the creation of  a 
Committee on Post-War Foreign Economic Policy. This agency was made up of  12 
‘special’ working groups engaged in the post-war planning process. Among them, the 
Special Committee on Private Monopolies and Cartels was of  strategic importance to the 
US and was heavily influenced by its interests and economic plans.759 
Indeed, the first internal reports on international cartels produced by the working 
group painted a dramatic picture. The international market was characterised by the 
presence of  a strong and complex interrelationship between governments and the 
investments and technology transfers of  multinational corporations. This intricate 
interdependency, which connected private and public ventures and speculations, 
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indicated the need for a comprehensive international agreement to enforce antitrust 
patents against international cartels and other anticompetitive practices. In fact, in 
accordance with the liberal Keynesian trend, the dominant antitrust ideas of  the time, 
based on Harvard-oriented principles, identified the need to foster general welfare by 
enhancing competition and strictly controlling the creation of  cartels, mergers and 
monopolies in the international and national markets. 
Following this trend, in 1944, shortly before the end of  the war, Roosevelt 
organised an international conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to work out a 
strategy to ensure a post-war economic recovery based on free competition and the 
promotion of  welfare.760 The aim of  the conference was to prevent the sort of  economic 
and political turmoil that resulted from the outcome of  the Versailles Treaty. Moreover, 
the US, in view of  its new global leadership role, wished to spread the same system of  
embedded liberalism of  the New Deal to the rest of  the world and to combine free 
international trade with state guarantees of  social welfare.761 
The economic arrangements established in Bretton Woods revolved around the 
institution of  a gold standard that pegged the dollar to gold. In addition, the Allies, in 
accordance with Keynes’s proposal to support policy directed as much at economic 
growth as at full employment, called for the establishment of  the ITO to complement 
the work of  the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
The latter institutions were considered the two pillars of  the economic and 
financial global order. In contrast, the ITO, as an autonomous supranational body, had to 
fulfil the function of  a third pillar. The ITO was meant to be in charge of  international 
trade policies, specifically by promoting competition and by avoiding the creation of  
                                                        
760  Robert Kuttner, The End of Laissez-Faire: National Purpose and The Global Economy After The 
Cold War, 1991, New York, Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 25-54. 
761 John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Post War Economic Order’, 2000, International Organization 36, 379-415. In Howard H. Lentner, 
Power and Politics in Globalization: The Indispensable State, 2000, Routledge New York, London, 81. 
269 
 
international cartels beyond the reach of  national policies. The organisation was given 
the duty to safeguard the system against any of  the restrictive trade practices that 
characterised the world economy during the 1930s. Furthermore, it had the authority to 
investigate and make recommendations.762 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council approved, in 1964, the first 
resolution on the creation of  the ITO. The organisation charter was then discussed in 
New York and in Geneva in 1947 and in Havana in 1948. However, during the Geneva 
meetings, besides the drafting of  an ITO charter, government representatives agreed to 
prepare a multilateral treaty containing general principles of  trade and tariff  reductions, 
namely, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As soon as the GATT 
treaty was completed in 1947, governments decided to adopt a Protocol of  Provisional 
Application of  GATT after January 1, 1948, in order to allow the treaty and its tariff  
schedules to immediately enter into force.763 Although the ITO charter was later 
completed during the Havana Conference of  1948, it never actually entered into force. 
Those countries that pressed for its adoption waited in vain for the US to approve the 
charter.764 The US government, however, refused to ratify a binding treaty in 
international trade. By 1947, it was clear that Europe and Japan were slowly recovering 
and that the US was the only industrialised nation that was left unscathed by the war. 
Only the US disposed of  the economic and financial resources necessary to help the 
other industrialised countries to overcome the economic havoc wrought by the crisis and 
the war. In this context, the United States had no reason to accept the authority of  an 
international organisation in matters of  global trade competition. Open borders and free 
trade would allow American manufactures to enter new markets and “domestic 
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competition policy would treat the rest of  the world as if  it did not exist”.765 In fact, in 
virtue of  the extraterritorial reach of  its rules, American antitrust law would even be able 
to prosecute anticompetitive practices in both the internal and the international market, 
thus bypassing the need of  an international organisation. The US was especially reluctant 
to create an international antitrust organisation because this would end up exerting the 
same authority as the central government and, as such, would be allowed to judge and 
legislate over the practices of  private businesses.  
As a result, the International Trade Organisation never came to fruition. In 1948, 
after President Truman submitted the ITO charter, the Republicans gained control of  
Congress and finally rejected the charter.766 Consequently, in 1950, the Truman 
administration announced that it would no longer seek congressional approval for the 
ITO. 
In the absence of  an international organisation that dealt with trade and antitrust, 
which was to be the ‘third pillar’ of  the Bretton Woods system, the US supported a 
narrower multilateral agreement for trade: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).767 The GATT had to simply promote liberal trade agreements through 
multilateral cooperation by encouraging the lifting of  national barriers and protectionist 
tariffs.768 In this sense, the GATT was perfect for spreading a shared perception of  
antitrust at an international level in such a way as to fulfil the American interests of  free 
market without directly intervening in any antitrust litigation. This allowed American 
firms to easily expand their commercial activities worldwide, while only few foreign firms 
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were able to directly invest in the US domestic market.769  
This is a classic example of  how the US managed to create an ad hoc organisation 
to formally and informally institutionalise specific antitrust approaches according to its 
own market interests. The General Agreement on Tariff  and Trade, together with the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, represents the liberal institution that 
internationalised Keynesian and Harvard ideas, promoted liberal trade programmes, and 
stabilised the international market by creating a common arena where a normative 
isomorphism could develop. This liberal international regime was based on shared liberal 
ideas and was sustained by the principled belief  that competition without control was 
detrimental and the causal belief  that every attempt to constrain the market had to be 
regarded as economically inefficient.  
Later often identified as the Golden Age of  capitalism, this historical period 
lasted until the beginning of  the 1970s. At that time, the US realised that the 
international economic trends called for a radically new approach. In conclusion, this is a 
perfect illustration of  the way interests shaped the promotions of  specific ideas, which, 
in turn, reflected and institutionalised particular economic needs, such as the necessity to 
liberalise and open national markets according to causal and principled beliefs. 
Furthermore, it also shows how ideas themselves contributed to the creation of  
international organisations and how the latter shaped in its turn the perceptions on the 
feasibility of  economic practices. In this sense, ideas and interests, at an international 
level, combined with the strategic economic and military power exerted by the US at the 
time, created a legitimate international regime that defined how business practices were 
to be universally perceived and understood. 
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US Antitrust and International Trade Policy during the 1970’s: from Harvard to Chicago 
In the decades after World War II, the American commitment to multilateral regimes and 
international organisations became conditional. The US, while limiting other states’ room 
for action through multilateral rules and institutions, strove to maintain special privileges 
for preserving its freedom and achieving its interests.770 Although the economic 
dominance of  the United States started to erode at the beginning of  the 1970s, its 
legitimacy over the GATT and other international organisations was still solid enough to 
allow American government to use multilateral negotiations to try to influence antitrust 
policies. Unlike in the post-war period, this legitimacy was not based on coercive power, 
but on an international normative and mimetic isomorphic process that created shared 
perceptions of  anti-competitive practices in line with those expressed by the US.771  
Indeed, the unstable political and economic climate of  the 1970s, together with 
increased European and Japanese competition, significantly challenged the US 
international status quo and created new economic needs. Just as in the 1940s, the United 
States hastened to promote a new order in the international trade system through the 
implementation of  new institutions. These were designed to create a competitive 
advantage for American corporations and would thus allow the US to weather the 
recessionary squalls.   
At the outset, the process of  institutional change was inspired by a 
reinterpretation of  the same principles of  the 1950s according to the needs of  the time. 
By translating Harvard ideas into the Kennedy Round, Nixon aimed to re-launch US 
competitiveness not by merely applying antitrust provisions, but by blocking the 
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apparently anticompetitive foreign practices that were damaging the US trade balance. 
The Kennedy round consisted in the sixth session of  General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) trade negotiations held in 1964-1967 in Geneva. Its rationale was to 
formally institutionalise regulations against anticompetitive practices, to fight trade 
barriers settled by European and Japanese governments, and to allow American 
companies to regain or retain their dominant international position.772  Accordingly, ‘as 
trade barriers [were] reduced around the world, American exports [would] increase 
substantially, enhancing the health of  our entire economy’.773  
With this in mind, the resolution of  the Kennedy Round was institutionalised in 
the 1974 Trade Act. To be precise, section 201 of  the Act provided American business 
interests with an official representation, by requiring the International Trade Commission 
(ITR) to consider the petitions presented by domestic industries or workers that had 
been negatively affected by growing imports. In those cases, the ITR had to investigate 
for a period of  6 months and if  any illegal behaviour or injury was discovered, the US 
could resort to restrictive measures.774  Hence, the Kennedy Round and the consequent 
                                                        
772
 Robert E. Baldwin, ‘U.S. Trade Policy: Recent Changes and Future U.S. Interests’, May 1989, 79 
The American Economic Review 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and First Annual Meeting 
of the American Economic Association, 128-133. Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘The Challenge of Deeper 
International Integration: U.S. Trade Policy Options’ in Geza Feketekuty and Bruce Stokes (eds.), 
Trade Strategies for a new era: Ensuring U.S. Leadership in a Global Economy, 1998, Council on 
Foreign Relations Book,  chapter 17, 324-359. 
773 
 Richard Nixon, ‘Special Message to the Congress Proposing Trade Reform Legislation’, April 
10,1973, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2661.  
774 Additionally, section 301 could be used by domestic industries to push the US government to 
unilaterally bring a matter to international dispute settlement. Moreover, where market-opening 
activities ultimately were unsuccessful, the act empowered the president and the United States Trade 
Representatives (USTR) to address against unfair practices tolerated by local governments. This 
provision, being used to limit the access to the market to those foreign companies that created an 
unjustifiable burden on US commerce, was a clear example of the different use of antitrust and trade 
policy. Indeed, according to the US antitrust regulation, in order to start a legal action against a 
company and to challenge foreign market access, it was necessary to demonstrate the existence of an 
effective attempt to restrain trade that affected the possibility for American companies to compete. On 
the contrary, this section allowed the President to establish whether the trade practices were 
unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory, and if burdened or restricted US commerce. 
 The President was also given the power to negotiate with foreign countries reciprocal tariff 
concessions during the five-year period beginning on the date of enactment. 
The Congress later broadened Section 301 in 1979, 1984, 1988 and 1994. The statute now covers 
foreign barriers to investments, intellectual property, protection, and trade in all good and services. The 
amendments also restricted the President’s discretion to avoid taking action. In particular, the 1988 
274 
 
Trade Act effectively boosted US international trade. Emboldened by the ‘protection’ of  
the government, various American industries, in the semiconductor, pharmaceutical, 
automobile, photography, and entertainment sectors, among others, started to use the 
Act to fight off  foreign companies, primarily Japanese ones.775  
Consequently, after the tortuous four years of  the Kennedy Round trade 
negotiations that concluded in 1967, the US called for another large round of  talks to 
discuss international competition problems. Many economists of  the time maintained 
that one of  the causes of  the US deteriorated balance of  payments was the presence of  
many non-tariff  trade barriers (NTBs), such as the EC Common Agricultural Policy, that 
restricted US exports around the world. 
For this reason, in December 1970, Nixon, while promoting the Smithsonian 
Agreement to provide the international arena with a provisional monetary settlement, 
asserted that the temporary 10% surcharge established by the agreement would be 
cancelled only when another round of  negotiations on NTBs would be established. 
Therefore, the Smithsonian Agreement became the first step toward the launch of  the 
Tokyo Round in 1973. The negotiations did not arrive at any agreement until the US 
started to lead its meetings in January 1975. At this point, the level of  trade barriers was 
reduced from 27 % to an average of  5%. Furthermore, the Round promoted a series of  
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codes as the ‘Tokyo Round Codes’ or ‘MTN codes’ to reduce NTBs.776 However, the US 
failed to negotiate a new agricultural policy for Europe and to establish stronger 
discipline over domestic and export subsidies. 777 
For these reasons, as soon as the Tokyo Round was concluded, US companies’ 
growing concern with unfair trade practices made clear that the newly negotiated GATT 
codes were not sufficient.778It was evident that the Harvard principles where not 
responding effectively to the economic needs of  the time. Moreover, during the 1980s, 
the US registered a trade downturn that confirmed the ideas that unfair trade practices 
were eroding US competitiveness. In reality, other different causes contributed to the US 
deficit as the high government spending, the tight monetary policy applied by the Federal 
Reserve and an abnormal increase in the value of  the dollar that created a disadvantage 
for American local enterprises, facilitating the rise of  imports.779 Additionally, from 1980 
to 1982 the world economy suffered a period of  economic stagnation that caused a sharp 
decline in international trade. As in the 1970s, the increasing competition that American 
firms had to face, resulted in the demand for institutional changes that began to be 
inspired by the Chicago School. 780 
 
A New Trend: Reagonomics and the Antitrust Neo-liberal Revolution 
The second attempt to institutionalise a new antitrust approach took place during the 
Reagan presidency. In those years, as the economic crisis challenged the international 
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economic order and foreign anticompetitive private conducts started to damage the 
American economy, the Reaganomics doctrine pointed the way to a new antitrust 
approach.781  
From the beginning of  the 1980s, under the aegis of  the Chicago Boys, Reagan 
used the legitimacy of  the GATT negotiations to promote the same principle at an 
international level and to justify his daringly far-reaching antitrust policy ambitions. In 
essence, President Reagan’s idea was to re-launch the American economy in the 
international arena by liberalising the markets, even at the cost of  mitigating antitrust 
provisions.782    
For instance, in 1982, as a result of  the conclusion of  the Tokyo Round trade 
negotiations to reduce non-tariff  barriers, the Reagan Administration supported the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) in order to minimise the effects of  
the extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction.783 Indeed, by amending the Sherman Act and the 
Federal Commission Act, the FTAIA limited the application of  antitrust controls over 
the conducts of  those multilateral corporations, operating at an international level  whose 
operations could have a direct and negative effect on US commerce or would otherwise 
exclude US companies.784 The Act also removed from section 7 of  the Clayton Act 
jurisdiction all joint ventures engaged exclusively in export trade.785 Also as a result of  the 
Uruguay Round, President Reagan signed into law the Export Trading Company Act 
(ETCA) in October 1982. The aim of  the ETCA was primarily to reduce US balance-of-
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payment deficits by allowing the formation of  new export ventures.786 Indeed, at the 
beginning of  the 1980s, Western economies, including the United States, were still 
plagued by massive and growing trade deficits.  
Despite repeated efforts to boost their exports, many governments resorted to 
discouraging their competitors through tariff  and non-tariff  barriers. Foreign producers, 
particularly in Japan, were perceived as excessively and unfairly intrusive into US markets 
(they sold items ranging from automobiles to high-technology goods). Moreover, US 
companies were experiencing strong competition in overseas trade especially because 
many governments were granting aid to local enterprises and multinational trading 
companies. Hence, with the passing of  the ETCA, Congress was attempting to foster 
American competitiveness abroad by allowing US companies to combine their resources. 
The ETCA represented an alternative solution to a protectionist approach 
characterised by import restrictions, quotas, and other similar measures.787 Indeed, it 
established procedures that allowed the Department of  Commerce and the Department 
of  Justice to certify export agreements under which qualified export activities could 
receive antitrust immunity.788 Moreover, under Title IV, the Sherman Act could only be 
applied against those conducts that had a ‘direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable 
affect’ in domestic US markets, import trade, or the export trade of  another US 
person.789 
Consequently, by promoting a more liberal approach, Reagan allowed the frenetic 
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development of  business transactions in the international market in order to accelerate 
the phenomenon known as ‘economic globalisation’. Accordingly, the Uruguay round, 
formally launched in September 1986, aimed at revising the general policies of the GATT 
according to a more liberal perspective. Among the many important issues discussed 
during the round were the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and the 
development of clear international trading rules. GATT member countries agreed to cut 
their import tariffs by an average of 36% and to limit state aid practices of domestic 
subsidies.   
However, the Uruguay Round negotiations concluded in 1994, in Marrakesh, 
without agreeing on any specific international antitrust regulation. On the one hand, 
Reagan started to support an increasingly liberal antitrust approach and, on the other, the 
GATT and the WTO (created during the Uruguay Round) were far from obtaining direct 
jurisdiction over private anticompetitive conducts.790 Therefore, while the European 
Union made pressure to empower the WTO to create a global agency to control 
antitrust, to prohibit hard-core cartels, and to promote transparency and non-
discriminatory practices, the US remained sceptical.791  
Instead, it had rather support the development of  the International Competition 
Network (ICN), an ad hoc international network where normative isomorphism processes 
could eventually allow the international diffusion of  Chicago Boys competition ideas.792  
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The ICN would promote the global adoption of  the causal beliefs of  efficiency and 
laissez faire to justify the lack of  state intervention. Here, globally shared ideas were 
strictly of  the neo-liberal kind.  
Hence, the end of  the Uruguay Round can be seen as the formal reestablishment 
of  a post-crisis international order based on a form of  multilateral institutionalism led by 
the American government and designed to allow neo-liberalism and Chicago ideas to 
spread globally. Indeed, the same neo-liberal ideas promoted by Reagan at home and at a 
European and Japanese level, were now meant to go global without being subjected to 
any binding international antitrust organisation with the authority to block or check 
American companies.793  
 
The Doha Round and the Chicago Ideas 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a global process of national reforms of local 
institutions began to take place. While the US redesigned its antitrust policy under the 
influence of Chicago School ideas, it also demanded Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America to conform to such neo-liberal principles.794 Europe, Japan 
and many other countries welcomed such changes and increasingly engaged in debates 
around the necessity to internationalise their competition policy in response to market 
globalisation. 
In this context, great importance has been given to the process of coordination, 
convergence and harmonisation of competition laws. For instance, the WTO, initially 
promoted to generate institutional isomorphism at the international level, has switched 
its focus to antitrust issues per se and competition policy entered the agenda of the third 
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WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Seattle from November 30 to December 3, 1999. 
Institutional convergence has also been fostered through the creation of the 
International Competition Network in 2001, which aimed at identifying and sharing the 
best practices in competition matters among its members.795 The ICN is today 
considered the most influential organisation in promoting real convergence through 
informal interaction among antitrust agencies and practitioners.796 Indeed, the members 
of every antitrust authority meet every year, in one of the hosting member countries, to 
discuss antitrust policy implementation and practical competition cases; this promotes a 
soft convergence in competition policies, improves cooperation, and establishes non-
binding best practices.797  
The latest wave of  interest in antitrust coordination was sparked by the need to 
regulate international markets and reflected the ideas maintained by many academics that 
while competition is hard to harmonise, there is still a possibility to create a common 
theoretical or ideological ground for enforcing similar policy paradigms.798 
In the same vein, since the beginning of  his presidency, Bush has actively worked with 
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the WTO to promote neo-liberal ideas and free trade on behalf  of  US economic 
interests. Since the beginning of  his presidential mandate in 2001, George W. Bush 
promoted radical economic policies at international and national level. However, after the 
end of  the Cold War, the US had to face a multipolar world that required increasing 
cooperation with various small powers.799 In order to both sustain and preserve global 
economic interdependence and to institutionalise its preferences, the US had no other 
choice other than to engage in bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements.800 This 
pushed the US government to gradually build institutional structures that could allow the 
rapid accumulation of  capital through free competition and the elimination of  trade 
barriers.  
However, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001, galvanised this policymaking.801 The heightened sense of  instability 
pushed Bush to impose constraints to both allies and international institutions in the 
name of  American security. In the aftermath of  the terrorist attacks, the US waged wars 
against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and against the Talibans in Afghanistan. Even though 
these countries did not directly affect American security, they were still considered a 
security threat and the wars were justified on the grounds of  pre-emptive self-defence. 
The messianic rhetoric used by Bush to justify those military actions was constructed 
upon the need to protect the motherland and to rescue the world from tyrannical 
regimes. At the same time, the need to find and destroy weapons of  mass destruction in 
those countries was on a par with the duty to enforce democracy and free-market 
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principles.  
The general leitmotif of  the Bush administration can be summarised in the concept of  
freedom. ‘Freedom’, he stated, ‘is the almighty gift to every man and woman in this 
world’, it was to be given to the oppressed people in Iraq and Afghanistan and it was to 
be applied in policy matters as well as in economics.802 For instance, on September 19, 
2003, Paul Bremer, the head of  the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, declared ‘the 
full privatization of  public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of  Iraqi 
businesses, full repatriation of  foreign profits […] the opening of  Iraq’s banks to foreign 
control, national treatment for foreign companies and […] the elimination of  nearly all 
trade barriers’.803 This level of  liberalisation had to be applied across all industries, 
including public services, the media, manufacturing, transportation, finance, and 
construction. Oil was the only exception to this on account of  its geopolitical strategic 
importance.    
While the world focused on the implementation of  the new American security system, 
a new economic order slowly emerged. 804 Indeed, the insecurity wave created by the 
terrorist attack of  2001 allowed Bush to reinforce his legitimacy as a national leader and 
to enforce his neo-liberal vision internationally.805 
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The political economy plan envisioned by President Bush had to be based, on the one 
hand, on economic and financial laissez faire and, on the other, on the military and 
political exportation of  democracy in order to create a stable international environment 
for trade relationships.806  
Therefore, economic laissez faire became the principled and casual belief  promoted by 
international organisations. Its principled nature stood in the obligation of  safeguarding 
freedom in every social relation, while its causal essence lay in the need to foster 
economic relations only in the context of  a completely free and open market. The US 
tried to uphold the global acceptance of  these beliefs by presenting them as the central 
contents of  the WTO Doha Round, heralded in November 2001 in Qatar. The Round 
aimed at addressing and sanctioning any restriction of  economic flows that could 
possibly generate market inefficiencies. In their dealing with the regulation of  market 
issues, such as competition and trade barriers, the Doha negotiations were again used by 
the US to another international normative isomorphism mechanism to spread and 
promote a neo-liberal worldview. Indeed, the aim of  the Doha was the promotion of  
multilateral standards in order to open national markets and to integrate them at an 
international level.807  
Despite the support paid by the US, the Round has been faltering. Currently, it risks  
becoming the first major multilateral trade negotiation to fail since the 1930s.808  In an 
attempt to ease the negotiations, two critical topics, namely investment and competition 
policy, were removed from the agenda in 2003; however, there are still too many 
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divergences concerning issues dealing with the possibility of  applying trade barriers in 
certain economic situations.809 
The possible failure of  Doha would be a very serious risk because it will be 
tantamount to an informally authorisation for governments to stop cooperating and to 
start pursuing protectionist policies.810 Despite its uncertain outlook, the Doha Round 
has seen Europe, the US and Japan negotiating over the same lines – with the exception 
of  the issue of  European agricultural subsidies. As explained in the following sections, 
this means that the isomorphic processes implemented over the years have allowed those 
three countries to gain a common vision of  economic regulations through the normative 
or institutional adoption of  a similar neo-liberal culture. Indeed, the emerging of  
alternative centres of  power such as China, India and Brazil, is showing that new 
countries might take the material leadership over the world. However, the fact that 
countries such as Europe and Japan are still accepting and sharing neoliberal economic 
principles and Chicago-oriented antitrust ideas is proof  that the role of  those ideological 
frameworks in the context of  globalising economy is extremely important. 
 
IDEAS AND THE GLOBAL ARENA 
 
Traditionally, the role of  ideas in the process of  economic structural change has been 
marginal and ideas themselves have rarely been considered independent variables. 
However, as outlined above, many political economic studies have recently attempted to 
diverge from traditional approaches and integrate the discipline with the analysis of  
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institutions.811 This experiment has brought to light a new set of  theories that seek to explain 
institutional transformation from a more ontological point of  view, i.e. in terms of  
ideological constructs and their influence on the social realm.  
Theories about the role of  ideas in policymaking have been widely criticised. 
Classical institutional scholars tend to regard them as an attempt to overcome the failure 
of  rationalist and quantitative methods to predict economic crises and possible post-
crisis scenarios – the well-known ‘analytical myopia of  the behavioural revolution’.812 
Although many rationalist scholars believe that Goldstein, Keohane, and Hall used the 
concept of  ideas as a way to buttress their political economic analysis, the analytical value 
of  ideas may in fact go deeper. Qua mental models, ideas are essential to understand and 
categorise the evolution of  institutions and of  the social realm. It follows that these are 
in turn determined – or in fact constructed – as much by material interests as by ideas 
themselves. In this view, the power of  ideas is consistent, and indeed concomitant, with 
the existence of  social actors and particular interests. In the case of  competition, for 
instance, the development of  antitrust policy was made possible by different social and 
political actors fostering the institutionalisation and internationalisation of  specific ideas 
in the pursuit of  particular interests.813 
The success of  antitrust institutions is normally associated to the degree to which 
the economic conditions they create are conducive to the achievement of  interests such 
as profits or welfare. The role of  interests in determining social constructions and 
influencing the social realm has long been considered prominent. For instance, rational-
choice institutionalists interpret institutions as structured apparatuses created for the 
purpose of  reducing uncertainty and providing a stable environment for the negotiation 
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of  agreements. Their chief  function is to maximise economic gains, overcome 
downturns, or foster welfare. In this perspective, ideas are largely irrelevant; theoretical 
conceptualisations, beliefs, and cultures constitute the environmental sources of  habitual 
customs that provide a steady framework of  conduct for individuals to efficiently pursue 
and preserve their economic interests. Essentially, rational-choice theories postulate that 
individuals are rational actors and behave according to precise cost-benefit calculations in 
order to maximise their interests and optimise their conditions. 
In this view, all social structures and institutions have only evolved and 
developed in furtherance of the needs of social actors.814 Everything happens for a 
specific reason; particular social dynamics occur as a result of an individual’s deliberate 
intention to create them, and their effects are never fortuitous. The majority of rationalist 
scholars maintain that ‘ideas are unimportant or epiphenomena either because agents 
correctly anticipate the results of their actions or because some selective process ensures 
that only agents who behave as if they were rational succeed’.815 Interests are the main 
drivers of social action, because they represent the ends to be achieved; the means to 
pursue them are only a reflection of their existence. In other words: social action is 
necessarily contingent upon the existence of a purpose to be reached; interests are the 
sole priorities of social actors; and ideas and social beliefs are unexplained variables. 
However, the historical frequency of economic crises, such as the ones discussed 
in this thesis, shows that the institutional rational approach and game theories have been 
less helpful in providing ‘a priori specific Nash equilibria without resorting to dubious 
post hoc logics’.816 In other words, rationalist scholars are only able to explain social 
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actions ex post, by outlining the rational basis of social behaviour, but they struggle to 
offer a similar level of understanding of present dynamics. For instance, although it is 
proven that the institutions responsible for unsettling the financial markets were among 
the underlying causes of the current credit crunch, governments have as yet failed to 
distance themselves from those types of destabilizing regulations and policies.817 
This can be explained with an historical perspective. Indeed, historical 
institutionalists consider institutions as tools to steer, but not limit, social actions. 
Normally, they are deeply embedded in society and only exogenous factors can alter or 
break their structures. These factors, such as wars or economic and financial crises, play 
the role of a deus ex machina, in that they challenge the system and pave the way for 
transformation. In this context, the role of ideas is fundamental to understanding the 
process of change; however, beliefs themselves are not directly responsible for the 
evolution of institutions. On the contrary, every alteration is linked to a path-dependent 
process, where theories and culture cause ‘ideational turns’ and are conceptualised by 
agents in response to new interests or problems.  
By contrast, scholars like Hall, Goldstein, Keohane and others challenged the 
classical axioms that actors are perfectly rational or that institutions are necessarily 
oriented towards specific interests, thereby drawing special attention to the role of ideas. 
Ideas are interpreted not as useless and static variables, but as fundamental determiners 
of social behaviour. For instance, Goldstein and Keohane, in their seminal contributions 
to the debate, did not radically deny the role of interests in shaping human actions, but 
they strongly contested the belief that needs are the sole engines that motivate actors’ 
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behaviour.818 Rather, the role of ideas is pivotal because they generate the basic building 
blocks of the mental models that individuals use to judge reality, make predictions, and 
plan goal-oriented strategies. In contrast to reflectivists like Wendt, they argue that 
interests are neither endogenous elements of ideas nor abstract mental constructions: 
they are both fully exogenous and very much real. Beliefs, on the other hand, allow 
actors the leeway to freely change direction in the daily pursuit of their interests.  
In this sense, those scholars found a sort of middle ground between rational, 
historical, and reflectivist interpretations of reality. Ideas, here, as seen as playing a 
central role in the interest-seeking game, as actors use their mental models to analyse 
interests and the social environment as well as to build a strategy to pursue specific 
needs. Thus, culture and theoretical thoughts come to determine not only the way social 
actors are going to achieve their objectives, but also the way society understands and 
interprets its own interests. According to Gourevitch, 
Ideas or ideology, for example, can make a great difference to political 
development: Catholic vs. Protestant; Napoleon and the French 
Revolution vs. the Ancient Regime; fascism, communism and bourgeois 
democracy against each other. These lines of ideological tension shaped 
not only the international system but internal politics as well. This should 
be no surprise. Ideas, along with war and trade, relate intimately to the 
critical functions any regime must perform: defence against invaders, 
satisfaction of material want, gratification of ideal needs.819 
 
In addition to the political dynamics described by Gourevitch, it is worth noting that 
ideas has been equally crucial in the field of competition, especially for their role in 
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defining the fluctuating relationship between efficiency and welfare as well as in steering 
the geopolitical and historical evolution of antitrust policies. As perfectly illustrated by 
the theories on varieties of capitalism, each country develops its own institutions in 
accordance to its own culture and beliefs. For this reason, states end up either developing 
entirely different institutions or applying similar regulations in different ways. This 
hypothesis is amply evidenced by the original implementation of antitrust rules in West 
Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II. The two processes evolved along 
noticeably different paths: while West Germany reacted more readily to the imposition of 
anti-monopoly rules, Japan barely accepted to enforce a strict control of the business 
activities of its local industrial groups. In Germany, the anti-monopoly law was adapted 
to the Ordoliberal ideological framework, in such a way that the American antitrust 
principles contained in it were integrated with a more welfare-oriented approach. Still, 
the law was fully enforced, and it represented one of major turning points for the 
achievement of economic development in West Germany.  
By contrast, the anti-monopoly law in Japan was only maintained until the end of 
the Allied occupation. Soon after the US withdrawal, the Japanese government interfered 
with the anti-monopoly principles embedded in the law and reapplied its traditional 
political principles based on state intervention and on barriers to external investors. In 
fact, a few years after the dismantling of the Zaibatsu, Tokyo amended the Anti-
Monopoly Act and legalised the formation of the Keiretsu, another big industrial group 
that essentially replaced the previous model. In this sense, even though the US used 
antitrust institutions to coercively impose antitrust ideas on Japan and to direct its 
economic affairs, the power of local culture and local beliefs proved more influential to 
the development of their interest-maximising strategies than the one exerted by 
Washington. A similar but opposite trend happened in the 1970s, when, in spite of the 
invisible constraints dictated by local customs and worldviews, both Germany and Japan, 
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among others, adopted US neo-liberal antitrust norms and institutions much more 
voluntarily because in explicit pursuit of economic efficiency.  
Therefore, as Haas and Adler note, this epistemic approach provides ‘the 
necessary prerequisites for rational choice analysis’ but, at the same time, it helps to 
uncover ‘where alternatives and payoffs come from’.820  
Ideas Institutions and Interests 
As highlighted above, the structural essence of ideas encompasses three aspects: 
principled beliefs, causal beliefs, and worldviews. While principled beliefs provide actors 
with criteria to define what is right and what is wrong or with justifications of particular 
decisions, causal beliefs supply individuals with tools to understand the consequences of 
each action and the strategies for achieving goals. Worldviews, in contrast, provide 
common principles for all the recognised elites and, in this sense, they have the greatest 
impact on the social realm.821  
Even though economic ideas and theories usually comprise all those three 
elements, this thesis has assumed as ‘worldview’ the idea that antitrust, or competition, 
aims at maximising efficiency and welfare. In this sense, only changes in principled and 
the causal beliefs have played a role in producing or preserving institutional change. 
  For instance, throughout the history of antitrust policy, the Harvard, Chicago, 
and Post-Chicago schools have all struck a different balance between economic 
efficiency and welfare and have accordingly produced different interpretations of 
economic interests and causality, not only in the US, but internationally. This process has 
been implemented through the institutionalisation of their vision into corresponding 
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policies and regulations. Therefore, the worldview shared by the two main antitrust 
schools of thought was that the maintenance of competition was good for fostering 
efficient economic performance and welfare. However, the principled beliefs of the 
Harvard school emphasised that it was necessary for the state to intervene in the market 
in order to find a balance between the efficient gains of the few and the welfare of the 
many. By contrast, according to the Chicago School, the state did not have to play a 
strong role in directing competition because market-based rivalry mechanisms were 
efficient per se.  
Accordingly, the causal beliefs supported by Harvard underlined that competition 
was not perfect; hence, the state had to control the market more strictly. On the 
contrary, Chicago believed that free market was perfectly autonomous and that, in the 
case of inefficiencies, competition would readjust by itself. 
As in the case of the Harvard and Chicago schools, these ideas have influenced 
the real world not just in virtue of their existence, but because they have inspired 
regulators into promoting institutions that would overcome specific problems or 
otherwise help society to reach specific interests. In this sense, Goldstein and Keohane 
distanced their analysis from rationalist and reflectivist positions. On the one hand, even 
though interests exist per se, their interpretation and understanding are performed 
through what the authors define as ‘social psychological models’. Here, ideas play a 
central role because they determine the mechanism of such models. On the other hand, 
in contrast to the reflectivists, these scholars argue that interests are not an outcome of 
psychological models and they are not determined by their language, culture or history, 
but they are perceived and acknowledged through them. Therefore, even though the 
interests at the basis of antitrust were still efficiency and welfare, the way states 
interpreted those interests varied with each country and with each historical period. In 
the words of Garret and Weingast:  
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More generally, the force of ideas is neither random nor independent. 
Only certain ideas have properties that may lead to their selection by 
political actors and to their institutionalisation and perpetuation. It is not 
something intrinsic to ideas that give them their power, but their utility in 
helping actors achieve their desired ends under prevailing constraints. 
Given the complexity and uncertainty of most political economic 
interactions, appropriate ideas may serve as pivotal mechanisms for 
coordinating expectations and behaviour.822 
 
In this sense, without the presence of specific actors, not only would the 
institutionalisation of Harvard and Chicago simple not take place, but the interests at the 
basis of their institutionalisation would be immaterial. Douglas North defines those who 
make decisions as the ‘relevant actors’ of organisations. In my research, these are 
identified as the members of the FTC and the DOJ as well as the American presidents in 
the case of the US, the European Commission in the case of Europe, and the executive 
governments in the case of Japan and West Germany. 
As Goldstein and Keohane argue, once institutionalised, the principled and 
casual beliefs behind an idea provide a sort of ‘map’ that allows individuals to solve 
problems and pursue interests. However, they also provide a pair of lenses through 
which actors increase their understanding of the goals they want to achieve in reality. 
Indeed, ‘how a problem is defined, determine the nature of the solution’.823 
Thus, while the worldview embodied in the antitrust ideas presented above 
reflected economic efficiency and welfare, the institutions inspired by those ideas were 
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different because the theorisation of the principled and casual believes of those principles 
was different. For instance, the 1950 amendment of section 7 of the Clayton Act's 
merger provision, which extended the application of merger controls over cases of 
market dominance, was a transposition of Harvard ideas into a formal institution, which 
was made to reach a specific national interest, i.e. the control of mergers and the 
achievement of greater welfare. However, the Merger Modernisation Act of 1986, which 
amended section 7 of the Clayton Act, was an expression of Chicago-oriented principled 
and casual beliefs and was made to foster free markets and efficiency by liberalising 
mergers. Hence, it is possible to argue that ideas not only provide different paths through 
which specific interests are acquired, but also contribute to generate several 
understandings of social needs. 
 
Why were US Antitrust Ideas Stronger? Challenging Hegemonic Conceptions 
While path-dependency can explain why antitrust takes on different characteristics 
according to the country and the period taken into consideration, it does not explain its 
international diffusion. In other words, neither does it highlights the way antitrust 
policies in Europe and Japan have been shaped by prior political choices made in the US, 
nor does it explain why it was the US to influence Europe and Japan rather than the 
other way around.824 Indeed, even though some European theories had a moderate 
impact on the development of US antitrust policy – for instance, both Hayek and the 
Chicago School were demonstrably inspired by many German Ordoliberal principles – 
the US antitrust tradition was too deep-rooted to countenance any European or Japanese 
influence.  
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Therefore, the success of US antitrust ideas, and of its general capitalistic model, 
in the international arena, and specifically across Europe and Japan, can be interpreted as 
a manifestation of the greater power exerted by the US through it material resources. 
Through the international economic institutions created after World War II, American 
government ‘has used a combination of carrots (political and military support, as well as 
preferential access to US markets) and sticks (from strings attached to financial assistance 
to threats of military coercion) to impose its vision for political and economic liberalism 
on the rest of the world’. 825 In other words, coercion may be considered the most 
effective explanation for the spread of antitrust. This is because stronger countries can 
directly influence other nations’ policy-making process through a mix of grants and 
constraints or by mediating their intervention with the use of the international 
organisations created or led by themselves. Whether direct or mediated, coercion 
implicates that a stronger country may threat to use force or directly intervene in another 
nation in order to obtain the enforcement of specific policies.826  
This type of coerced policy diffusion can also be conducted through a softer 
form of power. Following a Gramscian theoretical line, it is possible to maintain that 
dominant actors can influence other countries ‘through ideational channels without 
exerting physical power or materially altering costs or benefits’.827 In this vein, scholars, 
such as Gill and Cox, in their review of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, have created a 
separate ‘island’ of IPE theories by interpreting market and economic dynamics as a 
reflection of hegemonic power. According to this approach, global politics and decision-
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making processes take place in the context of a world order, which is built upon a strong 
production system and oriented by precise ideologies.828 
Cox argues that the world order is supported by a hegemonic liberal economic 
discourse that allows the free movement of goods, money, and investments across 
borders. After the oil crises of the 1970s, this order was based upon neo-liberal reforms 
that, by promoting open markets, free trade, and deregulation policies, disproportionally 
favoured the US because of the predominance of American multinationals and banks in 
the global economy.829 Following Cox and Gill, it may be possible to apply a Neo-
Gramscian interpretation to the study of the international institutionalisation of antitrust 
ideas. Indeed, it may be possible to demonstrate that the imposition of specific 
understandings of antitrust on Europe and Japan on the part of the US was a result of 
the hegemonic power of the latter. In other words, US ideas proved stronger than others 
because American governments used its superior material resources to build a hegemonic 
regime that helped to spread its ideology to the rest of the world.830  
 However, the limits of Neo-Gramscian IPE lie in the difficulties of unravelling 
the dynamics behind policy-making decision processes. While this approach helps to 
better comprehend how the mechanisms of specific social relations of production reflect 
distinct perspectives on the world, it does not allow for a cultural interpretation of 
power. Indeed, power, even if dependent on the material economic structure, as it is in 
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every capitalist society, is also determined by cultural and social beliefs.831 In other words, 
the concept of hegemony is useful to understand the relation between ideas and material 
power, but it is not relevant for the purposes of this analysis. That is because it does not 
provide any helpful instruments for appreciating the influence exerted by ideas and 
culture per se in promoting the institutionalisation of specific antitrust conceptualisations 
in relation to precise interests. 
As pointed out in the historical analysis of the crises, the material power exerted 
by the US was not the only cause of the international process of antitrust 
institutionalisation. Economic, financial, and military power was also relevant in 
explaining part of the institutionalisation process, but whether Europe and Japan 
followed the US model depended also on other reasons.  
In this sense, the triumph of US ideas cannot be linked only to material 
conditions or power dynamics. Antitrust institutions were invented in the US and only 
then exported abroad. Hence, the seeds of antitrust implanted in Europe and Japan had 
de facto US origins. This has generated a path-dependent process whereby the consequent 
institutionalisation of antitrust followed US-based discourses because of normative and 
mimetic reasons. The US was able to maintain primacy over the regulation of 
competition because, being the first to institute a specific antitrust discourse, it made sure 
that the international development of antitrust institutions would be in line with general 
American market conceptions. 
In conclusion, my study has shown that this process is better understood as an 
example of institutional policy diffusion explained by the sociological school of 
institutions, especially by the studies of DiMaggio and Powell. The isomorphism model 
they developed, in particular, is especially helpful to explain the link between the role of 
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ideas and the economic interests and contingent necessities of each country, as well as to 
explain the institutionalisation of specific US-based approaches in terms of to a double 
genesis: a formal international one and a national one.  
 
RIVALRY, EMULATION AND LEARNING IN THE DIFFUSION OF IDEAS AND THE 
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF COMPETITION POLICIES 
 
As underlined above, the international antitrust liberalisation process started in the 1930s 
can be defined in terms of a combination of institutional changes at a national and 
international level. In fact, the role of policy diffusion and institutional evolution have 
been crucial in determining the objectives of antitrust regulations and the way some 
governments have directly or indirectly influenced the choices of others. As previously 
mentioned, power and coercion cannot be considered the sole causes of the 
isomorphism process that has shaped the institutional change trends in Europe, Japan 
and the rest of the world. Among the different mechanisms that have contributed to a 
sort of institutional convergence of antitrust policy, economic rivalry rates as one of the 
most significant.  
Unlike coercion, competition does not require vertical hierarchical relations for 
policy diffusion to occur; on the contrary, at the basis of this specific isomorphic 
phenomenon are horizontal relationships. Indeed, in a competitive environment, actors 
tend to modify their institutional framework not because their economic rivals force 
them to, but because the latter are acting in what is perceived to be a more efficient 
manner. Moreover, in stark contrast to the coercive mechanism of policy diffusion, 
competition-based isomorphism can be considered a more de-centralised mechanism, in 
that it is based on the allure of certain policies and on the efforts on the part of the state 
to develop revenue-raising strategies. Indeed, it is self-evident that actors wishing to 
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invest in the global market place tend to prefer a political system where their interests 
can be maximised. This favourable environment is often created, for instance, by 
enforcing less binding regulatory requirements or lower tax burdens. Hence, in order to 
receive the best investments, governments compete with each other by elaborating 
strategic plans to make their markets more attractive. This form of competitive 
isomorphism can partially explain, for instance, the diffusion of neo-liberalism in the 
early 1990s in Europe.  
Competitive isomorphism was undoubtedly a positive force for the promotion of 
efficient policy tools. Yet, at the same time, it also produced radical negative effects over 
the general welfare by favouring a sort of ‘race to the bottom’ of social spending as well 
as environmental and labour regulations. Apart for the disputable negative consequences 
of neo-liberal antitrust reforms, what it is relevant here is the understanding of why and 
how competitive isomorphism has pushed the European Union to accept specific 
interpretations of antitrust or, more generally, why certain conceptions of efficiency have 
driven the Commission to adopt particular neo-liberal antitrust policies and to modify its 
traditional institutional assets. Indeed, during the 1950s, the EC economic policy was 
based both on extensive market regulations and on large public economies. This was 
extremely useful for achieving economic stability, pursuing social objectives, such as the 
redistribution of wealth and risk, and reconstructing the European economies. 
Competitive isomorphism, then, might have pushed Europe to change its policy 
as the US, under the Reagan Administration, began to heavily liberalise market 
transactions in order to face the negative consequences of the oil crises and the 
extremely high productivity rates of Europe and Japan.  
In this case, competitive isomorphism worked because, in the short-to-medium 
term, European countries believed that neo-liberal institutions could foster the flow of 
international production and capital. Moreover, policy diffusion is also normally expected 
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to grow when two economic competitors are under the persuasion that one of them has 
applied the right policy instrument to satisfactorily influence market trends in its favour. 
This can explain the radical European turn towards neo-liberalism. In other words, the 
adoption of neo-liberal antitrust provisions by Europe was led by the fact that its major 
competitor, the US, was perceived as able of providing its companies with better 
institutional instruments to be competitive in the international market. Thus, the need to 
be a competitive actor in international trade transactions, and thus to attract foreign 
investors, was translated into the institutionalisation of efficiency-oriented antitrust ideas, 
as those articulated by the Chicago School.  
However, as governments lack complete market information, the idea of 
efficiency cannot be adjusted to the precise calculations that states are expected to 
provide. To be sure, it is impossible for states to accurately predict the effects that 
particular policy changes in other countries will have on the global market and, 
consequently, on their own national economies. Moreover, while seeking to penetrate 
foreign markets, countries have to adopt entry modes, such as joint ventures or 
acquisitions, that require political and cultural knowledge of their competitors.832 
Hence, what drives states, and in this case Europe, to change their policy is the 
idea that an institutional reform will improve their economic outlook the way it did to 
their competitors. In other words, since the assumption of a perfectly rational system, as 
described by Hannan and Freeman, is not applicable to reality, the competitive process 
can only partially explain the process of institutional change.833  
A full picture can only be obtained by widening the spectrum of interpretation of 
reality to other approaches as well as by considering other isomorphic processes, such as 
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the mimetic one. The desire of mimesis pushes states or organisations that face similar 
issues to imitate each other. Proceeding from this assumption, since the late 1970s, many 
scholars have studied the process of emulation among organisations from different 
perspectives and this has eventually become ‘an established paradigm in international 
relations research in the late 1990s’.834  
Accordingly, social changes can be understood only by analysing the social 
context of reference. Indeed, the significance of every social fact or action is nothing 
more than the empirically traceable result of a social context of reference.835 In this sense, 
human interactions are not simply built upon material factors. Rather, they are shaped by 
widely accepted inter-subjective beliefs, which determine the desired and necessary 
interests of ‘purposive actors’.836 Following this approach, the historical pursuit of 
efficient or welfare-oriented competition policies by Europe and Japan can be 
understood also through the analysis of their local ideas and culture. In this respect, 
changing traditional or local ideological frameworks is tantamount to changing the social 
meaning attributed to efficiency and welfare; this, in turn, causes specific political 
choices.  
Indeed, sociological research suggest that these modifications can occur through 
a mimetic process and that countries tend to adopt certain programmes not only because 
they believe these are going to ameliorate their conditions but also because they simply 
emulate the conduct of their ‘self-identified peers, even when they cannot ascertain that 
                                                        
834
 Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garret, ‘Introduction: The International Diffusion of 
Liberalism’, autumn 2006, 4 International Organization 60, 781-810, 800. 
835
 Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garret, ‘Introduction: The International Diffusion of 
Liberalism’, autumn 2006, 4 International Organization 60, 781-810, 790-796. Max Weber, Economy 
and Society, 1978, Two Volumes, Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 4. See: John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan, National Development and the World 
System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950–1970, 1979, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
836
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics’, 2001, 4 Annual Review of Political Science 1, 391–
416, 391. 
301 
 
doing so will in fact be in their best interests’.837 In other words, the process of emulation 
implicates a converge of perceptions and the creation of patterns of behaviour that are 
considered acceptable because modelled upon the examples provided by peer-based 
reference groups or, as Halligan defined them, ‘elite networks’.838  
While these arguments were originally used to investigate mimesis among social 
communities, they can be applied also to the state as a particular type of organisation. In 
this respect, countries are seen as influencing others not only through the use of power, 
but also by sharing ideas through, for instance, diplomatic interactions or international 
events.  
This may help to explain why North American antitrust ideas had a great impact 
on European competition policies while, at the same time, being filtered through the 
preferences of national leaders. In the case of Europe, for instance, commissioners were 
sent to train in the United States in order to understand American antitrust policy. 
Therefore, while Europe was indeed at the receiving end of Harvard, and then Chicago, 
ideas, their influence was always filtered through the local, European understanding of 
efficiency and welfare.  
However, while analysing this process of mimesis it is necessary to consider that 
states also learn from one another. Here, the process of learning ‘refers to a change in 
beliefs or change in one’s confidence in existing beliefs, which can result from exposure 
to new evidence, theories, or behavioural repertoires’.839  
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Some researchers distinguish a simple learning process, whereby new strategic 
information prompts a change in the means, but not the ends, of behaviour, from a more 
complex learning process, which modifies not only the general beliefs but also the 
perception of the ends. 840  In other words, political actors can learn either to better 
understand the same target or to change target altogether. For instance, the emergence of 
Harvard School theories and their influence on European and Japanese competition 
policies changed their perception of welfare and efficiency and offered new means to 
achieve them.  
By contrast, the normative isomorphism process works neither through coercion 
or rivalry nor through an emulative mechanism. It exists because the spreading of new 
information, generated by a social group or a state, allows an alteration of the general 
beliefs held by actors in the international arena.841 At first, changes are caused by the 
diffusion of some specific knowledge among political elites, epistemic communities, or 
issue networks, which, at bottom, share a similar understanding of reality. 842 This 
process can be defined as ‘the sum of technical information and of theories about that 
information, which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested 
actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal.’843  
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Subsequently, this sharing process is also pushed by a dynamics of path-dependency, 
which allows change to proceed along a similar path.844 However, the fact that this social 
learning process is real does not mean that its effects are always efficient.845 This was true 
during the crises of the 1980s, but it is also manifest nowadays, in the aftermath of the 
credit crunch, when the US, Europe and Japan are paying the costs of hazardous neo-
liberal policies. This, again, is due to the fact that actors lack complete information and 
political decisions are taken for very different reasons. These reasons include coercion, as 
in Japan and Germany after World War II, competition, as in Europe after the oil crises, 
or the desire to emulate or learn.  
I believe that none of the above-mentioned isomorphic mechanisms can be 
singled out as the only explanation for the process of antitrust institutional modification 
that occurred in Europe and Japan and in the international arena. The process was 
caused by a combination of all those isomorphic mechanisms. Moreover, since the US 
was the first country to enforce antitrust, and then promote it as a ‘worldview’, Europe, 
Japan and the international arena, by default, looked to the United States for inspiration 
every time an antitrust institution failed to perform. This happened more frequently 
during economic and financial crises, as the new market necessities were more visible in 
times of downturns. 
In conclusion, the process was of international antitrust institutionalisation was 
primarily vertical, in that it was imposed by the US with the use of its military, economic, 
and financial power. It was also horizontal, as corporations pushed for antitrust 
institutional changes that would help their investment opportunities. At the same time, 
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though, the process was also ontological and epistemological. Indeed, on the one hand, it 
was linked to the perception of legitimacy acquired by the US, which allowed it to lead 
the international arena antitrust changes. On the other hand, it was also based on the 
superior expertise of the US, which was sought out by other countries in order to 
overcome their own economic issues. 
It is easy to see how those four phenomena are part of a unique process whereby 
ideas influence reality and interests push for the codifications of ideas. These forces are 
mutually reinforcing.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The power of ideas seems to be stronger than any other. Ideas are a flexible tool able to 
influence the social realm by shaping the perception of social interests. At a national 
level, ideas are the lenses through which reality is understood while their corresponding 
institutions are formed in response to specific necessities.  
The power of US antitrust ideas was so strong that, so far, American antitrust 
schools and institutions have been the only ones to ever be exported or adopted abroad. 
While the majority of IR and IP scholar would define this process as a hegemonic one, 
this thesis, because it starts its analysis from a different perspective, does not deny that 
material power has been fundamental in contributing to the diffusion of specific ideas 
but it also emphasises that, ideas and interests can exert power per se. Indeed, apart from 
the institutions that were coercively imposed on Europe, Japan and at a global level, it 
needs to be recognised that other elements have equally contributed to the 
internationalisation process of American antitrust theories. Competitive motivations, 
mimetic interests, and normative reasons also supported those specific antitrust 
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discourses, which contributed to the creation of globalised antitrust models in a 
globalising economy.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The major premise of this thesis has been that antitrust, both in national and 
international contexts can only be fully understood as an element in the institutional 
evolution of competition policies and regulations.  A pan-institutional approach adopted 
here has shown that antitrust policies are not only the result of practical political-juridical 
or economic answers to specific issues, but embody the institutionalisation of ideological 
framework into reality.  
In this context, pan-institutionalism appears to be a fundamental tool of analysis. 
Indeed, political institutionalism normally applies a normative understanding of reality 
and it uses universal rules to explain social events. For instance, political rational 
institutionalists define reality as a process of interests’ achievement by rational actors and 
they refuse the possibility that human rationality might lead to inefficient outcomes. 
Historical institutionalists instead, by applying the concept of path dependency, 
understand social realm as a chain in which every event is caused by previous one. While 
it is undeniable that reality is conditioned by path dependency - since historical facts 
influence human understanding of the realm itself- still the historical approach deprives 
social actors of any possibility to change the environment according to their interests. 
Hence, while the merit of political institutionalism is to appreciate the role of path 
dependency in constructing reality, it provides a universalistic approach that can hardly 
explain the complexity characterising social and economic trends.  
On the contrary, the limit of the different sociological institutional studies lays in 
their cognitive interpretation of reality. In this vein, the realm becomes a social 
construction, a product of human intellect, whereby contingent and material interests do 
not play any role. Scholars of such sociological acquaintance conceive any human need as 
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a product of human mind. At different levels, this approach appears to be too much 
ontological and vey hardly demonstrable. Nevertheless, the sociological understanding of 
the role of ideas in shaping and influencing reality is very much important to explain the 
process of both internalisation and internationalisation of institutions through the 
concept of isomorphic policy diffusion. 
Differently from the previous approaches, economic institutionalists and in 
particular Douglass North, generally apply a much more regulatory approach. Economic 
institutionalism does not try to fix universal rule to understand reality, but it firstly 
analyses events and then extracts workable rules to comprehend human behaviours. 
According to Douglass North, institutions are a set of formal or informal constraints that 
are created by individuals and adapted to their interests. Indeed, even if human beings act 
rationally, their actions cannot always be efficient as reality is much more complex than 
economic models. Hence, the lack of perfect conditions and full information favour the 
evolution of institutions. 
Starting from Douglass North’s theoretical constructions, pan-institutionalism 
takes into account the contributions developed by the socio-political institutional 
approaches and it provides a much more complete understanding of institutional 
evolution.  Indeed, while individuals act rationally to pursue their objectives, their 
rationality is shaped by the social context and by the ideas, culture and traditions that 
through different isomorphic process influence it. In this vein, the necessity to pursue 
specific needs pushes actors to think the best way to achieve them. However, the process 
of thinking and understanding reality is influenced or shaped by the shared ideological 
framework of each society. 
Therefore, a pan-institutional approach has the merit to allow the understanding 
of reality through a much more flexible approach that is neither too ontological, neither 
too rational. It takes into consideration the role of ideas and interests in influencing 
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social realm and it harmonises the dichotomies developed by the three different 
institutional approaches.  
In this vein, a pan-institutional understanding of institutionalisation allows to 
better analyse the evolution of competition policies and regulations. This is particularly 
relevant because there are no such studies of antitrust from an international political 
economic approach. Normally antitrust is analysed according to economic and juridical 
points or view as the set of regulations and policies enforced by governments to foster 
market competitiveness. Indeed, the desirability of competitiveness lies in its capacity to 
efficiently increase profit and the general wellbeing, as long as its market conditions are 
respected.  
Since the implementation of the Sherman Act in 1890, there has been much 
academic interest in the study of competition and of alternative ways of regulating the 
market. If, on the one hand, pure laissez faire can result in the development of monopolies 
and cartels that may negatively affect the market, on the other hand, strict state control 
can stifle meritocracy and personal initiative by reducing profits and, along with it, 
general welfare. 
In this respect, the need to foster, but also to control, market competition has 
long been considered a fundamental condition for economic growth and welfare and it 
has always inspired scholars in their study of  antitrust. However, while it was generally 
accepted that the significance of  competition was the maximisation of  economic 
efficiency and/or the promotion of  general welfare, the principled and causal beliefs 
embedded in the various theoretical schools developed over the course of  history 
changed the perception on how those two goals were to be pursued. For instance, the 
Harvard School promoted institutions to block the rise of  mergers and thereby control 
competition and support a fairer distribution of  welfare. The Chicago School, in 
contrast, favoured personal initiative and economic freedom over state interventionism, 
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and it indirectly fostered practices to that effect. 
 The evolution of  different theoretical frameworks sharing the same values and 
worldviews proceeded in line with the development of  the general economic principles 
underpinning each country’s model of  capitalism. Thus, when antitrust policies were led 
by Harvard principles, and general economic policies were inspired by Keynesian and 
Fordist ideas, the common idea was that the state should intervene in the market. 
Similarly, after the oil crises, the Chicago School and the Mont Pelerin Society 
respectively shaped antitrust policies and economic regulations in support of  the same 
neo-liberal principles.  
At the same time, US antitrust ideas, acquired and applied by Europe and Japan, 
were filtered through local European and Japanese perception of  competition. Thus, in 
Europe, American antitrust conceptualisations were understood from an Ordoliberal 
angle, while, in Japan, the Confucian tradition provided yet another set of  interpretative 
lenses through which Western antitrust principles came to be perceived and enforced. In 
this sense, it is not possible to speak of  a process of  complete antitrust harmonisation, 
because each country has interpreted market competition through unique ideological and 
cultural lenses. However, this does not mean that antitrust influence did not occur. 
  Up until the beginning of  the latest financial crisis, in 2007, international 
cooperation in antitrust policy had progressively increased. Governments had to face the 
challenge of  adapting their national regulations to the exigencies of  the international 
arena and of  the global markets. This fostered the implementation of  isomorphic 
processes in the form of  bilateral and multilateral negotiations. 
Since the 1930s, the US has been the leading model in this process of  
convergence. The negative consequences of  the Great Depression and World War II 
were partly overcome by applying Harvard-oriented antitrust policies, which allowed 
Arnold to take on international cartels and harmonise the antitrust policy with the 
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general Keynesian political economy adopted by President Roosevelt. Harvard School 
antitrust ideas were based on the realisation that competition is not perfect per se and that 
oligopolistic or monopolistic dynamics are the most common market conditions. 
Because of  the impossibility of  perfect competition, these scholars called for states to 
intervene in the economy through appropriate regulations in order to promote a 
workable competition. This was deemed the only way to simultaneously allow firms to 
efficiently compete against each other and society to enjoy a better distribution of  
welfare. 
After the end of  World War II, those antitrust ideas, alongside the Keynesian and 
Fordist economic models, started to be applied internationally with the help of  
international organisations. At the time, the US was the only country to have the 
economic, military, financial, and knowledge resources to re-stabilise the international 
arena, create a valuable international market for its corporations, and overcome the 
negative fallout of  the Great Depression.846 In order to promote economic 
reconstruction in Europe and Japan and to create a strong barrier to the Soviet sphere of  
influence, the US was driven to coercively influence antitrust regulations in both Europe 
and Japan. While this process was encouraged by the economic and military power the 
US could still exert at the time, it was also partially fostered, especially in the case of  
Europe, by the need to find an alternative economic model and win back international 
competitiveness. In this sense, although the isomorphic mechanism was mainly coercive, 
it was also characterised by elements of  mimesis and competition. This is apparent in the 
adoption of  the first European competition regulation, inspired by Professor Bowie as a 
mediation of  Ordoliberal principles. At the same time, however, the Allies also coerced 
Germany and Japan to adopt Anti-monopoly laws that would strongly control the use 
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and abuse of  cartels. 
 Harvard-oriented doctrines were at their zenith under Nixon, Ford, and Carter, 
but they were then replaced by Chicago School ideas when the outbreak of  the two oil 
crises of  the 1970s called for new solutions for new economic necessities. Indeed, during 
the 1970s, the US had to face not only the oil crises, but also the military costs caused by 
the conflict in Vietnam and the increasing political instability in Iran. Harvard-oriented 
policies against mergers and business freedoms started to lose ground, since the crises 
and the economic competition exerted by the rest of  the world were considered a sort of  
wake-up call to liberalise the market in order to guarantee better conditions to American 
corporations and to improve their investment opportunities. As a result, Harvard School 
policies were gradually abandoned over the course of  the Carter Administration. 
President Reagan was the first one to openly adopt a pure Chicago School antitrust 
policy, in line with the economic neo-liberal prescriptions enforced in the US internal 
market. Under his administration, the general process of  economic liberalisation and 
deregulation began to be converted into competition policy reforms and antitrust 
institutional changes.  
 This competition approach was inspired by the ideas of  economists who 
strongly believed in the positive effects and long-term efficiency of  the free market. 
Chicago ideas rejected the need to intervene in competition regulations. Rather, they 
looked at any form of  antitrust regulation as a restriction of  market possibilities.847 The 
Chicago antitrust revolution took place without significantly challenging the body of  
competition regulation itself  but, by suggesting an alternative interpretation of  previous 
regulations and practices, it completely modified the orientation of  US antitrust policy.848 
                                                        
847
 Oliver Budzinsky,‘Monoculture versus Diversity in  Competition Economics’, February 2007, 
Diskussionsbeitrag aus dem  Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften Universität Duisburg-Essen 
Campus Essen, Nr. 158 (http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32122/1/541747029.pdf) 
848
 Eleanor M. Fox and Lawrence A. Sullivan, ‘Antitrust – Retrospective and Prospective’, 1987, 62 
New York University Law Review, 936-968. William E. Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust Policy: A 
312 
 
As soon as Europe and Japan felt the negative economic repercussions of  the 
crisis, they began to look for new alternatives to the already ineffective American liberal 
model. Although the strategies implemented by Japan and many European countries 
were not fully protectionist, they still provided support for local enterprises through state 
aid and national grants. For this reason, after re-stabilising the US domestic economy 
through the institutionalisation of  the Chicago approach, Reagan sought to develop 
strategies to fight the international rise of  unfair and anticompetitive practices and to 
recreate an international environment that would once again favour American business 
interests. At the same time, Europe and Japan were still on the lookout for new models 
to overcome the crisis. 
The implementation of  neo-liberal institutions occurred through coercive 
mimetic normative and competitive isomorphism processes. Internationally, the neo-
liberal vision was sponsored through the WTO rounds, specifically through the fight 
against non-trade barriers. Also, the creation of  an international environment where it 
was possible to share ideas on market regulation facilitated the adoption of  the same 
policy language and precipitated an international process of  conversion towards neo-
liberalism.   
In Europe, a softer version of  the US neo-liberal model was applied through 
mimetic, normative and competitive isomorphic mechanisms. The search for new 
solutions to the crisis pushed the Commission, which was already familiar with the 
language of  the US antitrust discourse, directly towards Reagan. Additionally, the need to 
face competition from both sides of  the world resulted in the promotion of  competitive 
isomorphism: Europe did not wish to remain the backwater of  the international 
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economy and the US model seemed the only feasible way to win back competitiveness.  
This time the process of  conversion was not coerced by the US, as it did not 
have enough legitimacy or power to directly intervene in Europe. However, it was still in 
the interests of  the US to push Europe further into neo-liberalism, as the collapse of  the 
Soviet Bloc created the geo-political conditions for a European enlargement towards the 
East. This part of  the world was now left wide open to Western investment 
opportunities and political influence. It is in this context that Europe, under 
Commissioner Mario Monti, started its long journey towards a neo-liberal market 
economy and neo-liberal antitrust regulations. 
In the case of  Japan, the SII was initially demanded by the US, but later 
implemented through a process of  mimetic and normative isomorphism. Indeed, on 
creating the first antitrust law in Japan, the Anti-Monopoly Act, the US had also 
established its own antitrust discourse within the country. This allowed Tokyo to 
understand more easily the antitrust ideas implemented by the US. Moreover, in its 
pursuit of  international competitiveness, Japan started to look at the US as a positive 
antitrust model. In other words, a version of  neo-liberalism was implemented in Japan 
through a coercive bilateral cooperation agreement, whereby Tokyo was compelled to 
shift to a more neo-liberal interpretation of  antitrust policy in order to remain 
internationally competitive. 
Since the neo-liberal path established during the Regan presidency were hard to 
challenge, the Chicago approach lasted through to the Bush Administration. The Bush 
presidential doctrine was characterised by the creation of  a new international order based 
on democracy and free market and the key to the interpretation of  all of  his political 
actions and decisions centred on the notion of  economic freedom. However, this bold 
laissez-faire system resulted in the credit crunch of  2007 and the beginning of  a new 
recession.  
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Currently, the approach adopted by Obama is a sort of  mixture between a 
Harvard and a Chicago approach, which most scholars identify as a Post-Chicago School. 
This refers to a liberal system that introduces more freedom in business activities 
together with more central control by judges and the state. Excessive Chicago optimism 
in the free market might have motivated the reintroduction of  more Harvard-oriented 
policies, which, on their own, would however risk producing anticompetitive effects on 
the market. By contrast, a Post-Chicago approach has the advantage of  preserving the 
goal of  allocative efficiency while implementing some control over the distribution of  
general social welfare. In this sense, it appears to be a middle ground between the two 
contrasting approaches in that it links ‘the antipodes by a common methodological 
framework: the game-theoretic oligopoly theory’.849 This will possibly and hopefully 
allow the US to overcome the downturn alongside the rest of  the world.  
In the end, it can be argued that the worldviews, the principled beliefs and the 
casual beliefs embodied in the different conceptualisations of  antitrust have been 
essential tools to progressively adjust the international perception of  competition to best 
suit American interests over time. By sharing the principles embedded in the above-
mentioned different schools of  thought, the US has been able to project internationally 
its own ideological frameworks in the form of  worldviews, which have been reshaped 
and adapted by the rest of  the world in accordance to their own model of  capitalism. 
Thus, while the global perception of  competition was one of  fostering efficiency and 
welfare, the principled and casual beliefs that went with it varied with the economic 
interests and the antitrust theoretical framework of  the time.  
This process allowed the US to create a structure that would support its 
economic interests while simultaneously allowing Europe and Japan to develop their own 
                                                        
849
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markets. The fact that the US was the only country able to influence the European and 
Japanese antitrust culture, and thereby serving its one interests while doing so, has been 
fully explained. The US was the first country to develop a coherent antitrust tradition, 
whereas Europe and Japan only implemented one after World War II. Again, this process 
of  institutionalisation was not the result of  a simple act of  coercion as both Europe and 
Japan actively participated in the making of  their liberal and neo-liberal antitrust 
institutionalisation. Moreover, they had already developed forms of  domestic US-
oriented discourses through a path-dependent process of  mimetic and normative 
isomorphism that derived from the sort of  authority the US had long enjoyed on the 
conceptualisation of  antitrust policy. 
At present, it looks very unlikely that we will revert to a system where the state 
exerts more influence over the market, as corporations seems to have reached such an 
economic power to be able to overturn political decisions. It is also unclear whether the 
US can continue to be a model of  reference for the rest of  the world, since countries like 
China, India and Brazil are growing very fast and seem to hold different ideas about 
competition and capitalism. However, although the US has lost its economic, military 
and financial predominance, Europe and Japan are still likely to follow the American 
model because of  mimetic, normative and competitive reasons. 
In conclusion, the thesis aimed at demonstrating the power of  antitrust 
conceptualisations in influencing policy-making from a pan-institutional point of  view. 
Specifically, it attempted to analyse how particular ideas, in the form of  beliefs and 
academic theories, have been transformed into institutions that reflected specific 
purposes. In the wake of  each one of  the economic crises discussed, the US was 
consistently found in need of  a new policy model to overcome the economic recession. 
By revealing new economic needs, the crises proved to spell more than just economic 
disaster; they also served as bellwethers of  the failure of  knowledge models to fulfil new 
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social and economic interests. Each economic decline produced national institutions in 
the form of  laws and general policies that reflected particular economic ideas, principles 
and necessities. Those ideas were then projected at an international level, assimilated and 
institutionalised by other countries into appropriate agreements and rules through 
processes of  isomorphism. 
In this sense, it can be concluded that the power of  ideas has enabled the US not 
only to overcome its own economic downturns, but also to create and export ideological 
frameworks that, once adopted abroad, fostered a common international understanding 
of  antitrust in accordance with US interests. 
In summary, this thesis made two claims. First, institutional analysis, by allowing 
a balanced investigation of the role of both ideas and interests, is especially helpful to 
better understand the evolution of antitrust institutions in the context of the varieties of 
capitalism. Secondly, while material resources are important to explain some of the 
isomorphic dynamics, it is not possible to single out coercion, or the US use of power, as 
the only explanatory criterion. Indeed, since individuals seek their self-interests, the 
implementation of specific antitrust ideas has been caused by the need to reach specific 
objectives. At the same time, by applying particular theoretical conceptions, actors have 
modified their way of perceiving reality and material needs. This is what I define ‘the 
power of ideas’.  
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